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Belgian franc 
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French franc 
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European currency unit 
US dollar 
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Other abbreviations, etc. 
BIS 
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Eurostat 
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GDP (GNP) 
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SOEC 
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( ) 
s.a. 
0 
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Bank for International Settlements 
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European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
European Investment Bank 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
European Monetary Fund 
European Monetary System 
European System of Integrated Economic Accounts 
European Atomic Energy Community 
Statistical Office of the European Communities 
Free on board (valuation basis for exports or imports of goods) 
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Gross domestic (national) product 
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International Monetary Fund 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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Estimate 
Data not available 
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Not applicable 
Average 
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Business investment and the tax and financial environment 1 
Introduction . 
Since June 1982, the Commission has sent three communi-
cations to the Council , dealing respectively with the problem 
of investment, initiatives for promoting investment, tax and 
!inancial measures in favour of investment.2 
These matters were brought to the attention of the European 
Council when it met in June and December of last year. 
The subject of investment had already been highlighted in the 
Commission's proposal in the foreword to the !ifth medium-
term economic policy programme for an increase in the level 
of inves tment to ensure competitiveness, growth and , in the 
!inal analysis, employment, as one of the elements of a 
European strategy to end the crisis. 
In more general terms, the communications are a response to 
the requirement for joint in-depth consideration of certain 
ques tions connected with what could be briefly termed 
'supply policy' or 'adjustment policy', and for strengthening 
the links between national and Community structural 
measures. 
The communication of June 1982 analysed the macro-
economic factors affecting investment (growth ; the vari-
ability of inflation, interest rates and exchange rates ; public 
de!icits, etc.), and identi!ied possible support measures at 
na tional level (the restructuring of public budgets in favour 
of productive expenditure; the rationalization and improve-
ment of public intervention in the form of regulations, tax 
measures a nd !inancial measures applying to !irms) and at 
Community level (strengthening the internal market ; 
support and control in speci!ic areas including R&D, 
innova tion, informa tion technology ; reinforcing Com-
munity lending instruments - this was the occasion for 
announcing the proposal to renew the N CI). 
The communica tion of October 1982 went into further deta il 
on : 
(i) national structu ra l action in the common interest, with 
the accent on three types of measure : improvement of 
self-!inancing and channelling of savings into product-
ive investment ; improving exi sting aid arrangements; 
increasing public expenditure in support of develop-
ment ; 
(ii) ommunity structura l action. 
Written hy l. Ventura of the Din.-c to ra tc-Gcncra l for Economic and 
Financia l AfTairs. 
C'Ol\ l(S~):165 of June 1982. C'OM(82)64 I of October 1982 (sec European 
Enmomr o 1-1). and C'OM (83)2 18 of April 1983 (sec this issue of 
Eurnp,·,m Economy ). 
On the basis of a comparison of expenditure in Member 
States, the communication of April 1983 identified useful 
measures and steps that could improve the tax and !inancial 
environment of firms , leading to more resources f.or 
investment through self-finance and a larger supply of risk 
capital ; it recommended that such measures should be 
adopted or reinforced, as a function of the specific situation 
in each country. 
The following paragraphs deal in greater detail with some of 
the points raised in the April communication, and provide 
further information. 
I. Taxation and self-financing 
1.1 The tax burden on firms 
Firms' self-financing capacity is determined first and 
foremost by the relative trends of prices and production 
costs ; however, the burden of taxes is not irrelevant. 
lnformation on this subject will be found in Table I of 
COM(83)218. 
The figures available refer to tax yields : in the absence of 
information on the extent of tax shifting, this gives no 
indication of the effective incidence. The figures relate only 
to incorporated companies (the profits of unincorporated 
businesses are included among the income of households) . 
OECD !igures (which pennit a comparison with the United 
States and Japan) show a slight increase in company taxes as 
a percentage of GNP, except in the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the United Kingdom. For the Community in 
1980 the percentage of GNP taken by company taxes ranged 
from 1,3% in Greece to 3,5% in the United Kingdom (3,5% 
and 5,0% of GNP in the USA and Japan respectively). 
The percentage share of company taxes in tax revenue 
(including social security contributions) in 1980 was 3,8% in 
Greece and 8,2% in the United Kingdom (9,6% in the U nited 
Sta tes and 17,9% in Japan) and declined slightl y in all the 
Community countries between 1970 and 1980, except in 
Greece and Italy. 
Clea rly, a comparison in rela tion to GNP does not take 
account of pro!itability, nor of the rela tive size of the 
corpora te sector, which can vary from country to country. 
Table 2 of communica tion COM(83)2 l 8 shows the changes 
between 1970 and 1979 ( 1980). in the ratio of current taxes on 
income and capital to the gross operating surplus of non-
fi nancial co rpora te and quasi-corpora te enterpri ses. 
This indica tor shows an increase in the tax burden in the 
second half of the 1970s and in particular towards the end of 
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the period (Italy: up 4,2 points; France: up I point), except 
in the United Kingdom, but there the tax burden in 1980 was 
almost 4 points higher than the 1970-74 average. 
This increase in the tax burden is before deductions for 
depreciation which represent a greater drain on operating 
surpluses in periods of changes in relative prices (energy) and 
in which technology rapidly becomes obsolescent. 
1.2 Investment incentives 
1.2.1 Any change in taxation affects decisions to invest to 
the extent that it changes the expected return on the 
investment; tax neutrality means that a change in the tax rate 
leads neither to a change in the price of capital, nor, 
therefore, to a substitution effect between production 
factors. If there is no uncertainty, the conditions for 
neutrality are: 1 
(i) the deductibility of the economic depreciation of fixed 
assets; 
(ii) the deductibility of interest costs; 
(iii) taxation of capital gains at the same rate as income; 
(iv) inflation adjustment. 
It is clearly a fairly complex matter to assess existing taxation 
systems in the light of the theoretical concept of neutrality 
and therefore each system's (positive or negative) incentive 
content; the assessment depends on assumptions concerning 
'true' economic depreciation, inflationary expectations, etc. 
As an example, we give here the result of estimates for a 
number of industrialized countries.2 Although the estimates 
agree as to signs, the differences in incentive intensity show 
how far the results depend on the methodology used. 
Effects of taxation (decrease or increase in the cost of 
capital) as a percentage of the value of fixed assets 
D F UK NL B USA Japaa 
IMF -5,5 +4,4 +5,0+13,1 +6,2 -2,2+12,8 -3,4 
IFO -18,5 +3,4 ±0 + 10,4 -17,8 
According to other estimates,3 in 1978 company taxation was 
fairly close to a situation of 'partial' neutrality (i.e. leaving 
out of account the treatment of capital gains), the difference 
being expressed in percentage points as follows (+denotes a 
more favourable effective situation): 
10 
The conditions for neutrality arc also fulfilled if there is immediate 100% 
depreciation and non-deductibility of interest payments. 
Quoted by W. Leibfritz: 'Steuerliche Investitionsanreize und -hemmnisse 
im In- und Ausland', IFO-Sc/111elldiemt 22/82. 
Source: G. Kopitz: 'Factor prices in industrial countries', /MF Staff 
Papers, September 1982. 
Effects of taxationl as a percentage of the value of 
fixed assets: difference between the 1978 situation and a 
theoretical situation in which taxation is partly neutral 
D F UK N B USA Japan 
-0,2 +1,8 +2,6 +6,6 -0,1 +0,1 + 1,5 -0,2 
These arc the effects or taxation on the required rate or return. 
1.2.2 Apart from the question of the actual incentive content 
of tax measures in relation to the conditions of neutrality 
described above, tax measures that affect the volume of 
resources available for investment can be classified into 
categories as follows: 
(i) exemption from or the reduction of certain taxes which 
are levied independently of progressive personal income 
tax (sole proprietorships) of corporate income tax, but 
which affect the scope for self-financing. Examples are: 
(a) the business tax in France (reduced in 1980 and 
1981 ; the possibility of authorizing local autho-
rities to grant exemptions from the taxes they 
collect-including the business tax-is at present 
under consideration); and the tax on industry and 
trade, in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(recently, the tax base was significantly reduced), 
(b) the net wealth tax in the Federal Republic, the 
Netherlands and Denmark ;4 
(ii) reduction in the rate of taxation. Table 3 of communi-
cation COM(83)218 of 18 April shows the corporation 
tax situation in Member States at the end of 1982. In 
general there are lower rates for small firms. In Ireland 
the rate of corporation tax was temporarily reduced to 
10% on I January 1981 for manufacturing firms. In 
France, a provision exempting new industrial firms 
from direct taxation has just been announced; 
In France, the wealth tax does not apply to business assets (assets required 
by their owner for the exercise of an industrial or commercial occupation 
as his principal activity, or interests or shares in companies if their owner·s 
principal activity is exercised within the company). 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, wealth tax (Vermiigenssteuer) gives 
rise to double taxation. The company itself must pay the wealth tax, the 
basis being 0, 7% of company assets, while the shareholders, ifliable to the 
same tax, pay a tax of0,5~<~ on their shares; wealth tax payments are not 
deductible from the base for corporation tax and the tax on industry and 
trade. 
Under budget decisions for 1984, the German Govemme·nt has proposed 
exemption from the tax up to DM 125 OOO and a further 25% reduction in 
tax values for business assets, and a reduction in the rate of the tax for 
companies to 0,6%. 
(iii) a change . in the tax base, especially through (a) 
depreciation allowances and (b) the constitution oftax-
exempt reserves: 
(a) Tax depreciation is especially important for 
investment policy,' and can be a major incentive; 
firms find them particularly attractive because, 
among other things, of their automatic nature. 
From the economic point of view, arrangements 
for depreciation are an incentive when they permit 
deductions for depreciation greater than economic 
depreciation (if the other conditions for neutrality 
are fulfilled: see point 1.2.1 ). National tax laws 
define accelerated depreciation differently,but they 
all refer to the possibility of depreciation over and 
above that considered 'normal' under the law (with 
the definition of'normal' again differing according 
to country). For exaple, in Italy the only 'normal' 
method recognized is straight-line depreciation. 
The geometric degressive method of depreciation is 
considered normal in the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Netherlands, and an incentive in 
France. 
Consequently, it is not easy to measure the 'true' 
incentive element offered by accelerated depreci-
ation rules, especially since real economic depreci-
ation varies between industries, between assets, and 
over time (as a result of inflation and technological 
progress). The complexity of tax rules makes 
comparison between countries difficult; thus a 
depreciation method which is relatively less 
favourable may be partly compensated by a shorter 
tax life. 
Depreciation may be accelerated by increasing the 
rate of depreciation in the early years, by reducing 
the tax life of the assets (which permits higher 
amounts to be written off each year over a shorter 
period),2 by bringing the start of the tax life 
forward (e.g. to the ordering date rather than the 
moment at which the equipment is brought into 
use) or by using a method more favourable to the 
taxpayer (e.g. changing from straight-line depreci-
ation to declining-balance depreciation). 
Accelerated depreciation improves cash flow and 
saves interest charges; as a result the prospective 
Sec also Chapter 9 or the Annual Economic Review 1981-82: 'Some 
structural properties or subsidies. investment incentives and energy 
taxation· ( £11,opt'lln Eco11omy No IO or November 1981 ). 
One ,,r the main changes introduced in the USA by the 1981 Economic 
Rc-.:ovcry Tax Act was the change from a system which tried to make tax 
life coincide with actual life to the system or 'accelerated cost recovery' 
which provided for four lengths or asset life. namely three years (e.g. for 
vehicles). live years (all other capital goods). 10 years (construction by 
public scrvi<-c enterprises) and 15 years (construction). The possibilty or 
dc-.:lining-balancc depreciation was retained. 
Business investment and the tax and financial environment 
profitability of the investment increases and this 
may call forth new investment. In other words the 
tax liability is postponed, which corresponds to an 
interest-free loan (and one therefore granted to ~he 
enterprise irrespective of its creditworthiness). 
The advantage is, however, realized in the future; 
where the obstacle to investment lies in the 
difficulty in raising funds to finance new invest-
ment, and the reserves built up in the past are 
insufficient (notably, in the case of new enter-
prises), subsidies, low-interest loans or guarantees 
may be more direct incentives. 
Accelerated depreciation gives rise to effective tax 
rates which vary according to asset life and may 
therefore offer advantages that vary from one 
sector to another and as a function of the structure 
of a firm's assets. J 
The assessment for tax purposes of depreciation 
provisions on the basis of historical cost is one of 
the main factors determining the real tax burden on 
business profits. Other factors are stock valuation, 
the taxation of nominal capital gains and the tax 
deductibility of nominal interest, or the fact that 
the reduction of the real terms is not taken into 
account. 
We shall confine ourselves here to indicating the 
possible solutions as regards the calculation of 
provisions for depreciation, without touching on 
the questions concerning inflation accounting in 
general. The possible solutions are: 
depreciation at replacement cost, which takes 
account of the inflation rate. This is conceptu-
ally the most satisfying approach; however, it 
poses practical problems, in particular that of 
the choice of the price index to be used to 
calculate the replacement cost. In Denmark the 
Law of I September 1982 on depreciation for 
tax purposes provides for indexation of the 
amount giving rise to depreciation; 
the revaluation of depreciable assets. The 
difference between the calculated depreciation 
of the historical cost and the calculated 
depreciation of the replacement cost is sub-
tracted from taxable profits when tax laws 
authorize revaluation. There is still the prob-
lem of which index to use, and this makes this 
system fairly complicated and not transparent. 
In France, enterprises have been required or 
For example. see the estimates or effective tax rates for each category or 
assets resulting from the new system or depreciation introduced in the 
USA in J.G. Gravelle: 'Effects or the 1981 depreciation revisions on the 
taxation or income from business capital', National Tax Journal, March 
1982. 
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allowed to revalue their fixed assets on the basis 
of their value at 31 December 1976 (without 
this having any consequences for tax pur-
poses). In Italy, a 1975 Law permitted, inter 
alia, the revaluation of balance sheets so that 
tax depreciation could be based on the revalued 
figures for fixed assets. A new law has just been 
adopted on the subject: 'Visentini bis'; 
the setting up of reserves to take account of 
inflation (provisions for price rises); 
the possibility of accelerated depreciation, 
which partly reduces the problem. In par-
ticular, the first-year allowance of 100% for the 
depreciation of certain assets in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, although not designed 
to take account of inflation, has effectively 
compensated for its effects. 
(b) A special example of provisions for the constitution 
of tax-exempt reserves for investment is provided 
by Denmark: sole proprietors may deduct from 
taxable income for the tax year amounts up to 25% 
of profits to be set aside in an investment fund. 
These amounts must be used within six years of the 
end of the tax year during which they are set aside 
to depreciate by anticipation the historical costs of 
equipment goods purchased. Provisions that have 
not been used in the time allowed are subject to 
retrospective taxation. Wage and salary earners 
under 40 years of age may also deposit amounts, 
deductible from taxable income, with a view to 
setting up a business; these amounts must be used 
for depreciation by anticipation of business 
equipment. 
In Belgium the Recovery Law of I O February 1981 
provided for a tax-free allowance of 5% of profits 
or 28% of the amount of non-distributed profits for 
investment within three years. This system has 
since been replaced by a system of investment 
deductions (see below). 
(iv) tax deductions for investment: these are allowances 
amounting to a certain percentage of the investment to 
be set against taxable income or tax payable. When they 
are deducted from tax, they are often called 'tax credits' 
('investment tax credit' in the USA, where these 
allowances are one of the main investment incentives 
along with accelerated depreciation). 
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(a) In Belgium, Royal Decree No 48 of 22 June 1982 
provides for the possibility of deducting from 
taxable profits a certain percentage of the cost of 
investment, depending on the nature of the 
investment: energy conservation, research and 
development, and others (with unlimited carry-
forward if profits during the relevant tax year are 
insufficient). 
(b) In France, the prov1s1ons for deduction of a 
fraction of the amount invested during the tax year, 
which were introduced in December 1980, were 
amended in December 1981 (new rates of deduc-
tion, supplementary conditions that manning levels 
must be maintained or increased), and finally 
discontinued to be replaced on I January 1983 by 
improved provision for accelerated depreciation. 
(c) An example of allowances to be set against tax 
payable is provided in the Italian Finance Act for 
1983, which temporarily (to end 1984) authorizes 
firms in manufacturing industry to increase deduc-
tions for VAT by an amount equal to 6% of the cost 
purchasing of depreciable equipment (including 
imports but excluding buildings). Similar measures 
have been used in France and Belgium; 
(v) Tax aids to investment: these are incentives granted 
whether or not tax is due. The Investitionszulage in 
Germany is such an incentive: it is granted under a tax 
law for purposes of regional development and to 
promote investment in research and development. The 
investment subsidy is thus a negative tax. In the 
Netherlands a certain percentage of the investment 
(depending on the type of investment, regional criteria, 
etc.) is deducted from tax payable or reimbursed when 
the amount exceeds the amount of tax payable; the 
system is therefore a cross between tax credits and 
subsidies, and, unlike the lnvestitionszulage, expendi-
ture under the Netherlands system is categorized under 
budget expenditure. 
1.2.3. Tax provisions for offsetting losses by carrying back 
future profits or carrying forward previous profits may also 
constitute an investment incentive, although less direct than 
the method described above, to the extent that their effects 
on risk-taking are positive and, in the case of carry-back, that 
they improve the firm's liquidity. Remarks on carry-back 
and carry-froward of losses will be found at point 4.3 of 
communication COM(83)2 l 8. 
In the draft 1984 budget of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the maximum amount oflosses that can be carried 
back is doubled (from OM 5 million to OM 10 million). 
1.2.4. Under certain conditions the various types of 
investment incentive may represent the same net advantage 
to firms (e.g. the advantages of accelerated depreciation may 
under certain conditions be equivalent to those of tax 
deductions). However, some features of incentives such as 
their relation to profits, the rate of taxation or the interest 
rate, or whether they result in definitive or temporary 
reductions in the tax burden may effect their attractiveness to 
investors. The box shows an overall classification of the 
various incentives (including subsidies) in relation to these 
factors. 
Incentives may be independent of profits (tax payments, 
investment grants: see column 1 of the box), in which case 
there is no discrimination between profitable firms and firms 
making a loss or generating inarlequate profits because of 
temporary or structural problems or because they are newly 
established. 
When tax provisions lead to a reduction in the tax base 
(accelerated depreciation, tax-free reserves, favourable stock 
Some features of investment incentives 
I. Reduced or zero tax rates 
2. Accelerated depreciation 
2.1 at historic cost 
2.2 at replacement cost 
3. Stock valuation provisions 
4. Tax-free reserves 
5. Investment allowances against 
5.1 taxable profit 
5.2 tax liability 
6. Investment payments 
7. Losses 
7.1 carried back 
7.2 carried forward 
8. Investment grants 
9. Interest-rate subsidies 
10. Subsidies for cost pf inputs, excluding 9 
Notr 
Columns (I). (1). (J): 
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valuation, carry-back or carry-froward of losses), the 
advantage to the investor depends on the existence of profits 
and on the rate at which profits are taxed (the higher the rate, 
the greater the incentive: see column 2 of the box). 
When permissible reductions in the tax base result in a loss 
for tax purposes, the advantage depends on whether this loss 
can be carried back or forward. In the United Kingdom, the 
leasing of investment goods enables firms that are not eligible 
for certain tax incentives (in particular, 100% depreciation 
the first year) because of insufficient profits for tax purposes 
to take at least partial advantage of the incentives in terms of 
lower leasing costs; thus the leasing sector acts as a 
redistributor of tax incentives to firms that could not 
otherwise turn them to account. 
Relationships between investment 
incentives and 
profits 
(I) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
(=)(-) 
(=)(-) 
(=)(-) 
rate interest 
of tax rate 
(~) (3) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
(+)(-) 
(+)(-) 
+ 
+ 
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
+ 
+ 
+ 
(-)(=) 
(-)(=) 
+ 
(+)(=) 
(=) 
Deferral 
of tax 
(4) 
• 
* 
• 
* 
* 
• 
• 
• 
* 
• 
• 
• 
• 
t : the investment in\.--cnliYc is positively related to profits. the rate of tax. the interest rate; 
the investment inccnti\·c is nc~ativcly related to profits. the rate of tax. the interest rate; 
the investment inccnti\'C is independent from profits, the rate of tax. the interest rate; 
( + ). ( - ). ( - ) : the inc-enii,.., can be. under certain conditions. positively or negati,i,ly related to profits. the rate of tax. the interest rate. or independent from them. 
Column (4): 
*: the in-.-cnti,-c consists in the deferral of tax; 
• the incentive is a definite advantage. 
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The value ofsul?sidies (tax aids, premiums, interest subsidies) 
is inversely related to the rate of taxation (i.e. the higher the 
tax rate, the lower the value of subsidies) when the subsidies 
are subject to tax or reduce the amount of deductible 
expenditure .• 
Incentives may represent a definitive advantage to the 
investor (investment allowances, tax credits, investment 
grants, interest-rate subsidies or loans at reduced rates, 
reduced rates of taxation, favourable stock valuation 
provisions, carry-back or carry-forward oflosses), or lead to 
deferral of tax payment (special depreciation schemes, 
temporarily tax-free reserves). 
Clearly, the real advantage of deferral of tax payment (which 
corresponds to an interest-free loan) is in improved cash 
flow; it depends on the rate of interest (irrespective of the fact 
that the rate of interest determines the discounted value of 
any investment incentive and thus influences the economic 
calculations of investors in all cases) and varies with the life 
of assets. 
Apart from the specific features of the various tax 
mechanisms, other aspects have special importance for 
assessing company taxation in general and any distortions 
(or correction of distortions) that may be generated by 
incentives. 
Such aspects include: 
(i) the definition of categories of expenditure or assets 
eligible for tax concessions (e.g. equipment but not 
buildings, intangible investment); 
(ii) the criteria of eligibility for exemptions or concessions 
(e.g. small firms, innovative firms); 
(iii) the conditions attaching to incentives (e.g. job conserv-
ation, increase in exports). 
2. Channelling savings to firms 
2.1. The availability of adequate external resources, in 
particular risk capital, is a necessary condition for firms to 
innovate and expand. The modernization of capital markets 
in the Community is essential in this respect; but incentives 
to channel savings towards firms may also have favourable 
effects. The principal factor of tax discrimination between 
various types of financing! is the incentive to borrow 
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Thc-dilTcrent~ucstion of the efficiency of the allocation of funds if 
firms arc encouraged to borrow rather than using internal funds is not 
solved (sec Theoretical and empirical aspects of corporation taxation, OED, 
1974). 
provided by the deductibility of debt interest2 (both for sole 
proprietorships and for companies). In simple terms (and 
except where no profits are available), with a tax rate of 50%, 
the cost of borrowing is half the cost of using own funds. 
In certain Community countries it is possible to deduct the 
return on equity from the tax base: 
(i) in Greece, dividends are deductible; 
(ii) in France, there is partial and temporary deduction. The 
Law of 13 July 1978 provided for deduction from the tax 
base of dividends on new shares issued against cash 
between I January 1977 and 31 December 1981, for 
seven years only (I O years for non-voting preference 
shares), on condition the dividends paid do not exceed 
7,5% of the cash contribution. These arrangements have 
been extended to 31 December 1987, and amended. 
Dividends paid can be deducted for 10 years following 
the setting up of a new company or an increase in the 
capital of an existing company; 
(iii) in Belgium, partially and temporarily. The Royal 
Decree of 27 November 1977 introduced exemption 
from corporation tax for profits distributed during five 
years on shares purchased in 1978 which represent 
capital contributions to newly-formed companies or 
companies which have increased their capital; the 
profits may not exceed 5% of the relevant capital. The 
measure was extended to capital invested in 1980, 1981, 
1982 and 1983. Royal Decree No 15 of 9 March 1982 
introduced exemption from corporation tax for part of 
the income distributed during five years on shares or 
new shares, provided that the income does not exceed 
8% of the capital contributed in 1982 or 1983 (13% of 
capital contributed and a period of 10 or nine financial 
years if the company undertakes to pass the tax saving 
on to the shareholder). The tax relief is granted provided 
that at least 60% of the equity capital raised is allocated 
to direct or indirect investment3 in Belgium. 
2.2 Another form of discrimination is the double taxation of 
dividends, in the hands of the company and in the hands of 
the shareholder (through corporation tax and income tax): 
Tax legislation on directors' loans or advances, which can be used either to 
overcome temporary difficulties, or to finance the expansion or the 
conversion of the firm's activity and which are particularly advantageous 
for SMEs, generally limits: 
(i) the rate of deductible interest (by reference to the market rate, or to the 
central bank rate which is generally lower); 
(ii) the deductibility of interest where such loans amount to more than a 
certain proportion of the company capital so that contributions of 
capital are not disguised as directors' loans. 
Broad definition of investment: any physical or non-physical asset, new or 
second-hand, whether or not depreciable, used for the exercise of the 
company's activity in Belgium, and investment in the equity of Belgian 
companies. 
this does not exist in the case of the sole proprietorship, but 
some people argue that the discrimination is justified because 
of the advantage of the limitation of risk for incorporated 
businesses. 
Double taxation (classical system) is complete in the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and the United States. Partial 
relief from double taxation may be granted by one of the 
following methods or a combination of them : 
(i) the deduction of dividends paid from the corporation 
tax base (e.g. Greece, France and Belgium, see above) ; 
(ii) lower rates of tax for distributional profits ('split-rate ' 
systems, e.g. Federal Republic of Germany and Japan) ; 
(iii) partial credit for tax on dividends received by the 
shareholder (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, 
United Kingdom, Japan). 
Double taxation can be eliminated by a full tax credit 
(Federal Republic of Germany). 1 
Table 3 in communication COM(83)2 l 8 shows the rates of 
corpora tion tax, tax credit and withholding tax in the EEC, 
the United States and Japan. 
The 1975 proposal for an EEC directive concerning the 
harmoniza tion of systems of corporation tax and of 
withho lding tax on dividends, on which Parliament has not 
yet given its opinion, provides for tax credit at a rate between 
45% and 55% of the rate of corporation tax. 
2.3. In genera l, capital contributed to an enterprise by an 
individual or by another enterprise is not a cost deductible 
from the contributor's income or taxable profit. 
There arc exceptions, some of which have been introduced 
recently: 
France: 
(i) Deductibility from taxable income of net purchases 
(purchases less sales) of French shares up to a limit of 
FF 6 OOO. 
(ii) Law No 78-74 1 off 13 July 1978 ('Monory Law') 
permits individuals, temporarily and within certain 
limits. to deduct · from their taxable income sums 
invested, between 1 June 1978 and 31 December 1981. 
(a) in the purchase of quoted or similar-ranking shares 
of French companies, quoted oil certificates, rights or 
l lowcver. since the Jax en.-dil cannot be set against the tax o n trading profit 
Wedcra l Republic o f Germany) or local income tax ( Ita ly). the 
shareholder cannot be fully compensa ted for the tax paid o n the profit al 
company level. even with a I 00° 0 lax credit (Federal Republic o f 
Gcnnany) . 
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scrip certificates or allotment certificates attaching to 
such securities, and shares in open-ended investment 
companies (SICAVs) or units in unit trusts ; (b) by 
subscription to operations to constitute or increase 
capital by French public or private limited liability 
companies. 
(iii) From I January 1983, new arrangements, the 'equity 
savings account' replaced deductions under the Monory 
Law. Taxpayers opening such an account with an 
approved intermediary are entitled to a reduction in tax 
equal to 25% of net purchases of transferable securities 
up to a maximum of FF 7 OOO a year for individuals and 
FF 14 OOO a year for married couples. The savings must 
be new, i.e. not resulting from the sale of securities. 
Belgium: Royal Decree No 15 of 9 March 1982 allows 
taxpayers to deduct from taxable income declared for 
the years 1982 to 1985 the sums paid for the purchase of 
new shares or interests in Belgian companies or Belgian 
unit trust certificates, up to a ceiling of BFR 40 OOO (plus 
BFR 10 OOO for each dependent), provided that the 
shares are held for at least five years. This advantage is 
an alternative to the income from shares being exempted 
from personal income tax. 
United Kingdom: Under Section 52 of the Finance Act 198 1, 
shareholders subscribing in any one year to at least 
UKL 500 worth of shares issued by small companies 
embarking on new forms of activity can, under certain 
conditions, deduct the amount subscribed from their 
income up to a limit ofUKL 10 OOO. Capital subscribed 
. in this way must remain in the company for at least five 
yea rs; the company must not form part of a group. 
In the budget of March 1983, the government proposed 
substantial improvements to this scheme ('business 
start-up scheme'). Called from now on !he 'business 
expansion scheme' , it is to be prolonged to April 1987, 
and extended to cover existing unli sted firms. The 
ceiling on deductions, which had already been raised to 
UKL 20 OOO, will be set at UKL 40 OOO. The limit of 
50% of ordinary shares is to be removed. 
2.4. As to the tax treatment of the return on the equity of 
companies (dividends), Table 3 in communication 
COM(83)2 l 8 summarizes the provisions in force for tax 
credits and withholding tax. 
In Belgium, the Law of 8 August 1980 provided that where 
income from contributions of capital was exempt from 
corpora tion tax, it was exempt from personal income tax for 
five years, on certain conditions (the cash contribution on 
which the dividend accrues must be evidenced by a registered 
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security, subsci:ibed for and paid by the recipient of the 
income; limit: BFR 30 OOO for each tax year, but 
BFR 75 OOO in 1981). The Royal Decree of 9 March 1982 
exempts from personal income tax the income from shares 
which is nQrmally exempt from corporation tax (see 
point 2.2), with no limit as to amounts, and for all recipients, 
whether or not they have subscribed for the securities to 
which the profit attaches. Added to this there is exemption 
for 10 years from succession and the duty on gifts. For 
profits exempt in this way, the withholding tax on investment 
income discharges the liability in full. 
2.5. Two matters not dealt with in this article should be 
mentioned, as they are particularly important from the point 
of view of channelling savings to firms. They are: 
(i) the tax treatment of capital gains and losses, particularly 
for securities and shares owned by private individuals; 
(ii) taxation of the various financial intermediaries. 
Provisions on these matters are very complex, and vary from 
one Member State to another; they will be dealt with in a 
forthcoming article. 
3. Taxation and types of enterprises 
Using a rough and very simplified classification, it is possible 
to assess the advantages (or disadvantages) of the various 
incentive measures that affect self-financing and external 
financing by reference to the type of enterprise (SME large 
enterprises; quoted and non-quoted enterprises) and/or by 
reference to the various phases in the development cycles of 
an enterprise. 
3.1. Self-financing and external financing 
(i) Any measure which reinforces self-financing is of 
particular advantage to SMEs, which for various 
reasons do not have access to securities markets, and 
gives them easier access to bank credit; the greater the 
administrative complications, the smaller the ad-
vantage. 
(ii) Apart from exemption or partial relief from tax not 
linked to profits and the application of lower tax rates 
(provided for in several national tax systems), ac-
celerated depreciation, inflation accounting (revalu-
ation of balance sheets), investment allowances and the 
carry-back or carry-forward of losses are therefore of 
special advantage to SMEs. · 
(iii) The tax incentives relating to shares and dividends, and 
to bond interest, are of advantage to listed companies 
and companies with access to the new-issue bond 
market (generally, large companies). For small and 
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medium-sized enterprises, the practical advantage may 
lie in the taxation of capital contributions and the 
remuneration of shares, and the taxation of directors' 
loans. 
(iv) The elimination of tax penalties on financial inter-
mediaries such as unit trusts and investment trusts may 
help to improve the working of the stock exchange and 
therefore to encourage financing through share issues, 
which is specific to medium-sized and large companies: 
the relaxation of restrictions on equity investment in 
unlisted undertakings can make external financing 
easier for small and medium-sized firms. 
(v) The taxation of capital gains and losses may encourage 
capital contributions from private individuals and 
financial intermediaries (unit trusts, but also venture 
capital companies), with favourable effects for both 
large and small enterprises. 
3.2. Taxation and phases of development of enterprises 
The influence of the various tax arrangements on the self-
financing and external financing of enterprises clearly differs 
according to the state of development of the enterprise. Very 
briefly, the following phases may be distinguished: 
(i) Creation and start-up phase of the enterprise: the most 
useful measures are exemption from charges which are 
not related to profits (e.g. business tax, tax on net 
capital, registration taxes, etc.). It will be recalled that, 
in general, the effect of such incentives is to facilitate and 
assist the creation of new enterprises, and not to trigger 
it; however, they may help to reduce the mortality rate 
of newly-created enterprises. 
Reduction in the tax base (depreciation allowances, 
reserves, etc.) are advantageous if tax losses can be 
carried forward to later years (see Belgium, unlimited 
carry-forward for losses relating to the first five 
financial years; also the Netherlands, for losses relating 
to the first six financial years); the same is true of 
deductions from taxable profit, while deductions from 
tax liability may be useful if they come off charges not 
linked to profits, e.g. VAT. 
The carry-back or carry-forward of losses are also very 
suitable. Investment payments, subsidies, cheap loans, 
interest-rate subsidies, guarantees and lower input cost 
may also have favourable effects. By contrast rules 
which favour external financing, where they concern the 
capital markets (shares and bonds), are of no ad-
vantage, though they may have some impact when they 
make it easier for private individuals to contribute 
capital and earn a return on such capital (including 
capital gains), or facilitate the deduction of any losses 
from the income or the tax liability or contributors of 
capital (tax consolidation). 
(ii) Expansionary phase: for SM Es, reliefs on contributions 
from third parties or from the owner or the partners, as 
loans or as equity, and the possibility of consolidating 
any losses with profits or with the tax liability of 
contributors of capital. For large enterprises, 
favourable taxation of self-financing, and smooth 
operation of capital markets (including international 
capital markets). 
(iii) 'Normal' phase of the life of the enterprise: see 
preceding point on the advantage of the various tax 
arrangements depending on the size and/or legal status 
of the enterprise. 
(iv) Phase of internal or external conversion: at this stage, 
all tax incentives which are not linked to profits, and the 
Business investment and the tax and financial environment 
carry-forward and the carry-back of losses are useful 
particularly in the case of an enterprise which made 
profits in the past and has to undertake conversion or 
restructuring investment. Doubts may be expressed, as 
to the advisability of investment payments, allocated 
irrespective of whether profits are earned, when there is 
surplus capacity. 
(v) Temporary or structural difficulties: tax reliefs for the 
transfer or acquisition of holdings by third parties, 
including the possibility of deducting losses from the 
income or the tax liability of contributors of capital. It is 
important to guard against the danger of keeping non-
viable enterprises alive purely for tax reasons. 
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Tax and financial measures in favour of investment 
• COM(83)218, Brussels, 18 April 1983 
Introduction . 
At its meeting on 15 November 1982, the Council approved 
the procedures proposed by the Commission in its communi-
cation COM'(82)641 ; it agreed that the Commission would 
continue to assess the tax and financial measures introduced 
to help investment in the Member States and would submit 
any conclusions for consideration by the Council at one of its 
meetings in the first half of 1983. The European Council of 3 
and 4 December 1982 confirmed the Council's conclusions. 
This communication sets out the results of an examination of 
existing measures in the Member States designed to increase 
the resources of enterprises available for investment by : 
(i) increasing self-financing margins, and 
(ii) channelling a larger proportion of savings into the 
financing of productive investment. 
I . The case for measures to help increase the resources 
available for investment 
As a result of a prolonged period of high inflation and 
because of insufficient adjustment to structural changes, the 
productive system of the European economies eventually 
deteriorated: This is reflected : 
(i) in losses of competitiveness for certain industries, 
branches and products; 
(ii) in inadequate market shares for new high-technology 
products ; 
(iii) in an imbalance in the financial structures of enter-
prises; 
(iv) in a large number of business failures, some of them 
involving major companies. 
On several occasions, and in particular in its June 
communication on the problem of investment 
(COM(82)365), the Commission has stated that the restor-
ation of a climate more favourable to business investment 
depends on the existence of a number of macro-economic 
conditions which will : 
(i) ensure greater security of the international environ-
ment, and 
(ii) increase the stability of the economic framework within 
the Community. 
Any progress in these areas depends chiefly on national 
macro-economic policies, on coordinating them within the 
Community and on clo er international cooperation. 
Nevertheless, in the opm1on of the Commission, specific 
structural measures to improve business taxation and 
financing may be a significant aspect of the required overall 
strategy, the macro-economic components of which were 
defined in the Commission communication to the European 
Council in March. This is because: 
(i) the macro-economic room for manoeuvre is still limited 
in certain Community countries; 
(ii) there is an urgent need to eliminate as many obstacles as 
possible which may represent bottlenecks not only in 
conditions of slow growth, but also in the event of a 
significant improvement in macro-economic con-
ditions; 
(iii) the potential impact of such measures in terms of 
improving the general investment climate and business 
confidence is substantial; 
(iv) it is necessary to reduce certain burdens on productive 
activity, since the level of most production costs will 
inevitably remain higher in the Community than in 
some of its trading partners. 
If any specific measure to stimulate investment is to be 
effective, its introduction must not cause a significant net 
deterioration in the general macro-economic conditions 
which influence business behaviour; the repercussions on 
budget equilibrium and interest rates are of particular 
importance here since they could easily wipe out the 
beneficial effects of specific stimulatory measures through 
their effects on investor behaviour. 
Bearing this in mind, the Commission considers that any 
improvement in tax arrangements for investment should 
avoid adding to budget deficits and should be financed by 
reducing certain subsidies notably those which, by helping 
ultimately uncompetitive businesses to survive, deflect 
resources from profitable investment. 
Action to modernize the financial markets and break down 
barriers between them, which has made progress in recent 
years, must also be continued and stepped up, the relevant 
measures must be designed in a Community context 
promoting integration along the lines indicated by the 
Commission in its communication on financial integration. 1 
2. The need to improve both self-financing and external 
financing through the raising of equity capital 
In the Community countries, the financing of business 
investment differs in the relative reliance on loan capital and 
shareholders' funds, whether internally generated (self-
financing) or raised externally (issue of shares). 
Sec COM(83)207 final. 
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Although this situation may be due to some extent to the 
institutional features of financial markets, the following 
points are also worth considering: 
(i) a structure of investment financing based primarly on 
self-financing may mean that established enterprises 
escape market control as regards resource allocation 
and management capabilities: however, the financial 
markets cannot fulfil this role unless they are sufficiently 
developed and operate in a satisfactorily efficient 
manner, which is not always the case, particularly in 
certain Member States; 
(ii) access to adequate external funds is a prerequisite for 
innovation and expansion in certain phases of the life-
cycle of enterprises, particularly small and medium-
sized businesses. However, access to external finance in 
the form of equity capital and loan capital normally 
depends on an adequate flow of self-financing. Low self-
financing ratios cannot be sustained indefinitely, 
because they undermine the possibility of remunerating 
equity capital and because a high gearing ratio increases 
the risk for potential lenders; 
(iii) in view of the increased risk due to greater uncertainty, 
and the innovative effort necessary to preserve com-
petitiveness and employment, investment must be 
financed through an adequate flow of risk capital (self-
financing and equity raised externally); 
(iv) the scope for financing growth and innovation by 
borrowing is limited by the present slow-growth 
situation, by the availability of credit and the level of 
interest rates, which depend partly on restrictive policies 
aimed at bringing down inflation, and by the imbalance 
in the financial structures of enterprises, often charac-
terized by a high gearing ratio. 
To sum up, although the possibilities for impoving the 
conditions for medium- to long-term borrowing must be 
disregarded, the main focus must be on action on two fronts, 
self-financing and external financing through the raising of 
equity capital, so as to help restore sounder financial 
structures and to permit a faster rate of adjustment to 
change. 
3. Increasing firms' self~financing margins 
3.1. Taxation and self-financing 
Self-financing capacities depend primarily on profitability, 
i.e. on the relative movements of prices and production costs, 
but also oil the amount and structure of taxes (including 
social security contributions) borne by enterprises. There-
fore: 
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(i) to the extent that depreciation allowances must be based 
on historic cost, 1 taxation does not allow for the effects 
of inflation and of the acceleration of technical progress 
on the real value of productive capital, and this gives rise 
to the taxation of apparent profits. 
Although the scope for tax depreciation is not the only 
aspect of the interrelationship between taxation, 
inflation and profits, it is the most important from the 
point of view of investment policy. According to some 
estimations, in the Federal Republic of Germany, where 
inflation has been relatively modest in comparison with 
the Community average, taxes on the apparent profits 
resulting from the method of calculating depreciation 
for wear and tear probably represented over one third of 
the tax liability of enterprises subject to tax; in Italy, 
historic-cost depreciation for a sample of manufactur-
ing firms in 1981 was probably under half the amount of 
replacement-cost depreciation; 
(ii) taxation is insufficiently adapted to the requirements of 
new enterprises and of innovation, in particular high-
risk and deferred-profitability innovation. This is a 
problem which, by definition, cannot be solved by 
taxing profits less heavily, but other tax measures are 
possible; 
(iii) the burden of taxes not linked to profits (e.g. the taxe 
professionnelle in France, Gewerbesteuer in the Federal 
Republic of Germany; the net wealth tax in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and Denmark) weighs more heavily in periods of slow 
growth and declining profits. 
It is not possible in the context of this document, to present a 
more detailed analysis of the implications of the burden 
represented by employers' social security contributions, 
which in some Member States make up a significant 
proportion of labour costs and tax revenue (see Table I : 
some 29% of total taxes in France, Italy and the Nether-
lands). Clearly, it is the total cost of labour which influences 
enterprises' self-financing margins; but at least part of the 
social security contributions paid by enterprises is used to 
finance costs (health expenditure for example) which should 
not weigh mainly on one particular sector of the economy. 
Consequently, these charges affect the self-financing ca-
pacity of enterprises differenly in the Member States. As it 
stressed in its communication to the Council 'Social security 
The Fourth Directive on annual accounts does not advocate a uniform 
method as regards the relationship between taxation and accounting. 
Nevertheless, the directive took account of this problem in a number of 
respects. First, besides normal value adjustments, exceptional value 
adjustments are permitted for taxation purposes alone (Article 35 (I} (d), 
Article 39 ( I )(e)). In addition, the notes on the annual accounts must show 
the extent to which the calculation of the profit or loss for the financial 
year has been affected by a valuation of the items which by way of 
derogation from the valuation principle was made with a view to obtaining 
tax relief (Article 43 (I} (10)). 
problems - Poi.nts for consideration' (COM(82)716 of 17 
November 1982), the Commission considers that national 
measures in this area must be taken in the economic context 
of the single market, and that the Community as a whole 
should be able to benefit from the experience of the various 
Member States. 
3.2. Investment incentives 
All the Member States use general measures to give direct or 
indirect encouragement to enterprises to invest; on top of 
these there are more selective measures (e.g. regional or 
industry measures). At this stage, we have confined our 
analysis to general tax incentives. 
Essentially, these measures are the reduction of the rate of 
tax on profit (often they will favour certain categories of 
enterprises), the reduction of the tax base (in particular 
through the rules governing depreciation), the deductibility 
ofa percentage of the investment from the taxable profit (e.g. 
in Belgium, Denmark and Greece), the formation of tax-free 
reserves (e.g. in Denmark) or the reduction of tax liability in 
accordance with the investment (tax credit in Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands; investment payment in the Nether-
lands, where the portion in excess of the tax liability is paid 
out; 'negative VAT' in Italy). 
The following general comments may be made: 
(i) Reductions of the tax base are advantageous for profit-
making enterprises and if losses can be carried back or 
forward; the same is true of deductions from taxable 
profits. Where enterprises are not profit-making, the 
reduction of charges which are not linked to profits, or 
tax subsidies, are clearly more attractive. 
This raises the question whether investment should be 
facilitated irrespective of whether the enterprise is 
profitable. Such an approach might be justified in the 
case of new enterprises and innovative enterprises 
engaged in deferred-profitability activities or in order to 
get through a difficult cyclical situation without 
needlessly undermining the productive potential of the 
economy. 
(ii) Temporary incentives may prove effective where the 
object is to accelerate investment spending; but the 
stability of an environment favourable to investment is 
essential in order to encourage businesses to invest and 
innovate. 
(iii) The real efficacy of the various incentives depends on 
the extent to which they represent a definite advantage 
or merely compensate, to varying degrees, for the effects 
of inflation on the rebuilding of productive capital. 
(a) The national tax laws provide for various forms of 
accelerated depreciation which, although generally 
presented as an incentive mechanism, in fact also 
mitigate the effects of rising prices; in France, the 
Finance Act for 1983 temporarily improved the 
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possibilities of accelerated depreciation (in certain 
cases, first-year depreciation will go up to 70%). 
(b) In Ireland and the United Kingdom, the possibility 
of 100% first-year depreciation enables the effects 
of inflation on the depreciation of productive 
capital to be almost fully offset. In order to reduce 
distortions between industries and enterprises, a 
75% initial allowance has recently been introduced 
for buildings alongside the I 00% capital allowances 
for plant and machinery. 
(c) Other arrangements make it possible to allow for 
the effects of inflation, either systematically or 
occasionally: reserves for price increases; the 
indexation of depreciation allowances (this poss-
ibility was introduced in Denmark by the Law of 
September 1982 on tax depreciation); the revalu-
ation of balance sheets (a law on this subject has 
just been approved in Italy). 
In this area, it is important for the arrangements 
introduced 
(a) to be simple and transparent; 
(b) not to be ad hoe remedies, introduced piecemeal, 
but structural elements of taxation. 
3.3. Encouraging risk-taking 
The analysis of other tax arrangements ex1stmg in the 
Member States which affect self-financing suggest that 
changes to the rules on the carry-back or carry-forward of 
losses could have favourable effects on risk-taking. 
(i) The improvement of these rules, which enable losses to 
be set against past or future profits, would encourage 
the establishment and expansion of enterprises and the 
introduction of new deferred-profitability products and 
production processes. The carry-back oflosses may also 
enable enterprises in temporary difficulties and making 
losses after a period of profits to finance investment in 
loss-making years, and may thus have some regulatory 
effect on the economic cycle. 
(ii) Another advantage of lengthening the carry-back or 
carry-forward period is that it helps to lower the risk 
threshold for the enterprise without necessarily involv-
ing losses of tax revenue. 
(iii) Introducing in all the Member States the possibility of 
carrying losses back over the two previous financial 
years and forward indefinitely would bring the relevant 
tax rules into line with the most favourable general 
system which exists in the Community (see Table 4). 
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(iv) The carry-back of losses makes tax revenue more 
difficult to predict, but in a transitional phase shortfalls 
caused by an improvement of existing systems might be 
restricted by initially setting a ceiling, expressed as an 
absolute amount, on this form of relief. 
3.4. Readjustment in the tax burden on enterprises 
Generally speaking, and to allow for the slowdown in 
growth, the structural adjustment of the productive system 
could be helped by not increasing or even actually decreasing 
the tax burden on enterprises, in particular the charges not 
linked to profits. 
(i) In its communication on budget discipline and econ-
omic convergence (COM(82)422) of I July 1982, the 
Commission stressed that efforts to reduce the deficits 
must be concentrated on the area of public expenditure, 
and that increases in taxation were undesirable because 
of the high level already reached by the rates of tax and 
· social security contributions. 
(ii) More specifically and without prejudging the insti-
tutional problem of the financing of local authority 
expenditure, the local authorities' budget difficulties 
must not lead to an increase of the tax burden on the 
productive sector and have the effect of reducing or 
wiping out any advantages introduced under general 
taxation, and of distorting competition between en-
terprises. 
(iii) Certain exemptions from or changes to charges not 
linked to profits have recently been introduced (e.g. for 
the business tax in France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany); further progress in this area is desirable, as 
are direct or indirect reductions· in the net wealth tax 
which exists in certain Member States; a study might 
also be made of ways of modifying the Community VAT 
system so as to reduce the causes of some residual tax 
having to be borne by enterprises. 
4. Channelling savings into the financing of investment 
In this area, the objective must be to improve the possible 
choices so that: 
(i) enterprises are in an optimum position to implement a 
financial strategy for growth and innovation, based on 
the guarantee of a stable flow of funds; 
(ii) savers can have access to financial assets which, in terms 
of return and risk, match their investment preferences. 
This would allow for a more effective, growth-oriented use of 
the available savings. 
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In order to achieve these two objectives, the main focus must 
be on improving the operation of the capital markets, by 
eliminating distorsions and adapting capital market regu-
lation and taxation in such a way as to bring them into line 
with the most effective systems inside or outside the 
Community. 
Because of the complexity and variety of rules in the member 
countries for channelling savings into the financing of 
investment, this document confines itself to indicating a 
number of guidelines xhich, though not detailed in all their 
implications as regards laws and regulation, form a precise 
frame of reference recommended by the Commission. This 
frame of reference is as follows. 
4.1. Greater transparency of company accounts 
This is essential if the capital markets and the financial 
institutions are to be effective in performing their role of 
savings intermediaries. 
This is essential if the capital markets and the financial 
institutions are to be effective in performing their role of 
savings intermediaries. 
Without prejudice to the strengthening of national measures 
in this area, the incorporation into national law of the 
directives already approved by the Council, and the rapid 
adoption of the Commission proposals concerning company 
accounts should improve the publicity and transparency of 
company activities throught the Community. 
4.2. Conditions of access by firms to risk capital should be 
improved so that the prime consideration for enterprises in 
devising their financial strategies will be the assessment of 
risk and balance-sheet equilibrium. 
Easing the double taxation of dividends by means of a tax 
credit, along the lines of the 1975 proposal for a directive 
concerning the harmonization of systems uf company 
taxation, would help to reduce the bias in favour of debt 
finance which exists in certain Community countries. 
Temporary provisions in France and Belgium allow firms 
under certain conditions partially to deduct dividends on 
new shares or units from taxable profits: in France, this 
allowance is granted for 10 accounting years from the 
establishment of the firm or the increase in capital; in 
Belgium, it is granted on condition that at least 60% of the 
new capital is used for investment. 
The establishment of more favourable conditions for raising 
risk capital by enterprises must also be achieved by: 
(i) facilitating direct access to risk capital by: 
(a) broadening the range and reducing the cost of 
services provided by financial and banking insti-
tutions when issuing and placing company shares; 
(b) simplifying and making more transparent the 
technical and legal conditions and reducing the 
costs, particularly the tax costs, associated with the 
raising of equity capital by listed companies and 
companies coming to the stock market for the first 
time. In this connection the Commission proposes 
studying, together with the Member States, the 
scope for amending the Community system of 
registration duty by ending the duty or at least 
reducing it: when companies are formed or capital 
increased, duty is charged at the rate of I% on 
contributions to capital and is not deductible in 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland and the United King-
dom; 
(c) creating or modernizing markets in securities 
representing risk capital where unlisted companies 
can have access to risk capital on terms suited to 
their phase of development. The lack or in-
adequacy of such markets is a particular constraint 
on the growth of innovating small and medium-
sized companies, in that the difficulties of realizing 
the investment discourages the contribution of 
funds. 
In the United States, this role is filled by the 'over-
the-counter market', which in 1979 accounted for 
26% of transaction and 13% of the capitalization of 
all United States stock exchanges. In the United 
Kingdom, the unlisted securities market, set up 
under the auspices of the London Exchange but 
forming an entirely separate market, has been in 
existence since November 1980: on this market, 
only 10% of equity capital needs to be offered to the 
public and a number of tax and other concessions 
applicable to unquoted securities remain available. 
Special markets have been set up in Denmark and 
the Netherlands: the second-tier market recently 
opened in France performs the same function. 
(ii) del'eloping schemes of collective investment: 
(a) Indirect shareholdings must be developed by 
promoting collective investment undertakings. 
The advantages of a greater role for collective 
investment undertakings are: the stabilizing effects 
which they can exercise on the share market, to the 
extent that their investment strategy is geared to 
long-term considerations, and their objective of 
ensuring asset growth balances that of seeking 
immediate profits; the economies of scale and the 
risk-spreading achieved through the collective 
administration of savings; the possibility they offer 
small investors of reaching the minimum invest-
ment threshold so that they overcome one of the 
major obstacles to a significant level of remuner-
ation. 
Tax and financial measures in favour of investment 
Apart from the elimination of double taxation, 
these considerations justify treatment at least as 
favourable for such undertakings as for individual 
savers, together with all the tax advantages enjoyed 
by these. 
The Commission calls upon the Council to adopt, 
as quickly as possible, the proposal for a directive 
for the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions regarding collective 
investment undertakings for transferable securities 
(CIUTS) and the proposal for a directive on the 
liberalization of transactions in units issued by 
CIUTS; 
(b) a similar, more specialized function can be 
performed by investment companies and in par-
ticular venture capital companies; the other 
institutions which collect savings such as insurance 
companies and pension funds should play a more 
active role in channelling savings into enterprises, if 
not directly then. at least through specialist 
intermediaries, and this should be helped by 
relaxation of the rules which place constraints on 
such institutions to invest in shares. 
(iii) the channelling of savings into equity capital, through tax 
rules which are stable and, on certain conditions, 
encourage the direct or indirect investment in shares: 
this would redress the balance compared with the tax 
concessions generally granted for home-ownership 
saving. 
Tax concessions in the form of a reduction in income tax 
when shares are purchased, are granted subject to certain 
conditions, in France and Belgium (in the latter country, as a 
possible alternative to the exemption of natural persons' 
share income); in the United Kingdom, the business start-up 
scheme introduced in 1981 permits an indivigual resident 
who invests an amount limited to UKL 20 OOO in 1982/83 
and 1983/84 in the shares of certain small companies engaged 
in new forms of activity to set that investment against his 
taxable income for the year, subject to certain conditions. 
Significant improvements to these measures have, moreover, 
been proposed. Also in the United Kingdom, losses incurred 
by individuals or investment companies on the disposal of 
shares in certain unlisted companies may be set against 
income; this may have incentive effect by reducing the risk 
threshold. 
In addition, a policy of employee wealth formation, in 
particular through share-buying schemes, could help to 
improve savings diversification, and partially reduce the 
upward pressure on wage costs. There is a strong case for 
improving existing schemes and improving the advantages 
they grant. 
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5. Summary an.d conclusions 
5.1. This paper analyses the main general measures adopted 
in the Member States in favour of investment. 
5.2. The measures are assessed in terms of their contribution 
to increasing the resources available to firms for investment 
by improving self-financing margins and by channelling 
more savings into productive investment. 
5.3. In connection with self-financing, three main problems 
arise: 
(i) The taxation of apparent profits resulting from the 
effects of inflation on the rebuilding of productive 
capital: it is unclear how far the various incentives 
provided represent a definite advantage, and how far 
they merely compensate, to varying degrees, for the 
effects of inflation. The Commission recommends the 
adoption by the Member States of arrangements to 
eliminate in a structural manner the adverse effects of 
inflation on resources intended for rebuilding product-
ive capital. 
(ii) The limits imposed on offsetting losses with past or 
future profits: these limits reduce firms' ability to deal 
with temporary difficulties and to face up to the 
requirements of expansion and innovation. The Com-
mission recommends that tax rules for carry-back or 
carry-forward of losses should be brought into line with 
the most favourable system existing in the Member 
States. 
(iii) The burden of business taxes, particularly those that do 
not depend on profits, in a period of slow growth and 
high risk: the Commission thinks that this burden 
should not be increased-and even that it ought to be 
reduced-particularly for taxes not linked to profits. 
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5.4. Among measures to improve external financing of 
undertakings, the Commission recommends: 
(i) greater transparency of company accounts, which is 
essential to improve access to equity capital and 
borrowed funds; 
(ii) the following measures, to improve the flow of risk 
capital: 
(a) attenuation of double taxation of dividends; 
(b) improvement in the conditions of direct access by 
firms, especially strongly innovative small and 
medium-sized firms, to risk capital; 
(c) channelling of savings into risk capital, in par-
ticular through the development of forms of 
collective investment; 
(d) encouragement of wealth formation among wage 
and salary earners. 
5.5. Some progress has been made on these fronts in the past 
few years in the Community. But a considerable effort is still 
required, particularly in some Member States where the 
situation is far from satisfactory. 
In particular, for reasons of convergence, it is important to 
encourage business investment in the Member States with the 
most acute problems of inflation and balance of payments, 
so as to attenuate the adverse effects of economic readjust-
ment on production potential. 
The Commission would request the Council to approve the 
guidelines sketched out in Section 3 and 4 of this communi-
cation for the adaptation of company taxation and the 
channelling of savings into productive investment, allowing 
for special situations. 
For its part, the Commission will bear these guidelines in 
mind during its work on harmonization in collaboration with 
the Member States. 
Tax and financial measures in favour of investment 
Table 1 
Taxation of enterprises 
Employer's social security 
contributions 
As % oi GNP al factor cost 
1970 1980 Increase/ 1970 1980 
decrease in 
percentage 
pomts 
8 2,7 2,9 +0,2 7,7 9,5 
DK 
D 2,1 2,0 -0,1 6,3 8,3 
GR 0,6 1,3 +0,7 
F 2,7 2,8 +0,1 10,7 14,0 
IRL 
1 1,4 1,9 +0,5 9,5 10,2 
NL 2,8 3,4 +0,6 8,2 10,4 
UK 3,9 3,5 -0,4 3,1 4,3 
USA 3,6 3,2 -0,4 3,4 5,0 
Japan 4,5 5,0 +0,5 3,4 4,8 
Taxes on corporate Employer's social security 
income contributions 
As % of total laxes 
(including social security contributions) 
1970 1980 Increase/ 
decrease in 
percentage 
pomts 
8 7,0 6,0 - 1,0 
DK 
D 5,3 4,5 -0,8 
GR 2,1 3,8 + 1,7 
F 6,7 5,9 -0,8 
IRL 
I 4,6 5,4 2 +0,8 
L 
NL 6,6 5,5 - 1,1 
UK 8,9 8,2 - 0,7 
USA 11,1 9,6 2 -1,5 
Japan 21,1 17,9 - 3,2 
Unincorporated enterprises are included under households. Therefore, international comparisons should be interpreted carefully. 
1979. 
1970 1980 
19,9 19,8 
16,3 18,7 
26,3 28,9 
30,9 29,7 2 
19,5 29,3 
7,1 10,1 
10,4 14,3 
11 ,3 14,5 
Sourc, : ' International comparison of laxes and social security contributions, 1970-80', in Economic Trends , December 1982. Central Statistical Office. London. 
Increase/ 
decrease in 
percentage 
points 
+1,8 
+2,0 
+3,3 
+0,7 
+2,2 
+1,2 
+ 1,6 
+1,4 
Increase/ 
decrease in 
percentage 
points 
-1,0 
+2,4 
+2,6 
-1,2 
+0,8 
+3,0 
+3,9 
+3,2 
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Table 2 
Tax burden on enterprises I 
( Current and capital taxes 
as a percentage of gross operating surplw) 2 
F NL3 D3 UK 
1970-74 12,8 10,7 7,8 3,9 14,8 
1975-80 13,8 14,9 8,1 4,2 12,6 
1975 12,3 14,3 10,3 3,1 13,0 
1976 14,9 14,1 8,5 - ·3,8 8,3 
1977 14,9 15,1 7,9 4,7 10,1 
1978 12,3 16,6 7,4 4,5 11,3 
1979 12,9 ·15,5 6,7 4,9 · 14,0 
1980 15,5 14,0 7,9 18,7 
Sector S( 10), i.e. non-financial corporate and quasi-rorporate enterprises. ESA definition: cntcrpriscs whose distributive and financial transactions arc distinct from those of their 
owners-and which arc princ,pally engaged in the production of goods and non-financial market services. 
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The gross operating surplus (ESA dcfinition)corresponds to the sector's gross domestic product at market prices after deduction of taxes linked lo production and imports, less subsidies 
and less compensation of employees. 
II includes all other income generated in the course of production, together with consumption of fixed capital. 
For the Federal Republic of Gcrrnany and the Netherlands, the sector S(IO) includes all pcrtncrsbips and non-financial sole proprietorships. 
Table 4 
Carry-forward and carry-back of losses 
Carry-forward Carry-back 
B 5 I 2 0 
DK 5 0 
F 51 0 
D .. 5 23 
·oR 3 ,.0 
IRL 00 I 
I 5 0 
L 5 0 
NL 82 2 
UK 00 1 4 
USA 15 3 
Japan 5 I 
The portion of the tax loss corresponding 10 depreciation can be carried forward 
indefinitely. 
For initial losses no limit. 
Up lo DM 5 million. 
Thn:c years for losses deriving from 100";~ depreciation (can be scl against income and 
capital gains); thn:c years for the first four years' trading losses (can be SCI against 
income; for individual enterprises only). 
Tax and financial measures in favour of investment 
Table 3 
Corporation tax, tax credit and withholding tax 
Member State 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
The Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Japan 
Rate of 
corporation tax 
45% (profits in excess of BFR 
14 500 OOO) I (special solidarity 
fund surcharge) 
40% 
56%: undistributed profits 
36%: distributed profits 
50%' 
45%: corporation tax on un-
distributed profits 
15%: surcharge 2 
Actual overall rate: 48,5% 
50% (profits in excess of IRL 
35 OOO) I 
30%: corporation tax 
16,2%: Ilor 2.3 
Actual overall rate: 41,3% 
40% (profits in excess of LFR 
I 312 OOO) I (special unemploy-
ment fund surcharge) 
48% (profits in excess of HFL 
40 000) I 
52% (profits in excess of UKL 
225 000) I 
from 15% 4 to 46% 
40%: undistributed profits 
30;~: distributed profts 
Rate of tax credit 
(a) as % of the gross dividend 
(b) as % of corporation tax 
(a) 40,7% of the dividend 
(b) 49,8% of the tax 
(a) 25% of the dividend 
(b) 37,5% of the tax 
(a) 9/16 of the dividend 
(b) 100% of the tax on dis-
tributed profits 
(a) 50% of the dividend 
(b) 50% of the tax 
No tax credit but dividends are 
deductible from profits 
(a) 30/70 of the dividend 
(b) 42,9% of the tax 
(a) 33 1/3% of the dividend 
(b) 77,7% of corporation tax 
(47,2% of the total of the 
two taxes) 
No·tax credit 
No tax credit 
(a) 3/7 of the dividend 
(b) 39,6% of the tax 
10% 
Lower rates apply to profits below this level. Ireland, manufacturing industry: 10 % (temporary). 
Deductible agnmst income chargeable to corporation tnx. 
lmposta locale sui rcdditi (locAI income tnx). 
For the first USD 50 OOO slice (from 1983). 
(si uation at 31.12.1982) 
Withholding tax on 
dividends (subject to the 
provisions of double 
taxation conventions) 
20% 
30% 
25% 
0% (residents) 
25% (non-residents) 
42% and 47% for registered 
shares; 45% and 53% for bearer 
shares 
No withholding tax 
10% (residents) 
30% (non-residents) 
15% (no withholding tax on 
dividends distributed by Lux-
embourg holding companies) 
25% 
No withholding tax 
20% 
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Energy and the economy: 
a study of the main relationships in the countries of the European 
Community 
Since the first oil shock, the relationship between energy 
aggregates and macro-economic variables has been the 
subject of numerous analyses designed primarily to establish 
the scope for changing the ratio of energy demand to 
economic activity and to highlight the role played in this by 
two economic variables, prices and investment. In an earlier 
document, the Commission departments reviewed the main 
developments in the energy sector from 1963 to 1973 and 
from 1973 to 1979 and defined the objectives and instruments 
of the Community's energy strategy. ' 
Since the end of the 1970s, further progress has been made in 
compiling energy and sectoral data. A more accurate 
analysis can therefore now be offered of the main relations 
and their developments. The changes which occurred 
following the second oil shock have also gradually turned out 
to be grea ter than originally supposed: from 1979 to 1982, 
Sec E11ropea11 Economy No 9 of July 198 1: Chapter 10 : Energy. 
energy consumption in the Community has fallen sharply in 
absolute terms, although this trend should be related to that 
of economic activity over the same period if its full 
implications are to be appreciated. Finally, there have 1;,een 
considerable theoretical developments in the analysis of the 
role of prices in the changes in energy demand and very many 
estimates are available today. The need has therefore arisen 
to review the different approaches and to use the newly 
available data to establish a simple and regularly updated 
system for estimating certain key elasticities of energy 
demand. 
This background explains the structure of the study 
presented here. The first chapter surveys the 'trend in the 
principal energy aggregates and a brief analysis of their 
relationships with the economic variables : the second 
summarizes the main theoretical and empirical work on the 
elasticities of energy demand, and the third estimates energy 
demand functions for the industrial and household/ tertiary 
sectors on the basis of the new data available to the 
Commission's staff. 
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Energy balances and economic activi ty in the European Community: the main findings for the period 1973-82 
Since the first oil shock, the trends of the main energy 
aggregates (consumption, production, importation) have 
been quite different from those observed in the 1960s, as a 
result both of slower and less smooth economic develop-
ment, and of the energy policies implemented by Community 
member countries. A comparison of energy aggregates and 
the corresponding macro-economic variables from 1973 to 
1982 shows a major improvement in the efficiency of energy 
use in mos t consumer sectors (with the exception of 
transport): energy consumption per unit of GDP in the 
Community of Ten declined by 20% over the period. 
Nevertheless, consumption is still very sensitive to the level of 
activity, so that efforts to weaken the link must be resolutely 
pursued. Similarly, with the development of domestic energy 
production, Community dependence on imported energy, 
especially oil, has declined considerably (from 64% of all 
energy in 1973 to 45,6% in 1982) ; however, except in the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, it is still high, and 
weighs heavily on the balances of payments of many Member 
Sta tes. Greater independence is thus still essential both for 
security of supply and for the economic development of our 
countries. 
Introduction 
In the 'Energy' chapter of the 1982-83 Annual Economic 
Review,' a brief analysis of recent trends in the principal 
energy and economic aggregates showed that, as a result of 
the second oi l shock, major changes had occurred in energy 
demand and ea rlier trends had been completely disrupted. 
The fo llowing section attempts to gauge the size and limits of 
these changes and to pinpoint the main causes. This is 
fo llowed by sect ions on the main trends in energy supply 
(prod uction and imports) and in the Community's depen-
dence on external supplies of energy and oil. The study covers 
mainly the period 1973-82, with a division into two sub-
periods ( 1973-79 and 1979-82) to identify the changes which 
occurred fo llowing the second oil shock. 
It would also have been possible to break the larger period 
down into three sub-periods (1973-75, 1976-78, 1979-82) to 
fo llow economic and energy cycles more closely (see 
Graph 1.1.) ; but this would have expanded considerably the 
quantity of information supplied without improving the 
relevance of the findings and conclusions. Consequently, as 
the use of annual average ra tes of change would not be very 
meaningful in view of the cycl ical fea tures of the period 
1973-79, the rates of change given in the text and the tables 
always rela te to an entire period or sub-period . The energy 
sta tistics are fro m the SOEC's final energy balances (see box 
E11ropea11 Economy No 14 of ovembcr 1982, Chapter 9. pp. 132- 137. 
on page 36 for the main definitions) ; for resons of availability 
of data, the study and the main results concern the 
Community of Ten (EC 10) as a whole and seven individual 
countries (Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic; of 
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom). 
I . Energy demand: trend and components 
1.1. Overall trend of energy consumption 
Between 1973 and 1979, energy consumption in the 
Community of Ten again grew appreciably, although at a 
much slower rate than in previous years. Gross inland 
consumption of primary energy increased by 5,8% over the 
perod (s!!e Graph I.I and· Table I. I). This growth in 
consumption was accounted for mainly by natural gas (an 
increase of 48,9 %) and by electricity (82%), mainly nuclear-
generated , whi le oil consumption fell by 4,8%. This 
illustrates the diversification efforts already made during this 
period. 
In the following period (1979-82), gross inland consumption 
of primary energy fell quite dramatically by 112,9% million 
toe 2 or 11 ,5%. This fa ll was accounted for mainly by oil 
( - 20,8%) but also by solid fuels ( - 5,3%) and natural gas 
( - 9,7%). Only consumption of primary electricity, mainly 
nuclear-generated, again increased (by 51,3%). 
This general trend masks fairly substantial differences fro m 
one country to another, a ttributable partly to different 
energy potential but mainly to varying levels and structures 
of economic activity, as we shall see below. While energy 
consumption increased by an average of 5,8% in the 
Community from 1973 to 1979, it marked time or even 
declined in Belgium, Denmark and the United Kingdom, 
and increased by almost 8% in the four other countries 
covered by this study. Generally speaking, the stagnation in 
consumption recorded in the first three countries was due to 
a sharp reduction in oil consumption, while in the other 
countries oil consumption again increased or fell only 
moderately. In all the countries, there was a quite significant 
measure of replacement of oil by other sources of energy; this 
was refl ected mainly in increased consumption of natural gas 
and primary electricity, the growth in consumption of solid 
fuels in some countries being offset by reduction in the two 
largest producer and consumer countries, .the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. 
toe = tonnes of oil equi valent. 
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Table 1.1 
Gross inland consumption of primary energy, 197~ 
1973 1979 1979 1982 1982 1973 1979 1979 1982 1982 
1973 1979 1973 1979 
million % million % million % % million % million % million % % 
toe share toe toe share toe share toe toe share 
Belgium Denmark 
Solid fuels 11,3 23,2 11,4 +0,9 11,2 27,0 -1,8 2,3 11,3 4,3 +87,0 5,7 33,9 +33,0 
Oil 30,3 62,1 25,1 -17,2 19,5 41,7 -22,3 18,0 88,7 15,7 -12,8 10,9 64,9 -30,6 
Natural gas 7,2 14,7 9,3 +29,2 6,8 16,4 -26,9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Primary electricity and other 0 0 2,7 3,9 9,4 +44,4 0 0 0,3 0,2 1,2 -33,3 
Gross inland consumption 48,8 100 48,5 -0,6 41,4 100 -14,6 20,3 100 20,3 0 16,8 100 -17,2 
FR of Germany France 
Solid fuels 83,2 31,7 80,2 -3,6 78,5 32,l -2,I 28,7 16,4 31,8 +10,8 29,0 16,7 -8,8 
Oil 146,2 55,8 143,0 -2,2 108,7 44,4 -24,0 123,8 70,9 114,9 -7,2 87,9 50,7 -23,5 
Natural gas 27,0 10,3 45,3 +67,8 38,4 15,7 -15,2 13,6 7,8 21,2 +55,9 21,2 12,2 0 
Primary electricity and others 5,8 2,2 13,3 + 129,3 19,0 7,8 +42,9 8,6 4,9 17,4 + 102,3 35,3 20,4 + 102,9 
Gross inland consumption 262,2 100 281,8 +7,5 244,6 100 -13,2 174,7 100 185,3 +6,1 173,4 100 -6,4 
Italy The Netherlands 
Solid fuels 8,1 6,6 10,1 +24,7 12,5 9,9 +23,8 3,2 5,2 3,3 +3,1 5,1 9,2 +54,5 
Oil 95,2 77,9 95,6 +0,4 85,8 67,7 -10,3 29,5 48,0 30,6 +3,7 21,8 39,1 -28,8 
Natural gas 14,2 11,6 22,8 +60,6 21,9 17,3 -3,9 28,5 46,4 32,4 + 13,7 27,4 49,2 -15,4 
Primary electricity and others 4,7 3,8 5,6 +19,1 6,5 5,1 +16,1 0,2 0,3 1,2 +500,0 1,4 2,5 +16,6 
Gross inland consumption 122,2 100 134,1 +9,7 126,7 100 -5,5 61,4 JOO 67,5 +9,9 55,7 JOO -17,5 
United Kingdom EC 10 
Solid fuels 79,2 35,7 75,I -5,2 62,5 33,3 -16,8 222,0 23,9 223,4 +0,6 211,5 24,2 -5,3 
Oil 108,2 48,8 92,9 -14,I 74,3 39,6 -20,0 563,9 60,6 536,7 -4,8 425,5 48,8 -20,8 
Natural gas 25,I 11,3 40,4 +61,0 38,2 20,4 -5,4 115,8 12,4 172,4 +48,9 155,7 17,9 -9,7 
Primary electricity and others 9,2 4,2 11,4 +23,9 12,6 6,7 +10,5 28,9 3,1 52,6 +82,0 79,6 9,1 +51,3 
Gross inland consumption 221,7 100 219,8 -0,9 187,6 100 -14,6 930,7 100 985,1 +5,8 872,2 100 -11,5 
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GRAPH 1.1 : Gross inland consumption of energy (GICE) and 
of oil (GICO) 
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The period 1979-82 saw a general fall in energy consumption 
as economic activity contracted, although its extent again 
va ried. Five countries recorded a sharp drop in their gross 
inland consumption of energy (down by about 15%, 
compared to a Community average of 11 ,5%), while there 
was only a moderate decline in France and Italy (about 6%). 
This general decline in consumption affected mainly oil 
consumption, which fe ll by more than 20% in most countries 
(except in Italy where the fa ll was only I 0%), and natural gas, 
which lost part of it previous gain. Consumption of 
electricity increa ed very sharply in almost all the countries, 
Energy balance sheets 
The energy statistics in this chapter are from the energy supplied 
balance sheets drawn up by the SOEC. 1 The salient feature of 
these balance sheets is that all flows are recorded on the basis of 
the real energy content of the source assessed with no 
substitution hypothesis or calculation of equivalence such as are 
used in the 'primary equivalents' balance sheets. The bal~nce 
sheets for each source are brought together in aggregated balance 
sheets by converting quantities into a common unit- here it is 
the toe (tonne of oil equivalent), a standardized unit based on a 
calorie content of 41 ,86 gigajoules (10 joules). Energy supplied 
balance sheets record the losses occurring in the course of 
processing operations and thus give the quantities of energy 
actually made available to consumers, which can then be 
meaningfully compared with macro-economic data. They do not 
take account of losses at the final consumption stage, so that the 
yield of energy supplied may vary from one type of energy to 
another ; in particular, they underestimate the contribution of 
electrical energy, which has the highest final yield . 
To correct this shortcoming, the SOEC also publishes 'useful 
energy' balance sheets, derived from the energy supplied balance 
sheets, which show the energy really used by final consumers at 
their appliances . To draw up these balance sheets, it is necessary 
to know how many appliances are in use, how much energy is 
used by each type of appliance and what is the average yield of 
the appliances. The main advantage of this approach is that it is 
highly suitable for forecasting energy demand ; it is discussed in 
Chapter II and used for the empirical work ·in Chapter Ill. 
BSimple definitions are given below, accompanied by figures for 
EC 10 in 1981 (in million toe) , as a guide to understanding and 
assessing the importance of the main aggregates of the energy 
supplied balance sheets on which the calculations in Chapter I 
are based . 
The graphs and tables were drawn up on the basis of statistics 
from: 
(i) Energy supplied balance ·sheets, published by the Energy 
Statistics Directorate of the SOEC ; 
(ii) Nalional accounts: ESA - Aggregates 1960-81 and Sectoral 
databank 1960-81, published by the SOEC. 
For fur1her details, see Principles and methodology of energy 
balance sheers. SOEC, February 1980. 
whereas consumption of solid fuels rose only in a few 
countries, and fell overall owing to a further decline in the 
largest countries. 
This very general description of the main trends in gross 
inland consumption is no guide to the real changes in energy 
consumption, since it does not take into account the changes 
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The energy balance sheet (EC 10) in 1981 
Consumption of energy supplied corresponds to the sum 
of final consumption for energy purposes in the three 
c_onsumer sectors (industry. transport, household/ter-
tiary) and final consumption for non-energy purposes 
(raw materials in industry, mainly chemicals and petro-
chemicals). 
To obtain this quantity of energy in a form suitable to 
satisfy demand by final consumers, the energy sector has 
processed, consumed and transported various energy 
sources. All the energy used for this purpose is aggre-
gated. 
Total consumption of energy supplied and consumption 
by the energy sector is the quantity of energy needed to 
satisfy inland consumption in the territorial unit con-
sidered. 
To this total we may add supplies for ships on the high 
seas, irrespective of thier flags. These supplies may be 
treated as consumption, or preferably as exports, since 
bunker stocks are not in general related to the level of 
economic activity of a country. 
The grand total represents the country's aggregate 
demand for energy, and it should be equal to the 
aggregate supply: production imports, changes in stocks. 
1 
l 
1 
INDUSTRY (all industrial branches except the 
energy branch) 
+ TRANSPORT (all types of transport except shipping 
in international waters, covered by 'maritime bunker 
stocks') 
+ HOUSEHOLD/TERTIARY (heterogenous sector 
including consumption by households, small indus-
trial firms, crafts, trade, general government, agricul-
ture, fisheries and services except transport) 
FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION (energy sup-
plied to consumers for energy purposes) 
+ FINAL NON-ENERGY CONSUMPTION (com-
prising use for chemical synthesis and non-energy uses 
of other chemical synthesis and non-energy uses of 
other sectors: lubricants, road surfaces, etc.) 
FINAL CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY (allowing 
for statistical deviation) 
+ CONSUMPTION BY THE ENERGY SECTOR 
(processing losses, losses in the course of distribution, 
consumption of the sector itselO 
GROSS INLAND CONSUMPTION 
OF ENERGY (GICE) 
+ MARITIME BUNKER STOCKS 
GROSS PRODUCTION OF ENERGY 
PRIMARY PRODUCTION 
IMPORTS 
CHANGES IN STOCKS 
EXPORTS 
(million toe) 
210,0 
+ 152,0 
+255,0 
=617,0 
+58,0 
=677,0 
+233,0 
=910,0 
+ 26,0 
936,0 
484,0 
+680,0 
+7,0 
-235,0 
in economic activity in the main energy-consuming countries 
or sectors. It is therefore now necessary t0 analyse final 
energy consumption by sector and relate it to representative 
aggregates of corresponding economic activity to get a better 
idea of actual energy consumption trends, by measuring 
what we may term the 'energy intensity' of economic 
activities. 
1.2 Final energy consumption and energy intensity 
36 
Tables 1.2.1 to 1.2.8 for each of the countries covered in the 
analysis, give details of gross inland consumption of primary 
energy according to the definitions reproduced in the box 
above. It is thus possible to trace, from 1973 to 1979 and then 
to 1981 (the 1982 data for final consumption are not yet 
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GRAPH 1.2: Compari<lon ofenergy intensities 1973-1979-1981 
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available), the trends in the main components of energy 
consumption. 
1.2.1 General observations 
Throughout the period 1973-81 and for most of the 
countries, the main features of the trend in energy demand 
are as follows: 
(i) a marked fall (more than 15% in the Community of Ten) 
in the final consumption of industry, which led to a 
reduction in its share of final consumption from 34,9% 
to 31,1 %; 
(ii) an appreciable increase (concentrated in the period 
1973-79) in the final consumption of the transport 
sector, whose share of final consumption rose from 18% 
to 22,5%; 
(iii) an intermediate trend in the consumption of the 
household/tertiary sector: an increase up to 1979, 
followed by a fall, giving a roughly constant share of 
final consumption: 37,3% in 1973 and 37,8% in 1981; 
(iv) ~ contraction in final non-energy consumption (mainly 
as raw materials for chemicals and petro-chemicals 
branches), whose share of final consumption fell over 
the period from 9,8% to 8,6%; 
(v) a greater reduction in total final consumption of energy 
than in gross inland consumption of energy, because the 
marked decline in the use of oil and the increase in that 
of electricity led overall to an increase in the energy 
sector's own consumption. 
Finally, apart from these changes in total energy consump-
tion, there was a marked fall in oil consumption alone in all 
the sectors (except for transport) but particularly in 
industry-where the fall exceeded 40% in the Community of 
Ten between 1973 and 1981-and in the energy sector, where 
it exceeded 30% in the Community of Ten, the consequence 
here being a sharper reduction in gross inland consumption 
of oil than in that of final consumption. 
1.2.2. Final consumption in industry 
The general reduction in final consumption in industry is one 
of the main features of the period, although its extent must be 
seen in relation to the trend in industrial activity.• In 
Table 1.2, industry's final consumption of energy is related 
to the value added of industry as a whole, expressed in ECU 
at 1975 prices and exchange rates, in order to measure energy 
consumption per unit of value added, which Gonstitutes the 
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Account should also be taken of changes in the structure of industrial 
activity, particularly the share of high energy-consumption industries, 
especially steel, in total industry; in some countries (notably Belgium), this 
goes far to explain the decline in industry's consumption (see also 
point 1.3). 
'energy intensity' of industrial activity. The same was done 
with the final consumption of oil, although the relationship is 
less meaningful because only part of industry consumes oil. 
On examining the figures by country and for the Community 
as a whole, it can be seen first of all that in the sub-period 
1973-79 the final consumption of industry per unit of value 
added fell in many countries (giving a drop of 14,1% in the 
Community of Ten) and in any case decreased considerably 
more (or increased considerably less) than the total final 
consumption of industry (down 4, 1 % in the Community of 
Ten). In the second sub-period 1979-81, by contrast, the 
reduction in the energy intensity of industry (10% for the 
Ten) was less than the reduction of total final energy 
consumption in industry (11,8% for the Ten). This is 
certainly due to the fact that the easiest energy savings were 
made initially and that increasingly costly investment was 
then necessary to reduce energy consumption while the 
economic climate deteriorated (having grown by 11,7% 
between 1973 and 1979, industry's value added contracted by 
1,9% between 1979 and 1981). 
Even so, energy intensity in industry showed a remarkable 
fall over the period: 
Reduction in energy intensity in industry, 1973-81 
(%) 
B DK D F UK ECIO 
-30,0 -13,4 -19,7 -29,3 -20,1 -7,0 -16,8 -22,8 
The figures for the Netherlands arc no useful guide. lndustry"s energy consumption. as 
indicated by national statistics harmonized al Community level, shows trends which 
diverge from the rest of the Community. For example. whereas between 1973 and 1979 
unit consumption in the Community of Ten fell by 14,1%, that of the Netherlands 
increased by 9,1%; worse still, whereas unit consumption of oil, again in industry, 
seems lo have increased by 25.3% in the Netherlands between 1973 and 1979, ii fell by 
25,8"1. in the Community of Ten. 
As energy intensity is measured in toe per million ECU, both 
levels and changes can be compared (see Graph 1.2). It is 
interesting to note in this context that the improvements in 
industry's energy intensity in the various countries does not 
depend closely on the initial level: 
(i) Belgium, which had the highest consumption per unit of 
value added in 1973, admittedly showed the best 
performance, but this was not matched by the United 
Kingdom though unit consumption was very high and 
close to that of Belgium; 
(ii) Germany and France, whose levels of unit consumption 
were among the lowest, nevertheless reduced the energy 
intensity of their industry very sharply (better than 
Denmark which had a comparable initial level). 
Nevertheless, levels of energy intensity in industry are highly 
dispersed in the Community; this is perhaps due to different 
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Table 1.2.1 
Main energy consumption indicators_: Belgium 
1973 1979 1981 6 1979 6 .!2§1 6 .!2§1 
1973 1979 1973 
Energy 
Induslry 
I. Final consumption (FC) . (million /Oe ) 15,2 13,9 11 ,8 - 8,6 - 15,1 -22,4 
(Share in total FC) (%) (41,4) (37, 1) (36,5) 
2. FC per unit o r value added ( 10e/J()6 ECU) 1 184,0 959,1 840,8 - 19,0 - 12,3 -30,0 
Trcmsporl 
3. Final consumption (million foe) 5,0 5,9 5,7 + 18,0 -3,4 +14,0 
(Share in total FC) (%) (13,6) (15,7) (17,6) 
4. FC per unit or private consumption ( 1oe/ /()6 ECU) 171 ,2 170,0 164,2 - 0,7 -3,4 -4, 1 
Househo/d/1er1iary sec/or 
5. Final consumption ( million /Oe) 12,8 14,6 12,0 + 14,1 - 17,8 -6,3 
(Share in total FC) (%) (34,9) (38,9) (37,2) 
6. FC per unit or priva te consumption (10e/ /()6 £CU) 438,4 420,7 345,8 - 4,0 - 17,8 -21,1 
7. Total final energy consumption (million foe) 33,0 34,4 29,5 +4,2 - 14,2 - 10,6 
8. Final non-energy consumption (million toe) 3,7 3,1 2,8 - 16,2 -9,7 -24,3 
(Share in total FC) (%) (10, 1) (8,3) (8,7) 
9. Total fin al consumption ( 100%) (million toe) 36,7 37,5 32,3 +2,2 - 13,9 12,3 
10. FC per unit or GDP ( toe/ / ()6 ECU) 755, I 669,6 570,7 - 11 ,3 - 14,8 -24,4 
11. Energy sector consumption (million toe) 9,1 10,8 10,8 + 18,7 0 + 18,7 
12. Gross inland consumption or energy (GICE) (million foe) 45,7 48,5 43 ,3 +6, 1 - 10,7 -5,3 
13. G ICE per unit of GDP ( 10e/ J()6 ECU) 940,3 866, 1 765,0 - 7,9 -1 1,7 - 18,6 
Oil 
lnd11s1ry 
I . Fi na l consumption (FC) (million !Oe) 4,6 3, 1 2,2 -32,6 -29,0 -52,2 
(Share in total FC) (%) (22,5) (16, I) (14, 1) 
2. FC per unit or value added ( toe/ / ()6 ECU) 358,3 213,9 156,8 - 40,3 -26,7 - 56,2 
Transport 
3. Final consumption (million 10e) 4,9 5,9 5,6 +20,4 -5, 1 + 14,3 
(Share in total FC) (%) (24,0) (30,6) (35,9) 
4. FC per unit or private consumption ( loe/ /()6 £CU) 167,8 170,0 161,4 + 1,3 -5,1 -3,8 
Ho11sehold/1er1iary sec/or 
5. Final consumption (million foe ) 8,0 8, 1 5,8 + 1,2 -28,4 -27,5 
(Share in total FC) (%) (39,2) (42,0) (37,2) 
6. FC per unit or private consumption ( 1oe/ J()6 ECU) 270,0 233,4 167, 1 - 13,6 - 28,4 - 38,1 
7. Total final energy consumption (million 10e) 17,5 17, 1 13,6 - 2,3 -20,5 -22,3 
8. Final non-energy consumption ( million toe) 2,9 2,3 2,0 -20,7 - 13,0 - 31,0 
(Share in total FC) (%) (14,2) (11,9) (12,8) 
9. Total final consumption ( I 00%) ( million toe) 20,4 19,3 15,6 -5,4 - 19,2 -23,5 
10. F per unit or GDP ( toe/ /()6 ECU) 419,8 344,6 275,6 - 17,9 -20,0 -34,3 
11. Energy sector consumption ( million toe) 6,8 5,8 5,1 - 14,7 - 12,1 - 25,0 
12. Gross inland consumption or o il (GICO) ( million toe ) 27,3 25, 1 20,6 - 8,1 - 17,9 - 24,5 
13. G ICO per unit or GDP ( toe/ /()6 ECU) 561,7 448,2 364,0 - 20,2 - 18,8 - 35,2 
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Table 1.2.2 
Main energy consumption indicators: Denmark 
1973 1979 1981 6_ 1979 6.~ 6.~ 1973 1979 1973 
Energy 
Industry 
I. Final consumption (FC) ( million toe) 3,4 3,3 3,3 -2,9 0 -2,9 (Share in total FC) (%) (20,7) (19,9) (24,2) 
2. FC per unit of value added (toe/106 ECUJ 616,5 532,0 533,7 -13,7 +0,3 -13,4 
Transport 
3. Final consumption (million toe) 3,2 3,4 3,1 +6,2 -8,8 -3,1 (Share in total FC) (%) (19,5) (20,5) (22,8) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption (toe/106 ECU) 189,3 178,9 169,4 -5,5 -5,3 -10,5 
Household/tertiary sector 
5. Final consumption ( million toe) 9,2 9,5 6,8 +3,3 -28,4 -26,I (Share in total FC) (%) (56,1) (57,2) (50,0) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption (toe/106 ECU) 544,4 500,0 371,6 -8,2 -25,7 -31,7 
7. Total final energy consumption ( million toe) 15,8 16,2 13,2 +2,5 -18,5 -16,5 
8. Final non-energy consumption (million toe) 0,6 0,4 0,4 -33,3 0 -33,3 (Share in total FC) (%) (3,7) (2,4) (3,0) 
9. Total final consumption (100%) ( million toe) 16,4 16,6 13,6 + 1,2 -18,1 -17,1 
10. FC per unit of GDP (toe/106 ECU) 530,8 475,4 393,5 -10,4 -17,2 -25,9 
11. Energy sector consumption (million toe) 3,2 3,7 3,1 + 15,6 -16,2 -3,1 
12. Gross inland consumption of energy (GICE) (million toe) 19,5 20,3 16,8 +4,1 -17,2 -13,8 
13. GICE per unit of GDP (toe/106 ECU) 631,1 581,7 485,5 -7,8 -16,5 -23,1 
Oil 
Industry 
I. Final consumption (FC) (million toe) 2,7 2,2 1,6 -18,5 -27,3 -40,7 
(Share in total FC) (%) (19,4) (16,5) (15,7) 
2. FC per unit of value added (toe/106 ECU) 489,6 354,7 258,8 -27,6 -27,0 -47,1 
Transport 
3. Final consumption (million toe) 3,2 3,4 3,0 +6,2 -11,8 -6,2 
(Share in total FC) (%) (23,0) (25,6) (29,4) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption ( toe/ 106 ECU) 189,3 178,9 163,9 -5,5 -8,4 -13,4 
Household/tertiary sector 
5. Final consumption ( million toe) 7,4 7,3 5,2 -1,3 -28,8 -29,7 
(Share in total FC) (%) (53,2) (54,9) (51,0) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption (toe/106 ECU) 437,9 384,2 284,2 -12,3 -26,0 -35,1 
7. Total final energy consumption (million toe) 13,3 12,8 9,8 -3,8 -23,4 -26,3 
8. Final non-energy consumption (million toe) 0,6 0,4 0,4 -33,3 0 -33,3 
(Share in total FC) (%) (4,3) (3,0) (3,9) 
9. Total final consumption (100%) ( million toe) 13,9 13,3 10,2 -4,3 -23,3 -26,6 
10. FC per unit of GDP (toe/106 ECU) 449,9 380,9 295,1 -15,3 -22,5 -34,4 
11. Energy sector consumption (million toe) 3,4 2,4 1,1 -29,4 -54,2 -67,6 
12. Gross inland consumption of oil (GICO) (million toe) 17,2 15,7 11,5 -8,7 -26,7 -33,1 
13. GICO per unit of GDP (toe/106 ECUJ 556,6 449,9 332,4 -19,2 -26,1 -40,3 
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Table 1.2.3 
Main energy consumption indicators: FR of Germany 
1973 1979 198 1 f:i 1979 Li !2§.! Li !2§.! 
1973 1979 1973 
Energy 
!11d11s1ry 
I. Final consumption (FC) (million 10e) 68,6 66,5 60,5 -3, 1 -9,0 - 11 ,8 
(Share in total FC) (%) (34,1) (3 1,5) (31 ,8) 
2. FC per unit of value added ( foe/ 106 ECU) 563,3 490,9 452,3 - 12,9 -7,9 -19,7 
Trc111spor1 
3. Final consumption (million 10e) 33,0 39,6 39,3 +20,0 -0,8 + 19,0 
(Share in total FC) (%) (16,4) (18 ,8) (20,7) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption (1oe/ I06 ECU) 165,9 164,5 161 ,1 - 0,8 - 2,1 - 2,9 
/-/011sehold/1e/'liary sec/or 
5. Final consumption ( million IOe) 78,8 85,7 72,5 +8,8 - 15,4 -8,0 
(Share in total FC) (%) (39,2) (40,6) (38,2) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption ( 1oe/ !06 ECU) 396,2 355,9 297, 1 - 10,2 - 16,5 -25,0 
7. Total final energy consumption ( million 10e) 180,4 191,8 172,3 +6,3 - 10,2 - 4,5 
8. Final non-energy consumption (million 10e) 20,5 19,4 17,7 - 5,4 -8,8 - 13,7 
(Share in total FC) (%) (10,2) (9,2) (9,3) 
9. Total final consumption (100%) ( million 10e) 200,9 211 ,2 190,0 +5,1 - 10,0 -5,4 
10. FC per unit of GDP ( toe/106 ECU) 591 ,2 538, 474,0 - 9,0 - 11 ,9 - 19,8 
I I. Energy sector consumption (million fo e) 61,0 70,6 67 ,8 + 15,7 - 4,0 +11 ,1 
12. Gross inland consumption of energy (GICE) (million foe) 262,2 28 1,8 257,8 +7,5 - 8,5 - 1,7 
13. GI CE per unit of GDP ( toe/ 106 ECU) 77 1,6 717,8 643 ,1 - 7,0 - 10,4 - 16,7 
Oil 
Ind11s1ry 
I. Final consumption (FC) (million foe) 26,2 20,4 13,1 - 22,1 - 35,8 - 50,0 
(Share in total FC) (%) (20,8) (16,0) (12,6) 
2. FC per unit of value added ( 1oe/ J()6 ECU) 215 , I 150,9 98 ,0 - 29,8 - 35,1 - 54,4 
Transporl 
3. Final consumption (nzillion foe) 31,6 38,7 38,3 +22,5 - 1,0 + 21,2 
(Share in total FC) (%) (25, I) (30,4) (37,0) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption (1oe/ J()6 ECU) 158,9 160,7 157,0 + 1,1 - 2,3 - 1,2 
Ho11sehvld/1er1iary sec/or 
5. Fina l consumption (million foe) 50,0 50,7 37,2 + 1,4 - 26,6 - 25 ,6 
(Share in total FC) (%) (39, 7) (39 ,8) (35 ,9) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption (1oe/ !06 ECU) 251 ,4 210,5 152,5 - 16,3 -27,6 -39,3 
7. Total final energy consumption (million foe) 107,8 109,8 88,6 + 1,9 - 19,3 - 17,8 
8. Final non-energy consumption ( million IOe) 18,1 17,8 15,0 - 1,7 - 15,7 - 17,1 
( hare in total FC) (%) (14,4) (14,0) (14,5) 
9. Total fi nal consumption (100~{) (million 10e) 125,9 127,5 103,6 + 1,3 - 18,8 - 17,7 
10. FC per unit of GDP (1oe/ J{fi ECU) 370,5 324,8 258,4 - 12,3 - 20,4 - 30,3 
I I. Energy sector consumption (million foe ) 20,2 16,6 11 ,2 - 17,8 -32,5 - 44,6 
12. Gross inland consumption of oil (GICO) (million foe ) 146,2 143,0 114,8 - 2,2 - 19,8 -21,5 
13. G ICO per unit of GDP (1oe/ J(fi ECU) 430,2 364.5 286.4 - 15,3 - 21,4 - 33,4 
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Table 1.2.4 
Main energy consumption indicators: France 
1973 1979 1981 ~ 1979 ~ 1981 ~ .!lli 1973 1979 1973 
Energy 
Industry 
I. Final consumption (FC) ( million toe) 46,1 46,1 38,1 0 -17,4 -17,4 
(Share in total FC) (%) (33,5) (32,1) (28,6) 
2. FC per unit of value added (toe/ICY> ECU) 657,9 553,6 465,0 -15,9 -16,0 -29,3 
Transport 
3. Final consumption (million toe) 25,9 31,2 32,2 +20,5 +3,2 +24,3 
(Share in total FC) (%) (18,8) (21,7) (24,2) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption (toe/ICY> ECU) 163,2 157,3 156,9 -3,6 -0,3 -3,9 
Household/tertiary sector 
5. Final consumption ( million toe) 54,3 54,1 50,2 -0,4 -7,2 -7,6 
(Share in total FC) (%) (39,5) (37,6) (37,7) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption (toe/ICY> ECU) 342,2 272,8 244,6 -20,3 -10,3 -28,5 
7. Total final energy consumption (million toe) 126,3 131,4 120,5 +4,0 -8,3 -4,6 
8. Final non-energy consumption (million toe) 11,3 12,3 12,6 +8,8 +2,4 +11,5 
(Share in total FC) (%) (8,2) (8,6) (9,5) 
9. Total final consumption (100%) (million toe) 137,6 143,7 133,1 +4,4 -7,4 -3,3 
10. FC per unit of GDP (toe/ICY> ECU) 521,2 456,0 415,7 -12,5 -8,8 -20,2 
11. Energy sector consumption (million toe) 35,4 39,2 45,6 +10,7 + 16,3 +28,8 
12. Gross inland consumption of energy (GICE) (million toe) 174,7 185,3 180,5 +6,1 -2,6 +3,3 
13. GICE per unit of GDP (toe/ICY> ECU) 661,7 588,1 563,7 -11,1 -4,1 -14,8 
Oil 
Industry 
1. Final consumf lion (FC) ( million toe) 22,7 20,5 13,1 -9,7 -36,1 -42,3 
(Share in tota FC) (%) (23,8) (22,1) (16,2) 
2. FC per unit of value added (toe/ ICY> ECU) 323,9 246,2 160,0 -24,0 -35,0 -50,6 
Transport 
3. Final consumption ( million toe) 25,3 30,6 31,6 +20,9 +3,3 +24,9 
(Share in total FC) (%) (26,6) (33,0) (39,1) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption (toe/ ICY> ECU) 159,4 154,3 154,0 -3,2 -0,2 -3,4 
Household/tertiary sector 
5. Final consumf lion (million toe) 37,5 31,4 26,9 -16,3 -14,3 -28,3 
(Share in tota FC) (%) (39,4) (33,9) (33,3) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption (toe/ICY> ECU) 236,3 158,3 131,0 -33,0 -17,2 -44,6 
7. Total final energy consumption (million toe) 85,5 82,5 71,6 -3,5 -13,2 -16,3 
8. Final non-energy consumption ( million toe) 9,7 10,2 9,2 +5,2 -9,8 -5,1 
(Share in total FC) (%) (10,2) (11,0) (11,4) 
9. Total final consumption (100%) ( million toe) 95,2 92,7 80,8 -2,6 -12,8 -15,1 
10. FC per unit of GDP (toe/ICY> ECU) 360,6 294,2 252,3 -18,4 -14,2 -30,0 
11. Energy sector consumption (million toe) 27,0 20,4 13,7 -24,4 -32,8 -49,2 
12. Gross inland consumption of oil (GICO) (million toe) 123,8 114,9 96,6 -7,2 -15,9 -22,0 
13. GICO per unit of GDP (toe/ICY> ECU) 469,0 364,6 301,6 -22,3 -17,3 -35,7 
42 
Energy balances and economic activity in the European Community: the main findings for the period 1973-82 
Table 1.2.5 
Main energy consumption indicators: Italy 
1973 1979 1981 6 1979 6~ 6~ 1973 1979 1973 
Energy 
lndus/ry 
I. Final consumption (FC) ( million foe) 35,7 36,7 36,0 +2,8 - 1,9 +0,8 
(Share in total FC) (%) (36,4) (34,6) (35,0) 
2. FC per unit of value added ( toe/1()6 ECU) 745,6 638,8 595,7 -14,3 -6,7 -20,l 
Transport 
3. Final consumption ( million toe ) 19,4 24,9 25,4 +28,4 +2,0 +30,9 
(Share in total FC) (%) (19,8) (23,5) (24, 7) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption (toe/ 1()6 ECU) 193,8 213,9 208,7 + 10,4 -2,4 +7,7 
Household/tertiary sec/or 
5. Final consumption (million toe) 30,8 34,7 33,0 + 13,0 -4,9 +7,1 
(Share in total FC) (%) (31,4) (32,7) (32,0) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption ( toe/ 106 ECU) 307,7 298,1 271,1 -3, 1 -9, 1 - 11 ,9 
7. Total final energy consumption (million toe) 85,9 96,3 94,4 + 12,1 -2,0 +9,9 
8. Final non-energy consumption (million toe) 12,1 9,7 8,5 -19,8 - 12,4 -29,8 
(Share in total FC) (%) (12,3) (9,2) (8,3) 
9. Total final consumption (100%) ( million toe) 98,0 106,0 102,9 +8,2 - 2,9 +5,0 
10. FC per unit of GDP ( toe/ 1()6 ECU) 635,1 588,9 550,9 -7,3 -6,5 - 13,3 
11. Energy sector consumption (million toe) 24,5 28,8 28, 1 + 17,6 - 2,4 + 14,7 
12. Gross inland consumption of energy (GICE) (million toe) 122,2 134,1 130,4 +9,7 -2,8 +6,7 
13. GICE per unit of GDP (toe/ 106 ECU) 792,0 745,0 698,1 -5,9 -6,3 - 11 ,9 
Oil 
Industry 
I. Final consumption (FC) (million foe ) 17,3 14,7 14,3 - 15,0 - 2,7 - 17,3 
(Share in total FC) (%) (25, I) (21,9) (22,5) 
2. FC per unit of va lue added ( toe/ 106 £CU) 361,3 255,9 236,6 -29,2 - 7,5 -34,5 
Transport 
3. Final consumption (million toe ) 18,9 24,2 24,7 +28,0 +2,0 +30,7 
(Share in total FC) (%) (27,5) (36,0) (38,8) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption ( toe/ /()6 ECU) 188,8 207,9 203,0 + 10,1 -2,4 +7,5 
Household/ tertiary sector 
5. Final consumption (million toe) 22,7 21,0 18,2 - 7,5 - 13,3 -19,8 
(Share in total FC) (%) (33 ,0) (31 ,3) (28,6) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption ( toe/ /()6 £CU) 226,7 180,4 149,5 - 20,4 - 17,1 - 34,0 
7. Total final energy consumption ( million toe) 58,9 59,9 57,2 + 1,7 - 4,5 -2,9 
8. Final non-energy consumption (million toe) 9,9 7,3 6,5 -26,3 - 11 ,0 -34,3 
( hare in total FC) (%) (14,4) (10,9) (10,2) 
9. Total final consumption (100%) (million toe) 68,8 67,2 63,6 - 2,3 - 5,4 -7,6 
10. FC per unit or GDP ( loe/ /()6 £CU) 445,9 373,3 340,5 - 16,3 - 8,8 -23,6 
11. Energy sector consumption ( million toe) 26,8 29,2 26,4 +9,0 - 9,6 - 1,5 
12. Gross inland consumption or oil (GICO) (million toe) 95 ,2 95,6 89,6 +0,4 - 6,3 - 5,9 
13. GICO per unit or GDP ( toe/ /()6 £CU) 617,0 531,1 479,7 - 13,9 - 9,7 -22,3 
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Table 1.2.6 
Main energy consumption indicators: The Netherlands 
1973 1979 1981 6_ 1979 6.~ 6_ 1981 1973 1979 1973 
Energy 
Industry 
I. Final consumption (FC) ( million toe) 13,1 15,5 13,3 + 18,3 -14,2 + 1,5 
(Share in total FC) {%) (26,5) (27,8) (27,5) 
2. FC per unit of value added (toe/J()fJ ECU) 855,9 933,4 796,2 +9,1 -14,7 -7,0 
Transport 
3. Final consumption (million toe) 7,2 8,4 8,6 + 16,7 +2,4 + 19,4 
(Share in total FC) (;~) (14,5) (15, I) (17,8) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption (toe/J()fJ ECU) 198,9 175,0 183,4 -12,0 +4,8 -7,8 
Household/tertiary sector 
5. Final consumption ( million toe) 20,2 22,0 19,3 +8,9 -12,3 -4,5 
(Share in total FC) (%) (40,8) (39,4) (39,9) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption (toe/J()fJ ECU) 558,0 458,3 411,5 -17,9 -10,2 -25,2 
7. Total final energy consumption ( million toe) 40,5 46,9 41,2 + 15,8 -12,2 +1,7 
8. Final non-energy consumption (million toe) 9,0 9,9 7,2 + 10,0 -20,0 -27,3 
(Share in total FC) (%) (18,2) (17,7) (14,9) 
9. Total final consumption (100%) ( million toe) 49,5 55,8 48,4 + 12,7 -13,3 -2,2 
10. FC per unit of GDP ( toe/ J(jl'J ECU) 759,2 702,8 611,1 -7,4 -13,0 -19,5 
11. Energy sector consumption (million toe) 13,1 13,7 12,4 +4,6 -9,5 -5,3 
12. Gross inland consumption of energy (GICE) (million toe) 61,4 67,6 60,7 + 10,1 -10,2 -1,1 
13. GICE per unit of GDP ( toe/ J(jl'J ECU) 941,7 851,4 766,4 -9,6 -10,0 -18,6 
Oil 
Industry 
I. Final consumption (FC) (million toe) 2,5 3,4 2,5 +36,0 -26,5 0 
(Share in total FC) (%) (10,4) (14,5) (13,4) 
2. FC per unit of value added (toe/J()fJ ECU) 163,3 204,7 149,7 +25,3 -26,9 -8,3 
Transpori 
3. Final consumption ( million toe) 7,1 8,3 8,5 +16,9 +2,4 + 19,7 
(Share in total FC) (%) (29,6) (35,3) (45,7) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption ( toe/ J(jl'J ECU) 196,1 172,9 181,2 -11,8 +4,8 -7,6 
Household/tertiary sector 
5. Final consumption (million toe) 6,9 3,6 2,2 -47,8 .-38,9 -68,1 
(Share in total FC) (%) (28,8) (15,3) (11,8) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption (toe/J()fJ ECU) 190,6 75,0 46,9 -60,6 -37,5 -75,4 
7. Total final energy consumption (million toe) 16,5 15,3 13,2 -7,3 -13,7 -20,0 
8. Final non-energy consumption ( million toe) 7,5 8,1 5,4 +8,0 -33,3 -28,0 
(Share in total FC) (%) (31,2) (34,5) (29,0) 
9. Total final consumption (1001~) (million toe) 24,0 23,5 18,6 -2,1 -20,9 -22,5 
10. FC per unit of GDP ( toe/ J(jl'J ECU) 368,1 296,0 234,8 -19,6 -20,7 -36,2 
11. Energy sector consumption (million toe) 5,5 8,4 8,3 +52,7 -1,2 +50,9 
12. Gross inland consumption of oil (GICO) ( million toe) 29,5 30,6 26,8 +3,7 -12,4 -9,2 
13. GICO per unit of GDP (toe/J()fJ ECU) 452.5 385,4 338,4 -14,8 -12,2 -25,2 
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Table 1.2.7 
Main energy consumption indicators: United Kingdom 
1973 1979 198 1 6 1979 6 ~ 6~ 1973 1979 1973 
Energy 
Industry 
I. Final consumption (FC) (million toe) 57,6 48,6 39,3 - 18,8 - 16,0 -3 1,8 
(Share in total FC) (%) (37,5) (30,7) (29,1) 
2. FC per unit of value added ( toe/ 106 ECU) I 164,0 983,8 968,7 - 15,5 - 1,5 - 16,8 
Transport 
3. Final consumption (million toe) 29,8 32,8 32,0 + 10,0 -2,4 +7,4 
(Share in total FC) (%) (19,4) (21,5) (23, 7) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption {toe/106 ECU) 252,8 256,9 253,0 + 1,6 - 1,5 0 
Household/tertiary sector 
5. Fina l consumption (million toe) 54,0 59,1 55,8 +9,4 -5,6 +3,3 
(Share in total FC) (%) (35, I) (38,8) (41 ,3) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption ( toe/ 106 ECU) 458,0 462,8 441 ,1 + 1,0 -4,7 -3,7 
7. Total final energy consumption (million toe) 141 ,4 138,7 127. 1 - 1,9 -8,4 - 10,1 
8. Final non-energy consumption (million toe) 12,3 13,8 8,0 + 12,2 -42,0 -35,0 
(Share in total FC) (%) (8,0) (9,0) (5 ,9) 
9. Total final consumption ( 100%) (million toe) 153,7 152,5 135,1 - 0,8 - 11.4 - 12,1 
10. FC per unit o f GDP ( toe/106 ECU) 809 ,8 739,6 681 ,6 - 8,7 - 7.8 - 15,8 
11. Energy sector consumption (million toe) 67,5 64,4 58,4 -4,6 - 9,3 - 13,5 
12. Gross inland consumption of energy (GICE) (million toe) 22 1,7 219,8 194,4 - 0,9 - 11 ,6 - 12,3 
13. G ICE per unit of GDP {toe/ 106 ECU) I 168, 1 I 066,0 980,8 -8,7 - 8,0 - 16,0 
Oil 
Industry 
I. Final consumptio n (FC) (million toe) 24,4 17,9 11 ,6 - 26,6 - 35,2 -52,5 
(Share in total FC) (%) (31, I) (24,8) (19,2) 
2. FC per unit of value added {toe/ 106 ECU) 493 ,1 376,3 285,9 -23,7 - 24,0 - 42,0 
Transport 
3. Fi nal consumption (million toe) 29,5 32,4 31,6 +9,8 - 2,5 +7, 1 
(Share in total FC) (%) (37 ,6) (44,9) (52,3) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption ( toe/ 106 ECV) 250,2 253,7 250,0 + 1,4 - 1,5 0 
Ho11schold/tertiary sector 
5. Fina l consumption (million toe) 13,3 12,5 9,8 - 6,0 -21,6 -26,3 
(Share in total FC) (%) (17,0) (17,3) (16,2) 
6. FC per unit of priva te consumptio n ( toe/ 106 £CV) 112,8 97 ,9 77,5 - 13,2 -20,8 -3 1,3 
7. To tal final energy consumption (million toe) 67,2 62,8 53 ,0 - 6,5 - 15,6 -21,1 
8. Final non-energy consumption ( million toe) 11 ,2 9,3 7,4 - 17,0 -20,4 -33,9 
( hare in total FC) (~~) (14,3) (12,9) (12,3) 
9. Total final consumption (100%) (million toe) 78,4 72 ,1 60,4 -8,0 -22,2 -23,0 
10. FC per unit of GDP ( toe/ 106 £CU) 413, 1 349,7 304,7 - 15,3 - 12,9 -26,2 
11. Energy sector consumption ( million toe) 29,3 20,0 12,8 - 31,7 -36,0 -56,3 
12. Gross inland consumption of oil (G ICO) (million toe) 108 ,2 92,9 73,7 - 14,1 - 20,7 -3 1,9 
13. G ICO per unit of GDP ( toe/ 106 ECU) 570,0 450,S 37 1.8 -21,0 - 17,5 - 34,8 
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Table 1.2.8 
Main energy consumption indicators: EC 10 
1973 1979 1981 ,0,. 1979 ,0,. 1981 ,6.~ 
1973 1979 1973 
Energy 
Industry 
I. Final consumption (FC) (million toe) 248,0 238,0 210,0 -4,0 -11,8 -15,3 
(Share in total FC) (%) (34,9) (32,0) (31,1) 
2. FC per unit of value added (toe//Qf, ECU) 755,3 648,8 583,4 -14,I -10,0 -22,8 
Transport 
3. Final consumption (million toe) 128,0 152,0 152,0 + 18,8 0 + 18,8 
(Share in total FC) (%) (18,0) (20,4) (22,5) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption (toe//Qf, ECUJ 189,8 188,7 185,8 -0,6 -1,5 -2,1 
Household/tertiary sector 
5. Final consumption ( million toe) 265,0 286,0 255,0 +7,9 -10,8 -3,8 
(Share in total FC) (%) (37,3) (38,4) (37,8) 
6. FC per unit of private. consumption (toe//Qf, ECUJ 393,0 355,1 311,8 -9,6 -12,2 -20,7 
7. Total final energy consumption ( million toe) 641,0 676,0 617,0 +5,5 -8,7 -3,7 
8. Pinal non-energy consumption ( million toe) 70,0 69,0 58,0 -1,4 -15,9 -17,1 
(Share in total FC) (%) (9,8) (9,2) (8,6) 
9. Total final consumption (100%) (million toe) 711,0 745,0 675,0 +4,8 -9,4 -5,1 
10. FC per unit of GDP (toe//Qf, ECU) 636,3 575,4 516,3 -9,6 -10,3 -18,9 
11. Energy sector consumption (million toe) 218,0 238,0 233,0 +9,2 -2,1 +6,9 
12. Gross inland consumption of energy (GlCE) ( million toe) 931,0 985,0 910,0 +5,8 -7,6 -2,3 
13. GICE per unit of GDP (toe//Qf, ECUJ 833,3 760,8 696,0 -8,7 -8,5 -16,5 
Oil 
Industry 
I. Final consumption (FC) ( million toe) 105,0 87,0 62,0 -17,1 -28,7 -40,9 
(Share in total FC) . (%) (23,8) (20,2) (16,9) 
2. FC per unit of value added (toe//Qf, ECU) 319,8 237,2 172,2 -25,8 -27,4 -46,2 
Transport 
3. Final consumption ( million toe) 125,0 149,0 150,0 + 19,2 +0,7 +20,0 
(Share in total FC) (%) (28,4) (34,7) (40,9) 
4. FC per unit of private consumption (toe//Qf, ECU) 185,4 185,0 183,3 -0,2 -0,9 -1,I 
Household/tertiary sector 
5. Final consum1tion ( million toe) 149,0 138,0 108,0 -7,4 -21,7 -27,5 (Share in tota FC) (%) (33,9) (32,1) (29,4) 
6. FC per unit of private consumption (toe//Qf, ECU) 221,0 171,3 132,0 -22,5 -22,9 -40,3 
7. Total final energy consumptipn (million toe) 379,0 374,0 320,0 -1,3 -14,4 -15,6 
8. Final non-energy consumption ( million toe) 61,0 56,0 47,0 -8,2 -16,I -22,9 
(Share in total FC) (%) (13,9) (13,0) (12,8) 
9. Total final consumption (100%) (million toe) 440,0 430,0 367,0 -2,3 -14,7 -16,6 
10. FC per unit of GDP (toe//Qf, ECU) 393,8 332,1 280,7 -15,7 -15,5 -28,7 
11. Energy sector consumption (million toe) 122,0 107,0 85,0 -12,3 -20,6 -30,3 
12. Gross inland consumption of oil (GICO) (million toe) 564,0 537,0 452,0 -4,8 -15,8 -19,9 
13. GICO per unit of GDP (toe//Qf, ECU) 504,8 414,8 345,7 -17,8 -16,7 -31,5 
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industrial and energy consumption structures in the different 
countries, but also to less efficient energy use in certain 
countries, particularly Belgium, the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands (see Graph 1.2). In the case of oil, the level of 
consumption per unit of value added in industry varies 
extremely widely from one country to another (as pointed 
out above, the proportion of industry's value added that is 
based on the use of oil differs between countries). Only its 
trend can therefore be analysed. The following emerges: 
(i) the total consumption of oil in industry has fallen 
sharply (by 40,9% in the Community of Ten) ; generally 
speaking, the fa ll was more marked in the second sub-
period ( - 28, 7%) than in the first ( - 17, l %). Industry's 
share of final oil consumption thus fell from 23,8% in 
1973 to 16,9% in 1981; 
(i i) even more remarkable however, is the reduction in oil 
consumption per unit of value added , which in some 
countries reached or exceeded 50% between 1973 and 
198 1 (with an average reduction of 46% for the 
Community); 
(ii i) finally, a sharp reduction in the unit consumption of oil 
is frequently seen to be accompanied by a sharp 
reduction in energy consumption (Belgium, Germany 
and France) : oil savings, far from compromising energy 
savings, reinforce them. 
1.2.3 Final consumption in transport 
In the absence of a more suitable economic aggregate, the 
energy consumption of the transport sector has been rela ted 
to private consumption ,1 expressed in ECU a t 1975 prices 
and exchange ra tes, in order to calcula te a unit consumption 
of energy (in toe per million ECU). 
Genera ll y speaking, the final consumption of the transport 
sector grew appreciably during the peri od 1973-79, although 
only half as fas t as during the period 1963-73, when the 
an nual rate of expansion was over 5%. With the exception of 
Denmark ( + 6,21~ only) and Ita ly a t the other extreme ( + 28,4%), the increase in consumption over the whole 
period was close to the Community average in most 
countries ( + 18,8° 0 for the Community of Ten). 
Energy consumption per unit of private consumption varied 
fairly widely between count ries : between the two extremes of 
Italy ( + 10,4~0 ) and the Netherlands ( - 12,0}~), the Com-
munity average stood close to zero a t 0,6%. 
The aggregate is. of course. only un approximate indication of the 
·econo mic activity" to be related to the energy demand of these sectors. 
l\loreovcr. some findings may be distorted or dimcult to interpret because 
the aggregate is e~tremly sensi tive to cyclical variations. 
During the second sub-period, the growth in consumption 
was halted practically everywhere: consumption was 
stationary in the Community of Ten in 1979 and 1981 at 152 
million toe. Unit consumption showed a slightly greater fall 
than previously in the Community of Ten (- 1,5%), 
reflecting fairly accurately the general trend. 
Oil consumption increased between l 973 and 1981 to exceed 
98% of final consumption in the transport sector. This sector 
thus became the largest consumer of oil, accounting for 
40,9% of final oil consumption in 1981 (28,4% in 1973). 
1.2.4 Final consumption in the household/tertiary sector 
Any analysis of consumption in this sector is always made 
hazardous by the highly varied nature of its components : 
domestic consumption (heating, lighting, household appli-
ances), service activities (distributive trades and the craft 
sector), agriculture and fisheries . Here again, unit consump-
tion (energy intensity) was calculated in relation to private 
consumption expressed in ECU at 1975 prices and exchange 
rates. 
As in the case of transport, total consumption in the 
household/tertiary sector generally increased during the 
1973-79 sub-period, although more modestly ( + 7 ,9% for the 
Community ofTen) and with greater variation (ranging from 
- 0,4% in France, the only exception, to + 14, I% in 
Belgium). During the second sub-period, however, total 
consumption showed a significant fall , ranging from - 4,9% 
in Italy to - 28,4% in Denmark ( - I 0,8% for the Community 
of Ten) . 
With economic act1v1ty growing more slowly (private 
consumption in the Community of Ten increased by 19,5% 
between 1973 and 1979 and by only 1,6% between 1979 and 
1981 ), energy consumption per unit of private consumption 
in fact fell in the Community of Ten over the two sub-
periods, although more sharply in the second than in the first 
sub-period and tnis in most countries (Community of Ten : 
1973-79: - 9,6%; 1979-8 1: - 12,2%. 
The reduction in energy intensity thus achieved between 1973 
and 198 1 is quite remarkable and in some countries reached 
similar rates to those in industry. However, Italy and 
especially the United Kingdom did much worse than the 
Community average. 
Reduction in energy intensity in the household/tertiary 
sector, 1973-81 
B DK D F NL 
r· .J 
UK EC 10 
- 21.1 - 31, 7 - 25,0 - 28,5 - 11 ,9 - 25,2 - 3,7 - 20,7 
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Total oil consumption in the household/tertiary sector, 
having fallen fairly modestly (by 7,4% in the Community of 
Ten) between 1973 and 1979 in most countries (with the 
notable exceptions of the Netherlands: -47,8% 1 and 
France: - 16,3%), decreased sharply following the second 
oil shock (by 21,7% in the Community of Ten). The 
household/tertiary sector's share of oil consumption thus 
declined from 33,9% in 1973 to 29,4% in 1981. 
The changes in unit consumption of oil differed substantially 
between countries in the two sub-periods, but the results 
offset each other over the period as a whole, and (with the 
exception of the Netherlands: - 75,4%) the reduction was 
frequently close to the Community average of - 40%. Here 
again, the countries which reduced their unit consumption of 
oil the most were also the most successful in reducing their 
unit consumption of energy. 
1.2.5 Final energy consumption 
The total consumption of the three sectors (i.e. final energy 
consumption) increased generally in the Community of Ten 
(by 5.5~1~) between 1973 and 1979 as a result of the growth in 
consumption by the tranport and household/tertiary sectors. 
The trends of final non-energy consumption varied widely 
according to country (from -33,3% in Denmark to + 12,2% 
in the United Kingdom), although, given the comparatively 
small part it plays, this scarcely affected total final 
consumption, which grew moderately (by 4,8% in the 
Community of Ten). 
Final consumption was related this time to total GDP 
expressed in ECU at 1975 prices and exchange rates. The 
resultant final consumption per unit of GDP is fairly 
representative of the energy intensity of the different 
economies (see Graph 1.2): between 1973 and 1979, it fell in 
all Community countries in line with the sectoral results 
commented on above. Thus, taking into account economic 
growth of 15,9;;, between 1973 and 1979, energy intensity for 
the entire economy wa reduced by 9,6'/~ in the Community of 
Ten. 
In the second sub-period, the distinct fall in final consump-
tion in industry and the household/tertiary sector and the 
stagnation in the transport sector led to an appreciable 
decline in final energy consumption (down 8,7% in the 
Community of Ten) together with a sharp contraction in 
final non-energy consumption (down 15,9% in the Com-
munity of Ten. Total final consumption therefore fell 
significantly (by 9,4% in the Community of Ten), although, 
given the low level of economic growth (GDP up by only I% 
between 1979 and 1981 ), the reduction in CQJlsumption per 
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Assuming. this time, that the consumption figures given in the energy 
balance sheets for the Netherlands arc accurate (sec note I of table on 
p. 38). 
unit of GDP is barely different at Community of Ten level 
(down 10,3%). 
Over the period 1973 to 1981, as a whole, there was therefore 
a very marked reduction in the energy intensity of the 
Community economies: 
Reduction in total energy intensity, 1973-81 
(%) 
B DK D F NL UK EClO 
- 24,4 - 25,9 - 19,8 - 20,2 13,3 19,5 -15,8 -18,9 
The decline in energy intensity (i.e. for example, in the 
consumption of energy per unit of GDP) can be regarded as a 
meaningful measure of the energy savings made. 2 It results 
from the combination of two effects which are described in 
detail in Section 1.3: the first, the content effect, corresponds 
to the change in the energy content of each activity; the 
second, the structural effect, relects the trend in each 
activity's share of total economic activity. However, this 
second effect, which, to be captured completely, would 
require a high level of disaggregation of activities, is in fact 
usually underestimated. While the content effect alone 
should, strictly speaking, be regarded as corresponding to 
energy savings, it is usually, in view of what has been said, the 
wider concept of energy intensity which is used, thereby 
combining the content and structural effects, both then being 
regarded as lasting effects reducing energy demand. 
Oil consumption trends were generally in the same direction 
but slightly more pronounced. Final consumption fell more 
sharply during the second sub-period (by 2,3~{ between 1973 
and 1979 and by 14, 7~~ between 1979 and 1981 in the 
Community of Ten). However, consumption per unit of 
GDP showed similar and appreciable variations during the 
two sub-periods ( - 15, 7% and - 15,5~~ respectively for the 
Community of Ten). Overall, the reduction in final oil 
consumption per unit of GDP was 28,7% for the Community 
of Ten, which indicates that quite remarkable oil saving were 
made. 
Finally, Table 1.2 also gives the results for gross inland 
consumption of energy which are not very different from 
those for final consumption. The changes in the energy 
sector's own consumption usually reduce the 'energy savings' 
performance and improve the 'oil savings' performance for 
most countries, as we have already pointed out. 
See the definition given by R. Lattes and A. Jean blanc: Croissance 
eco11omiq11e. be.wins d'energie et economies d'energie, Commissariat a 
l'cnergic atomique, November 1981, p. 40. 
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1.3 Final cons.umption of energy and oil: analysis by 
component 
The above analysis has shown the main trends in the final 
consumption of energy and oil and in unit consumption (or 
energy intensity) in order to take account of the importance 
of changes (of level and structure) in economic activity. The 
analysis may be taken further by breaking down the change 
in final consumption into three components: 1 
(i) the content effect, which corresponds to the variation in 
consumption arising from a change in the energy 
content of each economic activity in the sectoral 
disaggregation: for example, the final energy consump-
tion of industry per unit of value added; 
(ii) the structural effect, which corresponds to the variation 
in consumption arising from changes in the structure of 
economic activities: share of industry's value added and 
share of services, etc. in GDP; then, within industry, 
share of certain sectors which are major energy 
consumers: steel industry, chemical industry, etc; 
(iii) the activity effect, which corresponds to the variation in 
consumption produced directly by changes in the level 
of economic activity (GDP). 
This section owes much to Patrick Criqui's article 'Impacts du premier 
choc pi:trolicr sur lcs consommations d'i:nergie finale (France, Allemagnc, 
Royaume-Uni et Japon)" in 'Les grands acteurs de la scene cnergctique 
mondialc·. t:nmomic Prospectfre /11tematio11ah· No 11. third quarter 1982, 
Documentation Franc;aise. He suggests the following breakdown: 
If final consumption is: 
FC = I: (FC; x VA, x GDP) 
I VA, GDP 
where FC; = final consumption of sector i 
VA; = value added for sector i 
GDP = gross domestic product of the country considered 
then its variation may be expressed as the sum of three effects: 
6FC = I: (6 FC;) x VA; x GDP ( = energy content effect) 
; VA, GDP 
+ I: 6-' ___! x UDP ( = structural effL'Ct) ( 
VA ) FC ~ 
; GDP " VA, 
+ r, (6GDP) FC, x VA, ( = activity effect) 
x YA; GDP 
+ adjustment 
In fact. the main contribution of this breakdown is to isolate 
the content effect which, alone, corresponds strictly speaking 
to energy savings (as pointed out in point 1.2.5.), so that this 
result can be used to project energy demand. That is why the 
following remarks concentrate on the relative effects of 
reducing energy contents. 
In this study, the breakdown has been made for energy and 
for oil between three sectors: industry, transport and the 
household/tertiary sector. In the absence of reliable branch-
by-branch statistics for energy consumption by industry, the 
analysis has been made for industry as a whole, which 
undoubtedly has the effect of reducing the importance of 
structural effects. In the case of the transport and household/ 
tertiary sectors, value added has been replaced by private 
consumption (as in Section 1.2), which, particularly in the 
case of the transport sector, makes the analysis less accurate. 
Nevertheless, the results for energy in Table 1.3.1. are fairly 
satisfactory, the adjustment is in general rather small and the 
effects revealed seem reasonable. 
1.3.1 Final consumption of energy 
Breaking down the change in final energy consumption 2 into 
three effects shows fairly clear differences between the two 
sub-periods studied. 
In the period 1973-79, the chief component of the change in 
final consumption is without any doubt the level of economic 
activity, the rise in which is associated with an increase in 
consumption of IOI, I million toe for the Community of Ten. 
However, the content effect is also of considerable import-
ance, at least as regards industry and the household/tertiary 
sector (as might be expected), since the reduction in energy 
content is as high as 61,3 million toe for the Community of 
Ten. This leaves the structural effect, which seems very low ( + 3,7 million toe for the Community of Ten) but it has 
probably been underestimated because the level of sectoral 
disaggregation is insufficient. 
By sector, the results show: 
(i) in industry: a very large content reduction effect 
( - 35 million toe, or over 50°1~ of the total content effect 
for the three sectors). reinforced in general by a fairly 
high negative structural effect, with one exception; in 
Italy, the positive structural effect reflects continuing 
industrialization (in contrast to the United Kingdom. 
where the negative structural effect is particularly 
pronounced). The net result is a decline in the demand 
for energy by industry. in spite of a high positive activity 
effect; 
Throughout this section. the analysis relates solely to consumption for 
energy purposes and excludes final non-energy consumption; con-
sequent!~ final consumption must here be taken to mean final 
consumption for energy purposes. 
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Table 1.3.1 
Components of the change in final energy consumption 
( IIP toe) 
B DK D F 
1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 
Energy 
Final consumption by industry -I 269 -2 122 -49 -15 -2 110 -5 980 -29 -7 980 
Content effect -2 887 -) 714 -466 +II -8 816 -5 228 -7309 -7 377 
Structural effect -289 -596 -17 +23 -2 408 -2 113 -525 -I 322 
Activity effect +2 312 +149 +443 -33 + 10 487 + I 323 +9 310 +598 
Adjustment -405 +39 -9 -16 - I 373 +38 -1 505 + 121 
Final consumption by transport +967 -275 + 198 -349 +6 557 -336 +5 244 +I 046 
Content effect -35 -201 -176 -180 -279 -819 -936 -79 
Structural effect + 157 -63 -17 -92 +I 581 -307 +I 214 +571 
Activity effect +761 +63 +417 -34 +5 127 +837 +5013 +505 
Adjustment +84 -74 -26 -43 + 128 -47 -47 +49 
Final consumption by household/tertiary +I 706 -2 502 +266 -2 699 +6 873 -13 249 -231 -3 879 
Content effect -517 -2599 -750 -2 440 -8 016 -14 159 -11 014 -5 592 
Structural effect +401 -155 -49 -256 +3 776 -659 +2 546 +991 
Activity effect + I 949 +156 +I 199 -96 + 12 244 + I 812 + 10 511 +876 
Adjustment -127 +96 -134 +93 -) 131 -243 -2 274 -154 
Final energy consumption + I 404 -4 899 +415 -3 063 +II 320 -19 565 +4 984 -10 813 
Content effect -3 439 -4 514 -1 392 -2 609 -17111 -20 206 -19 259 -13 048 
Structural effect +269 -814 -83 -325 +2 949 -3 079 +3 235 +240 
Activity effect +5 022 +368 +2 059 -163 +27 858 +3 972 +24 834 +I 979 
Adjustment -448 +61 -169 +34 -2 376 -252 -3 826 +16 
NL UK EClO 
1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 
Energy 
Final consumption by industry + I 044 -768 +2 356 -2 162 -10 742 -7 554 -10 384 -27 858 
Content effect -5 114 -2 746 + I 186 -2 278 -8 982 -718 -34 968 -23 990 
Structural effect + I 028 +501 -831 + 133 -7 023 -5 267 -8 355 -6 432 
Activity effect +5 934 + I 385 +2 079 -41 +5 005 -) 829 +38 728 +2 038 
Adjustment -798 +92 -78 +24 +258 +260 -5 789 +526 
Final consumption by transport +5 423 +496 + I 221 + 198 +3 008 -829 + 23 927 +200 
Content effect +2 012 -605 -865 +403 +483 -498 -742 -2 336 
Structural effect -62 +186 +640 -172 -90 + I 006 +3 937 +860 
Activity effect + 3 231 +940 + I 568 -21 +2 575 -) 282 +20 320 +I 491 
Adjustment +242 -25 -122 -12 +40 -55 +412 +185 
Final consumption by household/tertiary +3 881 -I 691 + I 798 -2 679 -5 137 -3 315 + 20 600 -30 325 
Content effect -960 -3 142 -3 609 -2 246 +566 -2 771 -25 556 -34 874 
Structural effect -98 +259 + I 794 -450 -163 + I 812 +8 152 +I 618 
Activity effect +5 130 + I 310 +4 399 -55 +4666 -2 310 +42 075 +2 805 
Adjustment -191 -118 -786 +72 +68 -46 -4 071 +126 
Final energy consumption + 10 348 - I 963 +5 375 -4 643 -2 597 -II 698 + 34 143 -57 983 
Content effect -4 062 -6 493 -3 288 -4121 -7 933 -3 987 -61 266 -61 200 
Structural effect .+-868 +946 + I 603 -489 -7 276 -2 449 +3 734 -3 954 
Activity effect + 14 295 +3 635 +8 046 -117 + 12 246 -5 421 + 101 123 +6 334 
Adjustment -753 -51 -986 +84 +366 + 159 -9 448 +837 
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(ii) in transport the content effect is generally very low, the 
structural effect is fairly low but positive (and not very 
significant), while the highly positive activity effect in all 
countries explains most of the growth in consumption ; 
(iii) in the household/ tertiary sector, a strongly positive 
activity effect is accompanied by a positive structural 
effect (reflecting an increase in the share of private 
consumption in GDP). Although the decline in energy 
content is very large, especially in France and Germany, 
it is still equivalent to only 50% of the total of the other 
two effects. 
The following period, 1979-81 , still saw heavily negative 
content effects ( - 61,2 million toe), modest structural effects 
( - 4,0 million toe), and , this time, much weaker although still 
positive activity effects ( + 6,3 million toe), as was to be 
expected. The net result of course is a substantial fall in final 
energy consumption. The results by sector show a very large 
reduction in the energy content of the household/tertiary 
sector ( - 34,9 million toe), a slightly lower reduction in 
industry ( - 24,0 million toe) and once more a fairly small 
reduction in transport ( - 2,3 million toe). The structural 
effect is unimportant except in industry (- 6,4 toe), while 
activity effects are obviously very small : altogether, the 
la rgest reduction in energy consumption is in the household/ 
terti a ry sector. 
So, although the period 1979-8 1 may seem to mark a break 
with the preceding period, with an appreciable fall in energy 
consumption (down 59 million toe for the Community of 
Ten), this is chiefl y the result of two phenomena: 
(i) a very large and virtually identical content effect in the 
two periods (down 61,2 million toe), which demonstrates 
that a high level of energy saving was maintained. This 
suggests that, since the least costly savings were made 
first, investment in the efficient use of energy was stepped 
up in the second period, despite the unfavourable 
Table 1.3.2 
Changes in final energy consumption: breakdown by sector, 1973-81 
Con tent efTect 
Structural cfTect 
Activity efTect 
Adjustment 
Total change in final energy consumption 
economic situation. This effect seems to have continued 
and even to have grown stronger in 1982 for gross inland 
consumption of energy (see Section 1.4), but we do not 
yet have figures for final consumption; 
(ii) a very high positive activity effect in the period 1973-79 ( + 101 million toe), followed by a very modest activity 
effect in the second period ( + 6,3 million toe), which 
reflects the contraction in economic activity. This effect 
continued in 1982 but is by its nature reversible. 
The structural effect, as estimated here, was negligible on the 
whole, but of some importance at sectoral level. 
All in all, it is therefore fair to say that the period following 
the second oil shock, while not strictly speaking marking a 
break in the trend of the energy-economy relationship, saw 
increased efforts to improve energy efficiency which are very 
important from the viewpoint of the Community's energy 
objectives. 
It is interesting to specify the share of each sector in these 
results (see Table 1.3.2 below), to qualify some of the 
findings. The table shows clearly that, over the period as a 
whole: 
(i) the household/tertiary sector reduced its energy content 
most, but was subject to a fairly marked positive 
structural effect; 
(ii) the good results for industry's reduction in energy 
content are accompanied by a heavily negative struc-
tural effect, which explains the considerable overall 
reduction in the sector's energy consumption; 
(iii) the transport sector is a case apart because the very 
small reduction in energy content means that its 
consumption is still largely determined by economic 
activity. 
Industry 
- 58 958 
- 14 767 
+ 40 766 
- 5 263 
-38 242 
EC to 
Transport 
- 3 078 
+4 797 
+ 21 811 
+597 
+24 127 
( thousand roe) 
Household/ 
tertiary 
-60 430 
+9 770 
+44 880 
- 3 945 
-6 398 
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Finally, developments in certain countries are worth noting: 
(Cf. table 1.3.3) the considerable reduction in energy content 
achieved in Belgium ( - 7,9 million toe), Germany ( - 37 
million toe) and France ( - 32 million toe altogether, but the 
results were better in the first sub-period than in the second 
because of the poor performance of the household/tertiary 
sector during the second period), while results are not nearly 
so good in other countries: the United Kingdom ( - 12 
million toe) and Italy (- 10,5 toe). It is also interesting that a 
highly negative structural effect is observed for the whole 
Table 1.3.3 
Components of the change in final consumption of energy, 1973-81 
B DK D 
Content clTect -7 953 -4 001 -37 317 
Structural elTcct -545 -408 -130 
Activity elTcct +5 390 + I 896 +31 830 
Adjustment -387 -135 -2 6:!8 
Total change in the final 
consumption of energy -3 495 -2 648 -8 245 
1.3.2 Final consumption of oil 
The above analysis can be extended to the final consumption 
of oil (or more strictly of petroleum products). 1 In this case 
the change in final consumption is broken down by three 
effects (see Table 1.3.4): 
52 
P. Criqui docs this in the study already mentioned: we have used the same 
formulae. adapting them lo the data available. In this case the final 
consumption of petroleum is formulated on the basis of its share 
in the final consumption of energy ~C and of the energy intensity of 
FC FC 
the consumer sector i: ___! ; we thus have: 
VA; 
PC= L (PC; X FC; X VA) 
i FC, VA, I 
(for transport and the household/tertiary sector. value added is replaced 
by private consumption on the economic territory). 
From which we deduce: 
APC = l: (A PC;) x FC, x VA; ( = substitution effect) 
I FC; VA; 
+ l: (AFC;) x PC; x VA. ( = content effect) 
i VA; FC; I 
+ r (t!.V A ) re, x FC, ( = activity effect) 
I I X FC; VA; 
period only in the United Kingdom (- 10 million toe), 
mainly owing to industry; a negative structural effect also 
developed in Germany from 1979 to 1981. 
Lastly, for the period 1973-81 as a whole, we find that the 
content effect aggregated for the two sub-periods is usually 
greater than the activity effect: since the structural -effect is 
small, the result is a net fall in the final consumption of 
energy for all countries, except Italy and the Netherlands -
see Table 1.3.3 below. 
( 1housand /Oe) 
F NL UK ECIO 
-32 307 -10 555 -7 409 -II 920 -122 466 
+3 475 + I 814 +1 114 -9 725 -220 
+26 813 + 17 930 +7 929 +6 825 + 107 457 
-3 810 -804 -902 +525 -8 611 
-5 829 +8 385 +732 -14 295 -23 840 
(i) the substitution effect, which corresponds to the change 
in the share of oil in energy consumption; 
(ii) the content effect, which corresponds to the change in 
the energy content of the activity of the sector 
considered; 
(iii) the activity effect, which com:sponds to the change in 
activity of the sector concerned, or the value added of 
industry. 
This means that this time the structural effect is not shown 
separately, but incorporated partly in the content effect and 
partly in the activity effect. 
A comparison of overall results for the Community of Ten 
over the two sub-periods leads to the following general 
conclusions: 
(i) the reduction of the oil content of economic activity was 
of a similar scale in the two sub-periods: - 30 million 
toe from 1973 to 1979, and - 28 million toe from 1979 to 
1981. This means that relative oil savings were 
maintained at a high level (in parallel to the findings for 
aggregate energy); 
(ii) substitution effects were heavily negative in both sub-
periods ( - 35 million toe in 1973-79, and - 32.6 million 
toe in 1979-81); this interesting finding needs to be 
analysed by sector; 
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Table 1.3.4 
Components of the change in the final consumption of oil for energy purposes 
( J()11oe) 
B DK D F 
1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 
Oil 
Final consumption by industry - I 552 -823 -462 -587 -5 804 -7264 -2 221 -7 380 
Content effect -878 -376 -334 -3 -3 367 -1604 -3 599 -3 280 
Structural effect - I 273 -420 -429 -579 -5 156 -6 001 -2 200 -4 650 
Activity effect +596 -97 +336 -7 +2 942 -255 +4 274 -330 
Adjustment +3 +70 -35 +2 -223 +596 -696 +880 
Final consumption by transport +962 -277 + 197 -350 +7 076 -366 + 5 257 + I 060 
Content effect -34 -198 -178 -231 -267 -800 -915 -78 
Structural effect +9 -6. 0 -2 +650 -108 + !02 +19 
Activity effect +926 0 +397 -125 +6 656 +514 +6 313 + I 064 
Adjustment +61 -73 -22 +8 +37 +28 -243 +55 
Final consumption by household/tertiary +88 -2 338 -188 -2 010 +505 -13 451 -6 062 -4 515 
Content effect -323 - I 220 -631 - I 869 -5 086 -8 263 -7 606 -3 246 
Structural effect -864 - I 138 -386 +80 -3 382 -6 727 -5 984 -2 4!0 
Activity effect + I 507 0 +924 -267 + 10 533 +674 +9 359 + I 093 
Adjustment -232 +20 -95 +46 - I 560 +865 - I 831 +48 
Final consumption for energy purposes -502 -3 438 -453 -2 947 + I 777 -21 081 -3 026 - 10 835 
Content effect - I 235 - I 794 -I 143 -2 !03 -8 720 - IO 667 -12 120 -6604 
Structural effect -2 128 - I 564 -815 -501 -7 888 -12 836 -8 082 -7 041 
Activity effect +3 029 -97 + I 657 -399 +20 131 +933 + 19 946 + I 827 
Adjustment -168 + 17 -152 +56 -1 746 + I 498 -2 770 +983 
NL UK ECIO 
1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 1973-79 1979-81 
Oil 
Final consumption by industry -2 560 -420 +856 -899 -6460 -6 366 -17 916 -24 579 
Content effect -2 478 -992 +218 -488 -3 777 -275 - 14 805 -8 770 
Structural effect -3 001 -122 +343 -498 -2 369 -4 086 - 14 345 - 16 733 
Activity effect +3 457 +763 +214 +20 -942 -2 635 + 12 307 -1 626 
Adjustment -538 -69 +81 +67 +628 +630 -1 073 +2 550 
Final consumption by transport + 5 361 +508 + I 218 + 195 +2 889 -828 +24 293 + 185 
Content effect +1960 -588 -834 +396 +479 -492 -724 -2 336 
Structural effect -45 +14 +9 -1 -63 -10 +474 + I OOO 
Activity effect +3 078 + I 101 +2 314 -191 +2 452 -305 +24 300 +2 312 
Adjustment +368 -19 -271 -9 +21 -21 +243 -791 
Final consumption by household/tertiary -1 723 -2 801 -3 251 - I 470 -807 -2 699 - IO 971 -29 722 
Content effect -708 - I 902 -1 231 -369 + 139 -586 -14 369 -16 827 
Structural effect -4 060 - I 862 -3 549 - I 169 -1 879 -2 120 -21 133 -16 871 
Activity effl'Ct +3 696 +956 +2 246 -83 + I 105 -117 +28 969 +2 142 
Adjustment -651 +7 -717 + 151 -172 + 124 -4 438 + I 834 
Final consumption for energy purposes I 078 -2 713 - I 177 -2 174 -4 378 -9 893 -4 594 - 54 116 
Content effect - I 226 -3 482 - I 847 -461 -3 159 - I 353 -29 898 - 27 933 
Structural effect -7 106 - I 970 -3 197 - I 668 -4 311 -6 216 -35 004 -32 604 
Activity effect + 10 231 +2 820 +4 774 -254 +2 615 -3 057 +65 576 +2 828 
Adjustment -821 -81 . -907 + 209 +477 + 733 -5 268 +3 593 
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Table 1.3.5 
Changes in the final consumption of oil for energy purposes: breakdown by sector, 1973-81 
Content effect 
Substitution effect 
Activity effect 
Adjustment 
Total change in the final consumption of oil for energy purposes 
(iii) activity effects were positive and very high in the first 
sub-period ( + 65,5 million toe), practically offsetting 
the negative content and substitution effects; as might 
be expected, they were low in the period 1979-81 ( + 2,8 
million toe); this led to a major reduction in oil 
consumption for energy purposes during the second 
sub-period ( - 54 million toe). 
Results by sector for the Community of Ten show: 
(i) total content and substitution effects highest in the 
household/tertiary sector ( - 69 million toe in 1973-81 : 
see Table 1.3.5), with a difference between the two sub-
periods: substitution was most marked from 1973 to 
1979, while the content effect grew stronger in 1979-81. 
The performance of the household/tertiary sector in 
respect of substitution corresponds to notable penet-
ration of natural gas and electricity in this sector; 
(ii) in industry, on the other hand, subsitution was stronger 
in the second sub-period, while content effects com-
bined accounted for 54,5 million toe from 1973 to 1981 ; 
Table 1.3.6 
/thousand toe) 
EC 10 
Industry Transport Household/ 
tertiary 
-23 575 -3 060 -31 196 
-31 078 + I 474 -38 004 
+ 10 681 +26 612 +31 Ill 
+ I 477 -548 -2 604 
-42 495 + 24 478 -40 693 
(iii) in transport, only the activity effect was significant; it 
was highly positive from 1973 to 1979, close to zero from 
1979 to 1981, and altogether it explains most of the 
growth of oil consumption in this sector ( + 24,5 million 
toe); there is no oil saving in transport as yet. 
Finally, results by countries show particularly sizeable 
subsitution and content effects: mainly in Germany but also 
in France, the Netherlands and Belgium, while performances 
in the other two major countries. the United Kingdom and 
Italy, are much poorer. These results show once again that, in 
general, large oil savings have not prevented the substitution 
of other energy sources for oil (see Table 1.3.6). 
1.4 Conclusion: the evolution of demand and of energy saving 
The preceding -sections have reviewed the various com-
ponents of the change in the sectoral and total demand for 
energy in the two sub-periods covered by the analysis. The 
three sectors behaved differently according to country and 
period, making it difficult to formulate an overall assessment 
Components of the change in the final consumption of oil for energy purposes, 1973-81 
(million toe) 
B DK D F NL UK ECIO 
Content effect -3 029 -3 246 -19 387 -18 724 -4 708 -2 308 -4 512 -57 831 
Substitution effect -3 692 -1 316 -20 724 -15 123 -9 076 -4 865 -10 527 -67 608 
Activity effect +2 932 + I 258 +21 064 +21 773 + 13 051 +4 520 -442 +68 404 
Adjustment -151 -96 -257 -1 787 -902 -698 -1 210 -1 675 
Total = change in the final con-
sumption of oil for 
energy purposes -3 940 -3 400 -19 304 -13 861 -1 635 -3 351 -14 271 -58 710 
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Table 1.4.1 
Performance in respect of relative energy saving 
B DK 
Final energy consumption per unit of GDP 
1973-79 - 11 ,3 - 10,4 
1979-8 1 - 14,8 - 17,2 
- 1973-8 1 -24,4 -25,9 
Gross inland consumption of energy per unit of 
G DP 
1973-79 - 7,9 -7,8 
1979-8 1 - 11 ,7 - 16,5 
1979-82 - 15,5 - 18,6 
1973-8 1 - 18,6 - 23,1 
1973-82 -22,2 -25,0 
which takes sufficient account of these special features. So 
when, (see Table 1.4.1 ), we look at what may be considered 
each country's overall performance, we must bear in mind 
the numerous peculiarities of each country or sector which 
were reviewed in detail above. 
Table 1.4. 1 shows the trend of energy consumption per uni.t 
of GDP, considered to be representative of the trend in 
energy intensity of a country's economic activi ties, and hence 
of its energy saving, broadly defined. Two formulae were 
used, one taking final energy consumption as the basis and 
the other gross inland consumption of energy (which takes 
account of the energy sector's own consumption and losses), 
Table 1.4.2 
Performance in respect of relative oil saving 
B DK 
Fi nal energy consumption of oi l 
per unit of GDP 
1973-79 - 17,9 - 15,3 
- 1979-81 - 20,0 - 22,5 
- 1973-81 - 34,3 - 34,4 
Gross inland consumpti on of oi l 
per unit of GDP 
1973-79 - 20,2 - 19,2 
1979-8 1 - 18,8 -26,1 
1979-82 - 23,0 - 31.8 
1973-8 1 - 35,2 - 40,3 
1973-82 - 38,6 - 44,8 
(%) 
D F NL UK EC 10 
- 9,0 - 12,5 - 7,3 - 7,4 -8,7 - 9,6 
- 11 ,9 -8,8 -6,5 -13,0 - 7,8 - 10,3 
- 19,8 -20,2 - 13,3 - 19,5 - 15,8 - 18,9 
- 7,0 - 11 ,1 - 5,9 - 9,6 -8,7 -8,7 
- 10,4 - 4,1 -6,3 - 10,0 -8,0 -8,5 
- 14,1 - 9,4 -8,7 - 16,1 - 12,5 - 12,5 
- 16,7 - 14,8 - 11 ,9 - 18,6 - 16,0 - 16,5 
-20,1 - 19,4 - 14, 1 -24,1 -20,1 -20,0 
but the differences are not very great, and as we have already 
stated, the performance everywhere--except in the United 
Kingdom- for gross inland consumption is lower than for 
final consumption. 
The figures show in particular that relative energy saving was 
above the Community average in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany and the Netherlands, close to the average in the 
United Kingdom, Germany and France, and well below 
average in Italy. In the first four countries, the best results 
were recorded chiefly in the second sub-period; in France, 
where relative energy saving was the largest in the period 
1973-79, the 1979-81 result was poor. Italy's performance 
was relatively modest in both sub-periods. 
(%) 
D F NL UK EC 10 
- 12,3 - 18,4 - 16,3 - 19,6 - 15,3 - 15,7 
-20,4 - 14,2 - 8,8 - 20,7 - 12,9 - 15,5 
- 30,3 - 30,0 - 23,6 - 36,2 - 26,2 - 28,7 
- 15,3 - 22,3 - 13,9 - 14,8 -21,0 - 17,8 
- 21,4 - 17,3 - 9,7 - 12,2 - 17,5 - 16,7 
- 24,8 - 25,9 - 13,2 - 27,4 - 17,9 - 21,8 
- 33,4 - 35,7 - 22,3 - 25,2 - 34,8 - 31,5 
- 36,3 - 42,4 - 25,3 - 38,2 - 35,1 - 35,8 
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Table 1.4.2 compares results for relative oil saving. The 
figures confirm the general point that oil saving and energy 
saving go hand in hand. Moreover, the figures for 1982 show 
a rather remarkable improvement in some countries' gross 
inland consumption of oil per unit of GDP. 
Overall the relative saving achieved in the Community is 
high: a decrease of20% between 1973 and 1982. It has been 
accompanied by a very considerable relative saving of (gross 
inland consumption of oil per unit of GDP): a decrease of 
35,8'j~ between 1973 and 1982. Both have made a remarkable 
contribution to the objective of reducing the Comunity's 
dependence on external supplies of energy and especially oil. 
2. Energy production and imports: reduced dependence on 
external supplies 
2.1 Primary energy production 
In order to loosen the energy constraint and especially the oil 
constraint, the oil-importing countries and the Community 
countries in particular have not only made efforts to reduce 
consumption but have also expanded production from 
domestic sources so as to reduce dependence on external 
supplies. From 1973 to 1982 (see Table 2.1.1 ), this expansion 
was chiefly in output of oil and electricity-for the most part 
nuclear-generated-while solid fuel production continued to 
decline and natural gas production peaked and then began to 
fall. 
Table 2.1.1 
Primary energy production 
1973 
Solid Oil Natu· Elcctr. Total 
fuels ral + 
gas other 
B 5,8 5,9 
DK 0,1 
D 92,0 7,2 15,0 5,0 119,2 
F 17,2 2,0 6,3 8,8 34,3 
I 0,3 1.8 12,6 4,6 19,3 
NL 1.2 1,5 53,8 0,3 56,8 
UK 78,7 0,7 24,4 9,2 113,0 
ECIO 197,7 13,2 112,2 28,2 351,3 
% by type of energy (56,3) (3,8) (31,9) (8,0) (100) 
~ 1979-73 
ECIO 
growth rnte ('.',;,) - 8,9 +577.0 +22,5 + 81,5 +30.4 
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The change in Community production during the period 
1973-82 may be broken down as shown in Table 2.1.2: 
The main trends can thus be seen more clearly: 
(i) Solid fuel production contracted mainly in the first 
period and then more or less stabilized in particular in 
the two chief producer countries, Germany and the 
United Kingdom. 
(ii) Oil production expanded most in the first period, in the 
United Kingdom of course, and is probably near its 
maximum at the present time. 
(iii) Natural gas production rose significantly from 1973 to 
1979 and thereafter fell back to the 1973 level chiefly 
because of the gradual exhaustion of Dutch reserves. 
(iv) Electricity generation increased substantially in several 
countries between 1973 and 1979, but thereafter the 
increase in production was most remarkable in France 
while the other countries clearly felt the effects of the 
slowdown in their nuclear power programmes. 
For the Community as a whole, the net effect of this process 
was a rise in primary production of almost 140 million toe, or 
39, 7%, from 1973 to 1982, with very remarkable results for 
some countries. 
(million toe) 
1979 1982 
Solid Oil NalU- Elcctr. Total Solid Oil NalU- Elcctr. Total 
fuels ral + fuels ral + 
gas other gas other 
4,5 2,8 7,4 4,9 3,8 8,8 
0,4 0.4 1,7 1,7 
87,8 5.1 15,7 13,3 121.9 89,4 4,2 12.6 18,4 124,7 
12,9 2.2 6,5 16.9 38,5 11,8 2.4 5,5 35.6 55,3 
0,3 1,7 II.I 5,2 18,3 0.3 1.8 12,0 5,9 19,9 
1,6 70,8 1,2 73,6 1,9 52,5 1.3 55,7 
70,9 78,3 32,9 11,4 193,5 73,0 101.8 30,0 12,6 217,3 
180,2 89,3 137,5 51.2 458,2 183,8 114.8 114.2 78,0 490,8 
(39,3) (19.5) (30.0) (11,2) (100) (37.4) (23.4) (23.3) (15,9) (IOO) 
~ 1982-79 ~ 1982-73 
+2,0 +28,6 -16,9 + 52,3 +7.1 -7,0 +770.0 + 1.8 + 177.0 +39,7 
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Table 2.1.2 
Changes in Community production of primary energy 
( millivn toe) 
1973-79 1979-82 
Solidfuel: EC JO -17,5 +3,6 
of ll'hich: UK -7,8 +2,1 
F -4,3 -1,1 
D -4,2 + 1,6 
B -1,3 +0,4 
Oil: EC /0 +76,1 +25,5 
o{ll'hich: UK +77,6 +23,5 
DK +0,4 + 1,3 
D -2,1 -0,9 
Natural gas: EC 10 +25,3 -23,3 
of ll'hich: NL + 17,0 -18,3 
UK +8,5 -2,9 
D +0,7 -3,1 
Primary electricity and other: EC JO +23,0 +26,8 
ufll'hich: F +8,1 + 18,7 
D +8,3 +5,1 
B +2,8 + 1,0 
UK +2,2 + 1,2 
Total: EC /0 + 106.9 +32,6 
ofll'hich: UK +80,5 +23,8 
NL + 16,8 -17,9 
F +4,2 + 16,8 
D +2,7 +2,8 
B +1,5 + 1,4 
DK +0,3 + 1,3 
I -1,0 + 1,6 
2.2 Imports and dependence 011 external supplies of energy 
Thanks to the efforts to reduce energy consumption and to 
expand domestic production, net energy imports into the 
Community fell significantly; however, the pattern varies 
according to energy source and country as Table 2.2.1 
shows. 
From 1973 to 1979, net energy imports fell sharply in the 
Netherlands and especially in the United Kingdom because 
of the development of oil and gas production in the two 
countries; they stabilized in Denmark but rose in the other 
countries because of the increase in imports of natural gas 
and solid fuel. For the Community. this meant a reduction of 
109.0 million toe ( 18.3'\) in net oil imports. an increase of 
14.8 million toe (77.9'\) in solid fuel imports and an increase 
of 32,2 million toe (80.5'' ,,) in natural gas imports. As a result 
of this diversification. imports were reduced by 61.3 million 
toe (or 9,9''.,) overall. Subsequently, from 1979 to 1982. net 
energy imports fell appreciably in all the countries except the 
Netherlands. but diversification was considerably curbed, 
notably by the reduction in energy consumption (so that 
although the figures for the Community of Ten still show an 
increase in net solid fuel and natural gas imports, this is due 
more to a fall in the exports of the major producer countries 
than to an increase in the other countries' imports). The 
energy imports of the Ten thus fell by 149,1 million toe 
(26, 7%) from 1979 to 1982, with oil imports down by 'I 63,8 
million toe, solid fuel imports up by 7,4 million toe and 
natural gas imports up by 7,2 million toe. 
In total over the period 1973-82 net energy imports fell by 
210,4 million toe or 34%; the share of oil in imports was 
reduced from 96% to 79% in favour of solid fuel and natural 
gas which each now account for 10% of imports. 
Table 2.2.2 gives the changes in the ratios expressing 
dependence on external supplies of energy and oil. From 
1973 to 1979 the reduction in the Community's dependence 
on external supplies of energy (down from 64% to 55,2%) is 
mainly due to the changes in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands while the dependence of other countries 
remained unchanged or actually increased: this reflects the 
expansion of coal and gas imports which has been referred to 
above for this period. Dependence on external supplies of oil 
fell only moderately in all the countries except, of course, the 
United Kingdom, where it fell from 49,8% to 8,5%. Between 
1979 and 1982, the reduction in dependence was generally 
more substantial than in the preceding period, except in the 
Netherlands where, because of the fall in natural gas exports, 
the dependence ratio increased. In Italy, the dependence 
ratio remained virtually unchanged over the period, because 
efforts to reduce consumption and to increase domestic 
production were inadequate, as the preceding sections have 
shown. The most remarkable performance was of course that 
of the United Kingdom. which became a net exporter of 
energy during this period (the dependence ratio thus being 
negative). France also performed well, managing to reduce 
dependence to 65,9%, from 81,3% in 1979. 
The reduction of dependence on external supplies is even 
more marked for oil, as the above analyses indicate. Apart 
from the United Kingdom, Denmark's achievement is 
noteworthy, with dependence down from 91,J~,~ in 1973 to 
54,9~10 in I 982. 
For the Community as a whole, the results are clearly very 
remarkable: 
(i) dependence on external supplies of energy was reduced 
from 64% in I 973 to 45,6~10 in I 982; 
(ii) dependence on external supplies of oil was reduced from 
61,6~~ in 1973 to 36,0% in 1982. 
However, the considerable impact of North Sea oil on 
dependence ratios must be borne in mind: dependence on 
imported energy and oil for the Community countries 
without the United Kingdom, although it declined con-
siderably, is still high: 
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Table 2.2.1 
Net imports of energy 
1973 1979 
Solid Oil Natu- Electr. Total Solid Oil Natu- Electr. Total 
rucls ral + rucls ral + 
gas other gas other 
B 5,3 30,5 7,1 -0,1 42,9 6,8 28,8 9,4 -0,1 44,9 
DK 1,9 18,4 0 0 20,3 4,6 15,3 0 0,3 20,2 
D -10,1 144,6 12,0 0,9· 147,4 -12,1 144,9 30,5 0 163,2 
F 9,9 128,7 7,6 -0,2 145,9 18,0 121,4 14,7 0,5 154,6 
I 7,7 !02,6 1,6 0,1 112,0 8,7 98,8 12,1 0,5 120,1 
NL 1,7 40,0 -25,2 -0,1 16,3 3,5 38,5 -38,4 0 3,6 
UK -0,8 113,0 0,7 0 112,9 1,1 18,9 7,5 0 27,6 
EC IO 19,0 596,2 4,0 0,7 619,9 33,8 487,2 36,2 1,4 558,6 
% by type or ener!IY (3,1) (96,2) (0,6) (0,1) (100) (6,0) (87,2) (6,5) (0,3) (100) 
6 1979-73 6 1982-79 
EC 10 
growth rate (%) +77,9 -18,3 + 805 +100 -9,9 +21,9 -33,6 + 19,9 
Table 2.2.2 
Dependence on external supplies of energy I and oil 2 
1973 1979 
Depen- Depen- Depen- Depen-
dencc on dencc on dencc on dencc on 
external external external external 
supplies supplies supplies supplies 
or energy or oil or energy or oil 
B 87,9 62,5 88,1 56,5 
DK 100 91,1 97,4 73,8 
D 55,5 54,4 57,3 50,9 
F 81,0 71,5 81,3 63,9 
I 86,7 79,4 86,3 71,0 
NL 22,4 54,5 4,8 51,1 
UK 49,7 49,8 12,4 8,5 
EC 10 64,0 61,6 55,2 48,1 
EC (without UK)3 68,4 65,2 67,2 59,3 
net imports or energy 
Dependence on external supplies or energy e --------------- as%. 
Dependence on external supplies or oil • 
gross inland consumption or energy + bunkers 
net imports or oil 
as%-
gross inland consumption or energy + bunkers 
+7,1 -26,7 
1981 
Depen-
dencc on 
external 
supplies 
or energy 
77,7 
100 
51,4 
70,1 
86,0 
5,2 
-6,4 
47,5 
60,1 
(million toe) 
1982 
Solid Oil Natu- Electr. Total 
foels ral + 
gas other 
6,6 21,9 7,0 0 35,5 
5,8 9,5 0 0,2 15,5 
-1,0 !03,1 25,9 0,6 128,5 
15,0 85,6 16,0 -0,3 116,3 
12,3 87,8 11,0 0,6 111,7 
5,3 27,6 -25,0 0,1 8,0 
-5,4 -28,0 8,2 0 -25,2 
41,2 323,4 43,4 1,5 409,5 
(10,0) (79,0) (10,6) (0,4) (100) 
6 1982-73 
+ 116,8 -45,8 +985 + 114,3 -34,0 
1982 
Depen- Depen- Depen-
dencc on dcnce on dence on 
external external external 
supplies supplies supplies 
or oil or energy or oil 
45,8 80,7 49,8 
60,6 89,6 54,9 
42,0 51,9 41,7 
51,0 65,9 48,5 
68,2 85,4 67,1 
45,0 12,3 42,7 
-9,2 -13,3 -14,8 
38,2 45,6 36,0 
48,4 57,8 45,7 
In this case, UK energy imports and consumption have been deducted from EC 10 figures; correspondingly (in the periods when that country was a net energy exporter) its exports have 
not been taken into account. 
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(i) dependence on external supplies for the Community 
excluding the United Kingdom reduced from 68,4% to 
57,8% ; 
(ii) dependence on external supplies of oil was reduced from 
65,2% to 45,7% (see Table 2.2.2). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the changes in the energy balance 
sheets of the Community countries from 1973 to 1982; the 
comparison has usually been between the two periods 
1973-79 and 1979-82 (or 1981 depending on the availability 
of data), chosen arbitrarily and clearly very different in a 
number of respects. However, while not revealing a real 
break in the energy-economy rela tionship, this distinction 
has permitted a clearer portrayal of the factors explaining the 
apparent trend , and in particular the reduction , in absolute 
fi gures, of energy consumption after 1979. The reduction can 
be put down to a combination of: 
(i) a sustained rate of energy saving (through reduced 
energy intensity and above all reduced energy conten_t) 
despite the fact that such saving was becoming increas-
ingly difficult to achieve and called for investment which 
was not favoured by the economic situation of the 1980s; 
and 
(ii) the effects of the recession, which meant that the 
economic acti vity effect on the growth of energy demand 
was inoperati ve. 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that as a result 
o f their saving, the Community countries have broken 
Table 2.3 
Net trade positions by category of product (SITC), 1982 
B/L 
Food prod ucts - 1,0 
Energy - 8, 1 
Raw materials - 2,7 
Machinery and transport eq uipmen t - 0,6 
Other industrial products + 6.3 
et trade position - 6. 1 
et trade position excluding energy +2.0 
sufficiently free from the energy constraint. This continues to 
represent a considerable burden on the external trade 
accounts of most of the energy-importing countries, as 
Table 2.3 demonstrates ; the figures indicate the ne~ trade 
positions by major category of product for the Community 
countries. They clearly show that for a number of countries, 
and for the Community of Ten, the energy bill still represents 
a very heavy burden and is responsible for, or actually makes 
up the main part of, the trade deficit. Although the volume of 
net energy imports has been reduced, their value, because of 
the rise in the oil price, has shot up so steeply that there are 
few countries which have the export capacity sufficient to 
balance their energy imports. The reduction of energy 
consumption per unit of GDP and of dependence on external 
supplies of energy are therefore still objectives of paramount 
importance for our countries. 
As several studies have shown (and notably the two reports 
by the J. Saint-Geours group ') , there is still vast potential in 
the Community for more rational use of energy. It should be 
stressed that, according to the main findings here, better 
Community performance on this front requires a con-
siderable improvement in the results achieved by Italy and 
the United Kingdom, and also to some extent Belgium and 
the Netherlands, where energy intensity is still well above the 
Community average (see Graph 1.2). 
DK 
3, 1 
- 2,9 
+ 0,1 
- 0, 1 
- 1,9 
- 1.6 
+ 1.3 
' In fa vour of an cnergy-e fficicnl society', Commission o f the European 
Communities, St11dies- £ 11ergy , No 4, 1979. 
'Investment and employment in an energy-effi cient socie ty', 1981, Study 
No XVll /052/8 1, Directorate-General fo r Energy, Commission of the 
European Communities. 
('OOO million £CU) 
D F NL UK EC 10 
- 8,3 +3,3 - 5,7 + 4,9 - 5,9 - 8.1 
- 30,5 - 27.9 - 23,5 - 1,7 +6,9 - 91,3 
- 7,7 - 3,0 - 6,6 - 0,6 - 4,2 - 24,2 
+ 52,0 + 4,2 + 6,8 - 2,7 +2,2 + 59,1 
+ 16,0 - 0,1 + 15.2 +2.5 -2,4 +29,5 
+21,5 - 23,5 - 13,8 +2,4 - 3,4 - 35,0 
+ 52.0 + 4,4 +9,7 +4, 1 - 10,3 +56.3 
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Introduction 
A review of the literature on energy demand functions 
produces results which are far from being uniform or 
satisfactory. It is difficult to find, in the work of the last 
decade or so, empirically estimated parameters that can 
readily be used for policy making and planning. Thus, in 
going through the mountain of existing empirical results, a 
critical eye and eclectic attitude is imperative. In the end, it 
appears that, econometric results based on the most recent 
years, elasticities that look plausible in the light of economic 
reality, consistent model specification through time and 
between sectors, the use of judgment as a supplement to 
computer-derived results, are essential criteria in 'screening 
out' the most relevant aspects of the energy demand 
literature. 
In a fairly recent study ( 1980) by the Energy Modelling 
Forum[!], 1 16 models were surveyed and used to shed light 
on the question of the aggregate elasticity of energy demand. 
The main conclusion was: 'Contrary to the popular 
conception, the energy demand elasticity cannot even be 
defined consistently without explicit specification of several 
factors. The point of measurement, method of aggregation, 
price change composition, time frame, taxes and regulations 
assumed can significantly affect the calculated value of the 
aggregate elasticity. Even if these factors are standardized, 
differences in parameter estimation approach and structural 
characteristics lead to a range of elasticity estimates.' · 
I. Aggregate demand for energy 
1.1. The aggregation problem 
Differences in elasticity estimates is a natural phenomenon of 
evolution. 
It should be remembered that prior to 1973 most of the 
energy demand forecasting was performed via the en-
ergy/GDP relationship and the resulting coefficient was 
'bent' by judgment to reflect changes in technology or the 
price of energy. ,After the first oil-price shock analysts 
discovered that 'prices matter'. So they tried to use the scant 
information that existed on fuel price data to estimate the 
missing price effect. It was after 1974 that the bulk of the 
energy studies appeared with a fuller specification, where 
energy prices arc given a fair treatment. Energy economics is 
Figures in brnckcts refer to bibliography al the end of this chapter. 
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thus a far less mature subject than the main body of macro-
economics. 
One of the main concerns in earlier and current studies is the 
problem of aggregating fuels into energy. The traditional 
method is the aggregation of fuels on the basis of their 
thermal content under ideal conditions. This concept of 
aggregation was challenged as early as 1965 by Turvey and 
Nobay [5]. The authors observed that demand theory 
suggests that in the case of a group of commodities, which are 
expressed in different quantity units aggregation should be 
done on the basis of monetary units. They suggested the 
alternative of expenditure and argued that 'the relevant 
conversion factors are either their marginal rates of 
transformation in production or their marginal rates of 
substitution in consumption. Thus, when they are looked at 
in relation to other purchases, fuel imputs should be valued 
at marginal cost to the consumer'. 
But in practice those who chose to aggregate fuels in terms of 
expenditures, rather than BTU equivalent. 2 are faced with 
the rapid escalation of prices after 1973 which calls for the 
use of moving rather than constant weights. In volatile 
periods as in the past decade, if fuel prices constitute the 
weights used to aggregate the different fuel quantities. then in 
order to capture the changing structure of the energy market 
the use of moving price weights is necessary (as in the Paasche 
concept of indexing). This practice, however, creates a 
formidable identification problem because one of the 
independent variables, price, has been used in both sides of 
the equation. 
A more sophisticated solution to the problem of aggregation 
has been suggested by Diewert [6]. whose theoretical work 
strongly supports a production function approach. An 
equivalent methodology is also proposed by Hudson and 
Jorgenson [7] based on a unit-cost function. According to the 
authors, the solution to the aggregation problem has, as a 
starting point, a cost function where the price of energy 
becomes a function of the price of individual fuel prices. 
However, both the production function and the cost function 
approach, to the problem of computing the price and 
quantity of aggregate energy, require far more information 
than needed to determine the price elasticity of energy 3 
namely the full specification of a production function 
involving capital stock evaluations, labour energy and 
materials as well as their respective factor prices. The 
escalation of complexities and the computer costs involved 
have led the working group of Energy Modelling Forum [I] 
to avoid using either the Diewert or the Hudson-Jorgenson 
approach and instead to use the more economical and direct 
BTU: British thermal unit. 
However, either the production function or the factor cost share approach 
docs not eliminate the need to aggregate individual fuels. Energy still 
enters into the equations in terms of values rather than physical quantities. 
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approach of inoex numbers, which provides an approxim-
ation to the production or cost function approach. 
Consequently, the methodology followed by the Energy 
Modelling Forum [I] is in line with the less sophisticated 
work proposed earlier by Turvey and Nobay [5). 
An improvement to the aggregation of fuels on the basis of 
BTUs is the distinction between primary energy and 
delivered or useful energy. In an early paper (1968) Adams 
and Miovic [8) pointed out that fuels have different 
efficiencies when they are used in alternative technologies. 
The 'useful' energy concept has subsequently been used by 
many researchers in applied work. The empirical results are 
usually more satisfactory especially in countries where major 
interfuel substitutions have taken place (Dunkerley [10)). 
But the elasticities obtained from useful energy data may be 
biased (a point also raised in [2]). The thermal efficiency 
adjustment implies that prices for individual fuels fail to 
reflect such differences in thermal efficiencies. This problem 
can be overcome if prices are aggregated on a useful energy 
basis. Additionally elasticity estimates vary as a result of the 
adjustments made for efficiency differences. Hence they 
depend on the efficiency factors applied to convert final 
energy into useful energy. But efficiency factors do not exist 
on a nationally agreed country-by-country and sector-by-
sector basis. These considerations have consequently led 
many researchers to use the traditional BTU aggregated data 
unadjusted, as they appear in numerous statistical sources. 
1.2. Aggregate demand for energy - Empirical results 
Empirical results on the aggregate demand for energy appear 
either on a national time series basis or on a regional pooled 
time series cross-section basis. The lack of price variability, 
especially before 1973, has led many researchers to use time 
Table 1.1 
Regional energy demand elasticities from pooled data 
Countries Author 
covered Period 
Dunkerley [10) 11 1953-74 
Dunkerley [10) 11 1960-76 
Kouris [II) 7 1955-70 
Kouris [II) 7 1965-70 
Nordhaus [12) 7 1959-72 
OECD [13) 11 1960-78 
OECD [13) 11 1973-78 
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series data across a number of countries. However, the main 
weakness of using pooled data is the fact that the resulting 
elasticities refer to a Jong-term unspecified period. The data 
variability across countries implies similar behaviour 
between countries that reach a similar development stage, a 
hypothesis that may or may not materialize but until it does 
the time required is unspecified. Thus the estimated 
elasticities equally reflect this long-term but unspecified time 
interval. This weakness disappears when time series data are 
used on their own. The time interval is then fixed (year, 
quarter, etc.) and the computed short-term or long-term 
elasticities refer to such specific interval. 
1.2.1. In Table 1.1 a number of studies are reported, which 
have used the pooling technique on data for industrialized 
countries. The values of the estimated income elasticities 
range between 0,83 and 1,27 (a much narrower range than 
the price elasticities). These values are not far off from unity, 
something that has been the usual finding of many studies 
based on time series data. 
The price elasticities assume values between - 0,31 and 
- 0,87. Judging from the studies that provide a split in the 
period investigated (Dunkerley, Kouris), it appears that the 
bigger the sample the bigger the estimated elasticity; 
something confirmed by the Nordhaus study which is based 
on a similar period. ' The OECD study using more recent 
data is able to capture the entire period of the first oil-price 
shock ( 1973-78), in this most recent period the price elasticity 
increases significantly compared to the entire estimation 
period ( 1960-78). Indeed in periods of sharp price fluctu-
This observation. however. is more of statistical significance rather than 
economic significance. In other words as the sample increases the 
variability of the price variable also increases thus producing a stronger 
effect. On the contrary when the sample of estimation becomes smaller 
variability is reduced and the resulting elasticity is weaker. 
Elasticity 
Data 
Ini:omc Pncc 
Useful energy 1,23 -0.61 
Useful energy 1,20 -0,47 
Primary energy 0,84 -0,77 
Primary energy l,27 -0,31 
Useful energy 0.79 -0,85 
Final energy 1,00 -0,69 
Final energy 0,83 -0,87 
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a tions one would expect consumers' frustrated expectations 
about the future, to increase the price effect. 
1.2.2. In Table 1.2 time series results for selected countries 
are reported (the studies quoted refer to a number of 
countries but for reasons of simplicity and space, the results 
for only the USA and the big four European countries are 
mentioned). 
Here also the income elasticities from the time series country 
results are clustered around unity, with two important 
exceptions : Italy's elasticity is consistently the highest and 
the United Kingdom's the lowest. In the case of Italy its rapid 
Table 1.2 
Income and price elasticities, aggregate demand for energy, 
time series results 
FR of Germany 
industrialization during the 1960s and the early 1970s must 
account for this higher value compared to other indus-
trialized countries. This, of course, is the problem with 
aggregate data, in that there is no allowance for 'sifts' over 
time in the various sectors of the economy. · 
In the case of the United Kingdom the low income elasticity 
in the first instance appears to be explained by the lack of 
adjustment for different fuel efficiencies. The useful energy 
data used in the Dunkerley [10] study seem to improve this 
situation as the UK income elasticity takes a value just over 
one. 
France Italy United Kingdom USA 
Aut hor : Dunkerley [1 0) Period: 1960-76 Data : useful energy 
Income 1,34 1,19 1,80 1,04 
Short-term price - 0,4 1 - 0,39 - 0,31 - 0,08 
Long- term price I 
Author: Kouris [1 6] Period: 1960-78 Data: final energy 
Income 0,87 0,96 1,06 0,43 
Short-term price - 0,18 - 0, 14 - 0,11 - 0,18 
Long- term price 2 - 0,51 - 0,39 - 0,34 - 0,41 
Auth or : Nordha us [1 2) Period : 1956-72 Data: useful energy 
Income 3 0,29 1,11 1,07 0,57 
Short-teri11 price - 0,44 - 0,16 - 0,33 - 0,42 
Long- term price 4 - 0,89 - 0,50 - 0,49 
Auth or : OC DE [13) Period: 1960-78 Data : final energy 
Income 1,08 1,16 1,41 0,57 
Short -term price - 0,11 - 0,10 - 0,14 - 0,10 
Long- term price 5 - 0,44 - 0,41 - 0,55 - 0,42 
Author : Pindyck [1 7] 6 Peri od: 1960-74 Data: expendi ture on energy 
Income 0,87 0,89 0,90 0,89 
Short -term price 
Long- term price 7 - 1,01 - I.OS - 0.98 - 1,10 
No-long. tcm1 rcnction hns been allowed for . 
A Koyck distribu ted Ing hypothesis was nssumed . 
The computed long-term income elas ticities were : F R o[Gcmrnny = 0.6: France = 1101 computed: llaly = 1.6: U K = 0.7: USA = 0,8. 
0,98 
-0,24 
0,77 
- 0,16 
- 0,47 
0,39 
- 0,26 
- 0,57 
1,02 
- 0,09 
- 0,38 
0,82 
- 1,06 
A pnrtial adjustment hypothesis was assumed . For France the long•tcrm elastici ty is not quott..'Cl because the lagged tc m1 had a negat ive sign. 
An Almon distribu ted la~ scheme was nssumcd with seven.year lugs. 
incc no og,grcgutc clnstic1llcs have been computed. the elastici ties quoted here arc weighted averages of the sectoral elastici ties that appear in the original study. The Pindyck study 
focust.."S on the long run so the shorl·lerm pncc clnsticitics nrc not quoted. 
for cnch SC\:tor n different dynamic structure hns been assumed. 
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However, the Nordhaus [12] study, which has equally been 
adjusted by engineering-type efficiency factors, produces a 
much lower short-term and long-term income elasticity and 
in line with the results of unadjusted data studies. 1 
Another odd feature of the Nordhaus [12] study is the 
comparatively high short-term price elasticities for all 
countries except for France. Two other studies (Kouris [16] 
and OECD [13]), which also allow for long-term adjust-
ments, produce short-term price elasticities which, in general, 
are at least half the size of those reported by Nordhaus [12]. 
One explanation may be that the adjustment for different 
fuel efficiencies generally increases the size of the price 
elasticity. 
In the two studies (Kouris [16] and OECD [13]) which use 
unadjusted energy data the long-term price elasticities range 
between - 0,4 and - 0,5, a very narrow band indeed. 2 
The Pindyck [17] study comes up with the highest elasticities 
for the period considered. This seems to be implausible 
especially since only one year, from the first oil price 
explosion period, has been included in the sample. 3 The 
main difference, however, between the Pindyck [17] study 
and the rest, is the use of expenditures on energy rather than 
physical quantities consumed. 
The crucial effect that one would wish to assess in a survey of 
energy studies, is the short and long-term price impact on 
energy demand. A general weakness of all the studies 
mentioned here is that none is recent enough to include the 
effects of the second oil-price shock. Clearly the inclusion of 
the 1979-81 data should yield results somehow different and 
more pertinent for the future. Even the inclusion of the first 
oil-price shock does not free the results from some oddities: 
the short-term UK price elasticity is estimated to be in the 
range of - 0,08 and - 0,42, the long-term price elasticity for 
Germany ranges between the values of -0,44 and -1,01. 
These observations point to the realization that unless data, 
time period and specification become more standardized, the 
results obtained are bound to show considerable fluctu-
ations. 
1.3. Some general remarks about aggregate energy elasticities 
A survey of the empirical results on energy demand reveal 
that there are a multitude of sources responsible for elasticity 
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Even under different specifications (i.e. Almon lags) the Nordhaus (12] 
study produces an income elasticity for the United Kingdom between 0.6 
and 0,7. 
Although different price series have been used arid different dynamic 
assumptions imposed on the data. 
An additional unsatisfactory feature or the Pindyck [ 17] study is the close 
proximity or the country income and price elasticities. This is primarily 
due to the specification chosen (for more explanations see next section on 
sectoral demand elasticities). 
differences. Perhaps the major one is time. Pre-1973 studies 
naturally undermined or neglected the price effect. But as we 
enter the 'energy crisis' period the impact of price on energy 
demand becomes progressively more and more dominant. 
The 19740ECD projections [18], for example, were based on 
an area aggregate long-term elasticity of - 0,30. By contrast 
the 1982 OECD energy outlook [18] is based on an implicit 
long-term price elasticity of - 0,65. 
Another source of differences in elasticity estimates is the 
often overlooked specification of the long-term income 
elasticity. In the case of the long-term price elasticity the 
implicit behaviour is meaningful and essential in energy 
demand projections. An increase in the price of energy 
generates conservation trends which are long lasting. The 
restructuring of the industrial capital stock and of appliances 
in the household, the trends in vehicle fleet efficiencies, etc., 
are elements which change slowly as a result of changes in 
energy prices. 
The same dynamic mechanism does not really apply in the 
case of the income elasticity. The income effect on energy 
demand is indirect because it depends on the utilization of the 
energy-using equipment. Even if, because of high past 
incomes, the capital stock or the appliances in the household 
have accumulated over time there is no guarantee that they 
will be fully utilized in any given time period: thus high past 
incomes (unlike past prices) have little influence on energy 
demand now. It is essentially current income changes which, 
by setting the utilization rate of the existing energy-using 
equipment, determine (together with prices and other 
factors) the lev~I of energy demand. 
Some researchers have sought the solution to the shortcom-
ings of the simple single equation models in an increase in 
sophistication. It is argued that simple models ignore the 
interaction between energy and the other inputs of the 
production process. The lag structure (i.e. Koyck, Almon, 
partial adjustments) is externally imposed and the result is 
often unrealistically high price elasticities. More sophisti-
cated specifications are needed to allow the speed of 
adjustment of input factors to long-run equilibrium to be 
endogenous and time-varying rather than fixed ad hoe (see 
Berndt et all. [25]). 
In this framework the ratio of energy to capital is 
endogenized and represents a measure of short-run capacity 
use. The path to equilibrium is based on continuous 
economic optimization while the speed of adjustment for 
'quasi-fixed' factors is being determined by cost-minimiz-
ation behaviour. This specification is claimed to produce 
clearly defined short, medium and long-run elasticities. 
Nevertheless, it is recognized that this is done at the expense 
of a lot of degrees of freedom. 
On the lines of this theorizing-see Berndt [25)-the US 
manufacturing sector has been investigated. The surprising 
feature in this study was the measurement of the income 
elasticity which, at the value of 0,23, was even below the 
short-run price elasticity. This seems unrealistic since a I% 
increase in both income and price would result on balance in 
a lower energy demand in the short term. In a similar 
dynamic optimization model Berndt, Fuss and Waver-
man [26] came up with the implausible result that the long 
and short-run price elasticities in the US manufacturing 
sector differ only minutely. 
Such results, as well as the skepticism that the Pindyck [17] 
findings generate, appear to cast doubts about the validity of 
overly sophisticated models. It is an open question whether 
firms or ,households act in a complicated way. There is a 
growing feeling that unduly increased model sophistication, 
for the time being, is probably of more theoretical than 
practical use. 
2. Sectoral demand studies 
Identification of energy demand behaviour should be carried 
out at the sectoral level. When energy demand is analysed at 
the aggregate (total economy) level, many meaningful 'shifts' 
within the structure of the economy are lost. Aggregate 
equations are essentially input-output 'devices' and they can 
tell us no more than the amount of energy required for the 
production of a unit of GDP plus any price-induced 
conservation trends. At the sectoral level, however, the 
different time profile of adjustments which take place in 
households and firms can be investigated. Besides, the 
general phenomenon in industrialized economies of in-
Table 2.1 
Elasticities with respect to industrial demand for energy 
(pooled time series cross-section data) 
Aulhor Countries 
covered 
Dunkerley [10] 9 
Grillin and 
Gregory [29) 9 
Nordhaus [12] 7 
OECD [13] II 
Pindyck [17] 10 
Period 
1960-76 
1955-69 
1956-72 
1973-78 
1959-74 
Energy demand elasticities: review of the literature 
creased demand for services over time-something that 
would bias aggregate elasticities downward I-does not 
impair empirical results on a sector-by-sector basis. 
2.1. Energy demand functions for the industrial sector 
Energy demand in the industrial sector can best be viewed as 
derived demand stemming from the need to use the services 
of various inputs (capital, labour, energy, materials) in the 
production process. Profit maximization and cost minimiz-
ation are the main optimalities embedded in most model 
specifications. 
2.1.1. In a recent sectoral demand study Cato [27) has used a 
variant 2 of the pooling technique to estimate sectoral 
demand elasticities for most OECD countries. 
The study was performed on data covering the 1959-77 
period and the dynamic mechanism assumed was partial 
adjustments. For the entire EEC manufacturing sector the 
author quotes short and long-term output elasticities equal 
to 0,52 and 0,95 respectively. The short and long-term price 
elasticities were -0,05 and -0,09 respectively. For the 
USA, Canada and Japan as a group, and the manufacturing 
sector, Cato [27) reports short and long-term output 
elasticities of 0,21 and 0, 72 while for the short and long-term 
price elasticity the values were - 0,09 and - 0,31 respect-
ively. 
Clearly when the economy moves towards more services it also becomes 
less energy-intensive and thus the impact of income and price on energy 
demand becomes less pronounced. 
The so-called random coefficient regression first developed by 
Swamy [28). 
Elasticit) 
Dala 
Income Price 
Useful energy 1,13 -0,20 
Share of energy 1 -0,79 
Useful energy 0,76 -0,52 
Final energy 0,97 -0,55 
Share of energy 1 0,75 -0.80 2 
The elasticities ha\'c hccn estimated from n translog specification and factor share equations. 
In lhe original Sludy lx>lh income and price claslieilics appear for each counlry indi,idually bul lhey were derived from a pooled sample. Thus for 1hc sake of comparison we have 
,·akulalcd lhe weighted average clast1c11y for the group of countries. 
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As the author admits himself an unsatisfactory result of the 
specification chosen was the implicit assumption of the 
partial adjustment hypothesis which constrains the dynamic 
mechanism for both income and price to be the same. 
Besides, the reported results with respect to the price 
elasticities do not appear to be plausible. In particular, a 
long-term price elasticity of - 0,09 for the EEC manufactur-
ing sector appears to be improbably small and would suggest 
only a minute long-term restructuring of the production 
process following an energy price increase. 
For the industrial sector as a whole several authors have 
produced area elasticities on the basis of pooling time series 
data of a number of countries. A number of them are listed in 
Table2.1. 
As already observed in the case of aggregate (total economy) 
income elasticities, the output elasticity of the industrial 
sector is close to unity even though the sample refers to 
pooled data which theoretically capture long-term elasti-
cities. 
The price elasticities quoted in Table 2.1 range from - 0,2 to . 
- 0,8. But the range narrows if we take into account the 
different specification of the models used. Both the Griffin-
Gregory [29] and the Pindyck [ 17] studies start with a 
translog cost function I and estimate the price elasticity of the 
share of energy (being one of the factors of production) 
rather than of actual energy quantities consumed. Thus when 
energy quantities (raw or adjusted for efficiency) are used, 
the computed long-term price elasticity for the industrial 
sector of developed economies ranges between - 0,2 and 
-0,6. 
2.1.2. Of the studies quoted in Table 2.2 the Nordhaus [12] 
results Sl!em the least convincing, being in general out of line 
compared with the other studies. The specification chosen 
and in particular the partial adjustment hypothesis which 
imposes a long-term reaction on income is probably 
responsible for these bad results. The IEA [32] results, where 
no long-term income reaction has been assumed or even the 
completely static formation of the Dunkerley [10] study, 
suggest that the income elasticity is more robust when it is 
computed as a year-on-year effect rather than distinguishing 
between short and long-term income reactions. 
The long-term price elasticities of the Griffin [31] and 
Pindyck [ 17] studies are very similar and for all countries 
there appears to be a converging value of - 0,8. It should be 
noted, however, that although the authors quote different 
elasticities for each country the results are derived from a 
pooled sample and thus the reaction picked up by the 
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A Jheorelical framework originaling from the work of Christensen, 
Jorgenson and Lau (30). 
elasticities essentially pertains to some average behaviour. Of 
course, the specification permits differential elasticities to be 
calculated but this does not significantly change the results 
which cluster around an average value. In fact the hypothesis 
of a common slope and differential intercepts 2 could very 
well have been used so that the price elasticity would be 
identical for all countries. 
The IEA [32] study produces a long-run price elasticity half 
the size of the one produced by Pindyck and Griffin. 
Nevertheless, the IEA results are consistent with the range of 
elasticities produced by the pooling technique (quoted in 
Table 2.1) on raw or efficiency-adjusted energy data. The 
- 0,4 average long-term price elasticity quoted by the IEA 
falls in the middle of the - 0,2 to - 0,6 range suggested by 
similar studies quoted in Table 3. 
Although the Pindyck-Griffin and the IEA studies produce 
long-term price elasticities which differ in size by a factor of 
two, there is a common feature in all: the individual country 
elasticity differences are very small indeed. Something which 
suggests that in the industry sector of industrialized countries 
the long-term reactions with respect to energy price changes 
are similar. 
In all studies reported in Table 2.2 the income elasticity for 
Italy is higher compared to the other countries. This is 
natural in view of the industrialization stage of Italy 
compared to other Western countries. But the results again 
point to an aggregation problem. When there are sectors 
within industry (i.e. heavy industries) which change faster 
than the rest, then the aggregate elasticity would tend to 
reflect such structural changes. Hence a disaggregation 
which would at least distinguish between light and heavy 
industries (and consequently between less and more energy-
intensive industries) appears to be preferable to follow. 
The results of the Dunkerley [I O] study reveal that a static 
version of the demand for energy in industry is un-
satisfactory. The computed yearly price elasticities are 
usually far too big 3 and a misspecification which ignores the 
existence of any time lags can lead to the computation of even 
positive price elasticities (France). However, as the· results 
surveyed so far suggest, any dynamic structure chosen 
should be flexible enough to allow for differential reactions 
with respect to the income and the price effects. 
2.2. Energy demandfunctionsfor the residential/commercial 
sector 
The basic characteristic of energy demand behaviour in the 
residential/commercial sector is the multi-activity purpose 
A common assumption in pooling different country time series. 
Mainly because they absorb part of the missing long-term price effect. 
Table 2.2 
Elasticities with respect to industrial demand for energy 
(time series results) 
FR of Germany France 
Energy demand elasticities: review of the literature 
Italy United Kingdom USA 
Author: !EA (19) Period: 1960-79 Data: final energy 
Income 
Short-term price 
Long-term price I 
1,10 
-0,19 
-0,45 
0,96 
-0,18 
-0,39 
1,15 
-0,14 
-0,40 
0,65 
-0,18 
-0,40 
0,77 
-0,15 
-0,36 
Author: Dunkerley [ I OJ Period: 1960-76 Data: useful energy 
Income 
Short-term price 
Long-term price 2 
0,74 
-0,26 
0,72 
0,29 
1,38 
-0,73 
0,33 
-0,31 
0,87 
-0,60 
Author: Griflin (31) Period: 1965 3 Data: share of energy 
Income 
Short-term price 
Long-term price 4 -0,80 -0,80 -0,79 -0,80 -0,79 
Author: Nordhaus [12) Period: 1956-72 Data: useful energy 
Income 
Short-term price 
Long-term price 5 
0,24 
-0,11 
-0,21 
0,17 
-0,47 
-0,82 
1,18 
-0,82 
-0,02 
-0,79 
-0,88 
0,63 
-0,21 
-0,33 
Author: Pindyck [17) Period: 1959-74 Data: share of energy 
Income 
Short-term price 
Long-term price 6 
0,76 
-0,82 
A Koyck lag distribution scheme was used to derive the long term. 
No long-term reaction has hc.~n assumed. 
0,78 
-0,82 
0,86 
-0,84 
0,78 
-0,84 
0,62 
-0,75 
The model was estimated from pooled international data for manufacturing. Four benchmark years were included ( 1955, 1960, 1965, 1969) but the elasticities reported here have been 
calculated by Griffin for 1965 for all sample countries. 
The clasticit1cs arc derived from n cost share regression model where only the long-run price effect is investigated. 
A partial adjustments hypothesis was assumed. The long-term income elasticities not quoted in the table are: USA = 1,0; France = 0,3; FR of Germany = 0,5; Italy = not computed for 
wrong lag term sign; UK = 0,02. 
Elasticities computed from a translating model of specification. 
use of energy and the long-term nature of adjustments due to 
the very slow changes in the housing stock. The long-term 
price elasticities then are usually bigger in the re-
sidential/commercial sector compared to the other sectors of 
the economy. 
The difficulty with the residential/commercial sector is that 
most statistical sources lump into this sector data from also 
the agricultural and public administration sectors. Thus 
modelling the so-called 'domestic' sector becomes more 
difficult because the economic theory postulates, about 
consumer behaviour, do not apply mutatis mutandis on the 
agricultural and public administration sectors. Additional 
data problems also arise from the way the residential/com-
mercial sector data are constructed: some sources ' calculate 
the residential/commercial energy consumption data as a 
residual. Hence any statistical discrepancies that exist in the 
consumption data of the other sectors re-appear in the 
computed data for the residential/commercial sector. 
As in the OECD series 'Energy balances'. 
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Table 2.3 
Elasticities for the residential/commercial sector 
(pooled time series cross-section data) 
Author Countries 
covered 
Dunkerley [10) 9 
Griffin (31] 17 
Nordhaus (12] 7 
OECD [13) 11 
Pindyck [17) 9 
Period 
1960-76 
. 1955-72 
1959-72 
· 1973-78 
1960-74 
2.2.1. Price and income elasticities from pooled time series of 
a number of countries are reported in Table 2.3. All studies 
(except the OECD study) use as an income variable GDP per 
capita. In the studies where a temperature variable' is used, 
an elasticity of about 0,3 is reported. 
The results of the five studies quoted in Table 2.3 are a lot 
more uniform than in the case of either the aggregate 
elasticities or the industrial sector elasticities. The income 
elasticity is very close to unity except in the Dunkerley study. 
In the Griffin study 2 the share of agriculture in total GDP 
has been used to allow for distortions created in the data 
from variations in the agricultural sector which is part of the 
residential/commercial sector. The inclusion of this variable 
indeed made an impact on the results as the income elasticity 
dropped (from 1,39 to 1,03) and the price elasticity rose 
(from - 0,80 to - 0,95). In the Pindyck study the income 
elasticity was constrained to unity since, by assumption, the 
starting point was a homothetic and stationary indirect 
utility function with unit total expenditure. 
As expected the price elasticities (Jong-run) are generally 
bigger than in the aggregate total economy or the industry 
demand functions. Three studies report a price elasticity 
about unity and the other two not far from unity. The long-
run nature of changes in the housing stock would support 
such long-term- elasticities. But as already argued the 
difficulty with pooled data is the unspecified time span of 
adjustment. 
2.2.2. In Table 2.4 individual country income and price 
elasticities from a number of studies are· listed. A general 
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Usually measured in degree days. 
A number of pooled regressions have been run but the results quoted here 
refer to the pooled dynamic equation. 
Elasticity 
Data 
Income Price 
Useful energy 1,73 -0,60 
Useful energy 1,03 -0,95 
Useful energy 1,08 -0,79 
Final energy 0,99 -1,00 
Expenditure on energy 1,00 -1,10 
dichotomy emerges from comparing the size of the price 
elasticities between the translog expenditure type of 
formulation (Griffin, Pindyck) and the formulations based 
on physical units (Dunkerley, Nordhaus, TEA). The Jong-
term elasticities computed by the former are generally much 
higher and consistently above unity. In the latter group (the 
Dunkerley study is not strictly comparable because it has a 
static specification) only the US price elasticity as computed 
in the Nordhaus study has a high long-term price elasticity 
value ( of - 1,5). All other Jong-term price elasticities are well 
below unity, with values around -0,7. 
A closer look at the Griffin [31] results reveal an incon-
sistency. When pooling of cross-sections and time series is 
performed, the author reports a price elasticity equal to 
- 0,95 (presumably Jong-term). But when the individual 
country long-term price elasticities are calculated from each 
fuel elasticity, then the elasticity takes on average a value as 
high as - 1,4. For reasons of clarity the fuel elasticities 
estimated in the Griffin [31) study are quoted in Table 2.5. 
It is obvious from these results that the implicit energy price 
elasticities that can be computed for the residential/commer-
cial sector are heavily affected by the high elasticities for coal 
and gas. However, these high elasticity values are accepted by 
the author on the basis of certain attractive theoretical 
properties, 'the translog model has the desirable property 
that as a fuel share approaches zero, the price elasticity rises, 
just as the standard linear demand curve becomes more 
elastic as consumption declines'. Thus because the share of 
gas and particularly coal has been small in the household of 
many industrialized countries a translog specification on 
historical data may yield a very high elasticity for these fuels. 
Consequently if there is a I% increase in all fuels 
simultaneously then these results would imply a reduction in 
energy demand well above what can be expected. While at the 
same time the resulting long-run price elasticity of energy is 
Energy demand elasticities : review of the literature 
Table 2.4 
Elasticities with respect to residential/commercial demand for energy 
( time-series results) 
Author : IEA (19) 
Income 
Short-term price 
Long- term price I 
Auth or : Dunkerley (10] 
Income 
Short-term price 
Long- term price 2 
Author : Griffin (3 J] 3 
Income 
Short-term price 
Long- term price 4 
Author : Nordhaus [1 2] 
Income 
Short -term price 
Long-term price 5 
Auth or : Pindyk [ 17) 
Income 6 
Short-term price 
Long- term price 7 
FR of Germany 
0,73 
- 0,13 
- 0,65 
2,43 
- 0,33 
- 1,30 
0,60 
- 0,35 
- 0,76 
- 1,05 
France 
Period : 1960-79 
1,06 
-0,17 
0,70 
Period: 1960-76 
2,04 
- 0,41 
Period : 1955-72 
- 1,20 
Period : 1956-72 
0,93 
- 0,07 
- 0,14 
Period : 1960-74 
- 1, 11 
Italy 
1,21 
- 0,08 
- 0,70 
2, 17 
- 0,66 
- 1,50 
0,65 
- 0,63 
- 1,05 
- 1,12 
United Kingdom 
Data: fina l energy 
0,58 
- 0,09 
- 0,60 
Data : useful energy 
1,62 
- 0,01 
Data : fuel sha res 
- 1,60 
Data: useful energy 
0,97 
- 0,36 
- 0,38 
Da ta: expenditure of energy 
- 1,09 
USA 
0,73 
- 0,12 
-0,70 
1,18 
- 0,15 
- 1,40 
0,17 
- 0,55 
- 1,53 
- 1,10 
A Koyck dynnmic mechanism was initinlly used . Some resul ts modi11ed by j udgment. Temperatu re elas ticities computed were about 0,3 for France, F R of Germany and United Kingdom 
nnd zero fo r USA and Ita ly. 
No dynamic mcchunism ullowcd fo r. 
In the Qri~inul stud y o nly individ ual fue l elasticities were compu ted fro m fu el sha re equations. Hence we have constructed t.hc implicit weigh ted average energy elasticities using 
consumption shnrcs as weights. 
The clnstici tics obta ined from a genera l trunslog model o f fue l consumpt io n. 
A pnrt in l ndj ustmcnts mechanism wns assumed . The long- term income elas ticity is : USA = 0.47 : Fra nce = 1.86: F R of Germany = 1.30 ; Ita ly = 1,10. 
Income elasticity constrnincd to unity by assumption. 
The elastici ties computed from n trnnslog model of consumptio n expenditure and for the year 1973. 
Table 2.5 
Rcsidcntinl/commercial sector own fuel price elasticities 
Coal Gas Oil 
s - 42,9 - 1,7 - 1,0 
France - 2,9 - 2,6 - 1,0 
FR of G ermany - 2,9 - 4.0 - 1,0 
Italy - 12,7 - 1,8 - 1,0 
ni tccl Kingdom - 3.2 - 1.9 - 1,2 
Elec-
trici ty 
- 0,7 
- 0,7 
- 0,6 
- 0,7 
- 0.7 
considerably higher than that computed by classical long-
run methodologies such as the pooling technique. 
The Dunkerley study [10] reveals once again that sta tic 
versions of a rela tionship which is essentia lly dynamic may 
lead to implausible results. According to thi s study a I% 
increase in income will induce within a year a more or less 2% 
increase in energy demand in the residential/commercial 
sector, omething which contrasts sharply with the results of 
all other studies mentioned here. 
The most surprising results in the Nordhaus [1 2] study refer 
to the USA where the income elas ticity obtained is very 
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small, while the. price elasticity is very high. In fact the long-
term income elasticity (of about 0,5) is three times smaller 
than the long-term price elasticity (of about -1,5). This 
implies that energy price increases lead, in the USA, to very 
rapid displacement of energy in the household regardless of 
equal increments in incomes. Joskow and Baughman [32] 
found a long-term price elasticity for the residential/commer-
cial sector of the USA equal to - 0,60, while Nelson [33] 
found for the housing sector of the USA a price elasticity as 
low as - 0,30. Both these studies as well as those reviewed in 
Table 2.4 1 suggest that the long-term price elasticity of the 
US residential/commercial sector is not as high as - 1,5 but 
instead its true value lies in the - 0,7 to - I region. 
2.3. Energy demand functions for the transport sector 
The demand for energy in the transport sector is in fact 
demand for oil as this is the main fuel used (99% of energy 
requirements in the transport sector of the OECD region are 
met by oil). In this sector, which uses practically only one 
source, the demand for motor gasoline commands a 
predominant position. Thus most of the empirical work on 
the transport sector actually refers to the demand for motor 
gasoline. 
Except of course, the Griffin study (with an elasticity of - 1.40). However, 
as pointed out, the results from aggregating individual fuel elasticities are 
highly suspect in this study. 
Table 2.6 
2.3.1. In Table 2.6 area elasticities for industrialized 
countries are quoted. Some studies refer to the energy 
consumption in transport while others refer to gasoline 
demand. The studies which refer to the total energy in 
transport typically use gasoline prices as a proxy for energy 
prices in that sector. Hence the results should be treated with 
caution. 
Studies on motor gasoline demand have an additional 
advantage which stems from well documented statistics: car 
stock data, the average efficiency of cars as well as distance 
travelled, constitute a well structured framework within 
which motor gasoline demand can be analysed empirically. 
Thus many researchers have been able to 'get into the 
structure' of gasoline demand by estimating equations for 
the distance travelled and the efficiency of cars. 
Other researchers have followed the less direct or reduced 
form approach where gasoline demand is made a function of 
income and prices variables, while a stock adjustment 
principle is supposed to capture the long-term effect of car 
ownership. The Cato [27] study, in Table 2.7, is of this type. 
Similarly the Kouris [34] study has followed the reduced 
form approach with a permanent income hypothesis rather 
than actual income. 2 The Griffin [31] and Pindyck [17] 
One of the reasons that the income elasticity is higher than in the other 
studies. However, in using this dynamic formation to project the 1974-76 
period, Kouris (35] found that the forecast errors were bigger when the 
long-term adjustments were used and smaller when only the short-term 
(static) version of the model was used. Hence he concluded that the income 
and price variables capture a short-term behaviour and that the reduced 
form approach is inadequate to model motoring habits or car saturation 
levels. 
Elasticities with respect to energy /gasoline demand in the transport sector 
(pooled time series cross-section data) 
Countries Author coven:<! Period Data 
Cato (27] 17 1959-77 Gasoline 
Dunkerley [10] 9 1960-76 Useful energy 
Griffin (31] 18 1955-72 Gasoline 
Kouris (34] 7 1956-73 Gasoline 
Nordhaus (12] 7 1956-72 Useful energy 
OECD [13] II 1973-78 Final energy 
Pindyck [17] 11 1960-74 Gasoline 
A dynamic hypothesis was assumed in the original studies so the elasticities quoted here refer to the implicit long-run values. 
The values of theses elasticities arc obtained af\cr 25 years of long-run adjustments. 
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Elasticity 
Income Price 
1,13 -1,091 
1,09 -1,00 
0,33 -1,28 
1,73 -0,75 t 
1,34 -0,36 
1,00 -1,12 
0,84 -1,31 2 
studies follow the structural approach to modelling gasoline 
demand, and they coincide in the estimation of the long-term 
gasoline price elasticity (with a value equal to - 1,3). The 
Griffin [31] study also produces a much smaller income 
elasticity (0,33) in comparison to the other studies. But this is 
mainly due to using, as the dependent variable, gasoline 
consumption per ca r. Hence in this formulation an implicit 
car stock variable exists with an elasticity constrained to 
unity, so that gasoline demand on its own is affected not only 
by an income elasticity equal to 0,33, but also by another 
Table 2.7 
Energy demand elasticities: review of the literature 
related factor, the car stock which has an elasticity equal 
to I. 1 
In fact the Griffin [31) gasoline demand equation had an additional 
independent variable. car stock per capila , with an estimated elastici ty 
equal to - 0,59. Thus a combined 1% increase in income and the car 
stock-other factors remaining constant- would lead to the following net 
change in gasoline dema nd 0,33+ 1- 0,59=0,74. Because of the 
interdependence of the income variable and the car stock variable the 
broad income effect in the Griffin study can be thought of as equivalent to 
0,74. . 
Elasticities with respect to energy/gasoline demand in the transport sector 
(time series results) 
FR of Gcrmony 
/\ uthor : IEA (1 9] Period: 
Income 0,85 
Short-term price - 0,20 
Long- term price I 
Author: Ca to (27] Period : 
Income 0,05 
Short- term price - 0,10 
Long-term price 2 - 0,9 1 
Author: Dunkerly (10] Period : 
Income 1,50 
Short-term price - 0,54 
Long- term price 3 
Aut hor: Nordhaus (1 2] Period : 
Income 0,79 
Short-term price - 0,13 
Long- term price 4 - 0.28 
Author: Pindyck (17] Period : 
I ncomc 0,07 
hort-tcrm price - 0.12 
Long- term price 5 - 1,38 
France 
1960-79 
0,85 
- 0,17 
1959-77 
0.58 
- 0.21 
- 0.~I 
1960-76 
1,27 
- 0,18 
1956-72 
1,62 
- 0,66 
1960-74 
0,07 
- 0,13 
- 1.60 
holy 
0,95 
- 0,18 
0,17 
- 0,14 
- 0,70 
l ,46 
- 0,18 
0,61 
- 0,09 
- 0,23 
0,07 
- 0,05 
- 1.1 3 
United Kingdom 
Data : gasoline 
0,85 
- 0,12 
Data: gasoline 
0,36 
- 0,18 
- 1,13 
Data: useful energy 
l ,85 
- 0,08 
Data: useful energy 
1,54 
0,02 
0,03 
Data : gasoline 
0,07 
- 0,13 
- 1,77 
USA 
0,80 
-0,26 
0,21 
- 0,14 
- 1,08 
1,06 
- 0,03 
0,24 
- 0,02 
- 0,76 
0,07 
- 0,11 
- 1,26 
The long-lcnn reaction has been nssunn .. -d to be represented by the nvcragc c:u efficiency which was an exogenous varinblc to the model. The income elastici ty in fact refers to the car stock 
elasticity. 
A rartinl ndju,tmcnts hypothesis wns assumed . The long-tcnn income clns ticitics wcn:: SA = 1.62: France = 1.4 1: FR of Gem1any = 0.45: Italy = 0.85: UK = 2.25. 
No lllftg-lcrm rcn..:'tion has bcrn ~,ssumcd . 
A partinl ndjusuncnts hypothl"Sis wus nss uml."<i . No long-tcnn elasticitic1.; calculated for France bccJusc the lag h:nn coefficient was outside the a priori range. The long- tcnn elastici ties 
were . USA • 0.83 : FR ofGeminny = 1.65: Italy - 1.53: UK ~ 2.20. 
The struclUrnl nppronch hns tx.-cn follo\\'l."<1 (i.e. ullowing for dist ance travelled nnd car cllicicncies). The long-term clas ticiticscalculatcd afier the ela pse of 25 years. The long-tcnn income 
cla, ti c11ics \\ere : U A - 0.84 : Frunc'C = 0.87: FR of Germany = 0.84. Italy = 0.84 : UK = 0.90. 
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From the three studies (Dunkerley, Nordhaus, OECD) 
which analyse energy rather than gasoline demand, two 
(Dunkerley and OECD) produce quite similar income and 
price elasticities, both close to unity. In the Nordhaus study 
the income elasticity is much higher, about 1,3, while the 
price elasticity is much lower, about - 0,4. This difference in 
elasticities is probably due to the period of estimation. The 
Nordhaus study uses none of the post-energy-crisis years in 
the sample of estimation. Consequently the absence of strong 
consumer reaction to higher prices is reflected by the weaker 
price elasticity. At the same time the income elasticity is 
higher reflecting primarily the accumulation of the vehicles 
in a period of healthy economic growth. 
2.3.2. In Table 2.7 individual country elasticities are 
reported from a number of studies. The results show vividly 
that, depending on the specification chosen, the estimated 
elasticities can differ markedly. 
The Pindyck study, with slow adjustments and elasticities 
derived from a pooled sample, produces the smallest one year 
income elasticities of any of the reported studies. In addition 
the income elasticities are almost identical in both the short 
. and long term. As regards the estimated long-term price 
elasticities of the Pindyck study, they are the highest 
compared to the other studies. The responsibility for these 
conflicting results lies probably in the long-term adjustment 
periods, which are calculated to be as long as 25 years, while 
the average life of a car on the road is estimated at between 7 
and 12 years. 
Both the Cato and Nordhaus studies are based on a partial 
adjustment hypothesis and yet the resulting elasticities are 
quite different. It appears then that the differences in the 
estimation period ( 1959-77 versus 1956-72) and the data 
chosen (gasoline versus total energy) are responsible for large 
differences in the computed elasticities. Clearly income and 
gasoline price variables are gross approximations for total 
energy demand in the transportation sector. Finer disaggreg-
ation (i.e. individual demand functions for gasoline, aviation 
fuels, fuel oil for shipping, etc.) is necessary if energy use in 
the transportation sector is to be modelled properly. 
The short-term price elasticities as computed in three of the 
studies (Cato, IEA, Pindyck) seem to be relatively uniform. 
They suggest, for the industrialized countries, a one-year 
gasoline price reaction in the region of - 0, I to - 0,2. This is 
in accord with prior expectations about the short-term price 
inelasticity of gasoline demand and hence its use as a good 
tax revenue instrument. Little can be said about the income 
elasticity of gasoline demand, mainly because of the wide 
differences in the results. · 
2.3.3. The investigation of the abundant US literature on 
gasoline demand (see Table 2.8) does not produce such 
widely conflicting results. Judging from the studies reviewed 
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Table 2.8 
US price elasticities with respect to motor gasoline 
demand 
Author Time period Short-run 
elasticity 
Mc Gillivory [35] 1951-69 -0,22 
Anderson (36] 1952-72 -0,ll 
Dahl (37] 1935-72 l -0,44 
Cato et al. (38) 1959-73 -0,24 
Sweeny [39) 1957-74 -0,22 
US DOE [40] -0,16 
Kouris [41) 1955-81 -0,40 
The 1942-46 period omitted from estimation. 
Long-run 
elasticity 
-0,69 
-0,60 
-0,78 
-0,36 
-0,73 
-0,55 2 
-1,02 
The short-run elasticity has been derived judgementally and is part of the short-term 
integrated forecasting system ofElA. The long-run elasticity, also judgemental, is part 
of the demand analysis system of EIA. 
the short-term price elasticity in the USA seems to lie in the 
- 0,2 to - 0,4 neighbourhood. As regards the long-term 
price elasticity of gasoline demand there appears to be a 
consensus around the value of - 0, 7. In the only study where 
most up-to-date data have been used (Kouris [41], 1955-81 
period) the long-term price elasticity is the highest, about 
- I. In this study gasoline demand has been modelled 
through the structural approach Gust as in the Dahl [37] and 
the Sweeny [39] studies) and the results suggest a strengthen-
ing of the long-term reaction as we enter the post-1973 period 
of higher prices. 
2.4. Conclusions on the sectoral demand analysis 
A survey of the empirical results on energy demand functions 
has highlighted a number of causes responsible for 
conflicting evidence on price and income elasticities. Among 
these causes the most prominent were: 
(i) choice of fuel aggregation (i.e. primary energy, final 
energy, useful energy, expenditure on energy); 
(ii) choice of sectoral breakdown (i.e. aggregate functions 
versus sectoral functions, subdivision of industry into 
heavy and light industries, the treatment of the 
transportation sector at the energy level or at the fuel 
level); 
(iii) choice of dynamic specification (i.e. partial adjustments, 
Koyck geometric declining schemes, polynominal or 
Almon lags, translog specification); 
(iv) choice of data intervals (i.e. annual time series versus 
cross-sectional data or pooled cross-section and time 
series data); and 
(v) choice of t.ime period of estimation (the critical factor 
here is the number of post-1973 years included in the 
sample). 
It is not surprising then that many researchers have sought 
the solution to these problems in the judgemental adjustment 
of econometrically derived results. In this spirit the World 
Energy Outlook, prepared by the IEA [ 19], was based on 
judgementally projected elasticities into the future. This 
procedure was followed because factors such as tech-
nological progress, structural shifts within industry, appli-
ance saturation levels in the household, etc., cannot 
adequately be captured by econometric techniques. Hence an 
allowance for the variation of these factors should be made 
and one way is to alter the size of the income and price 
elasticities in future periods. 
However, in applied energy work the only evidence we have 
is that of the past. Thus every effort should be made to 
improve the information flow embedded in historical data. 
1 n view of the results surveyed in the literature the use of a 
BTU fuel aggregation procedure adjusted for relative fuel 
efficiencies should improve results, especially when ample 
engineering data exist. Furthermore, if fuel efficiency factors 
on a time series basis exist then the major difficulties from the 
usually missing technological progress factor could also be 
solved. 
The breakdown of energy demand into a number of 
industrial sectors where light and heavy energy users are 
Energy demand elasticities: review of the literature 
treated separately is clearly an advantage. A similar 
breakdown ought to be made in the so-called 'domestic' 
sector as well as a differentiation between alternative fuel 
demands in the transportation sector. 
The choice of dynamic specification is crucial. Based on the 
literature surveyed, it appears that neither a sophisticated 
translog type of specification, nor a simple partial adjust-
ment hypothesis yields promising results. On the contrary, 
the llexibility of a polynominal distribution lag scheme or the 
Koyck specification, where the income variable may or may 
not be distributed over time, appears to be more appealing. 
The type of data used (either cross-section or pooled data) 
should be treated with caution because of the implicit long-
term reaction which does not have a clear time dimension. It 
was argued (and there is supportive evidence in the empirical 
results), that the use of an income variable for long-term 
projections is essentially of a short-term nature, and hence 
the annual income elasticity is the appropriate measure to 
use. 
Lastly (and very importantly) the time span included in the 
estimation period is very crucial indeed. The pre-1973 period 
in energy studies is interesting but not so relevant. It is only 
when the full impact of the two oil price shocks is included in 
the sample of observations, that the resulting income and 
price elasticities can be thought of as being representative for 
at least the immediate future. 
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Energy demand elasticities: a model, with results for five Community member countries 
Introduction 
This chapter proposes a complete, if highly aggregated, 
model for energy demand built on the lines sketched in the 
conclusions to the preceding chapter reviewing the literature 
on energy demand elasticities. This model, called Esteden, 
has been used to evaluate the main energy demand elasticities 
in five countries: FR of Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom ; the country-by-
country approach was adopted because available data take 
the form of time series by country from 1960 to 1981 . 
The sectors examined are the residential/commercial sector 
and industry, which together account for over 75% of final 
energy consumption in the European Community. As 
remarkable results have generally been achieved in these 
sectors in terms of reducing energy intensity, it was 
interesting to evaluate the corresponding price and income 
elasticities. Tn specifying the model, attention was focused on 
coherent distinctions between: 
(i) short-term price effects (i.e. changes in energy consump-
tion that do not result from a long-term investment, but 
rather reflect the immediate reaction of consumers to a 
change in the price of energy); 
(ii) long-term price effects (i .e. reactions to price changes 
that imply long-term investment, covered by introduc-
ing an appropria te dynamic fomrnla); 
(ii i) the effects of structural change ( e.g. changes in the share 
of high-energy-consumption industries in total indus-
trial output, central heating penetration and saturation 
in the dwelling stock, etc.); 
(iv) purely short-term or marginal income effects (i.e. those 
that are independent of the effects of structural change); 
(v) specific variables corresponding to the special features 
of energy consumption by the sector (e.g. degree-days) ; 
(vi) other autonomous effects (i .e. general trends that are 
independent of the above factors). 
Special care was taken to include the period 1979-8 1 in the 
estimation sample, so as to take as full account as possible of 
the very large increase in the prices of energy products that 
occurred during that period. 
Eurostat data and definitions were used wherever possible, in 
particular energy consumption by fuel , fuel prices, interest 
rates, other key macro-e'conomic variables, industrial output 
by branch. degree-days, etc. 
More specifically, the energy statistics (prices and quantities 
for various energy sources available to consumers) are taken 
from the energy prices databank of the SOEC. 1 These series 
were converted using yield factors calculated by the SOEC. 
Sec Energy pric,• indices 1960-80. SOEC. 1982. 
to highlight the consumption and prices of ' useful energy', 2 
pursuant to the conclusions reached in Chapter II. However, 
since fixed coefficients were used for conversion, changes in 
the yield of each energy source over the estimation P,eriod 
(technological progress) are not taken into account. 
Most of the gaps in Eurostat data were filled from other 
sources, but an attempt was made to keep to the same 
definitions as far as possible. For a number of variables like 
average dwelling size, central heating penetration rates, etc., 
survey data were used, and some extrapolation was made to 
fill gaps in the time series. Unsatisfactory as this use of soft 
data might seem, the approach is in fact justified by the gain 
in terms of logical robustness and analytical potential. 
The first part of this chapter is a theoretical description of the 
model, justifying the specifications and explaining the 
meaning of the energy demand function parameters for each 
of the two sectors. The second part includes a brief 
presentation, with comments, of the results of the estimation, 
referring to the earlier studies mentioned in Chapter II, and 
some general conclusions about the economic significance of 
the results obtained. 
I . The Esteden model 
The model proposed for estimating energy demand com-
prises specifications common to the industrial and residen-
tial/commercial sectors, and separate specifications for each 
sector corresponding to the different structural variables 
incorporated. 
1.1. The general approach 
The quantity of energy consumed in year t is defined as: 
where U, is the 'useful' energy consumed, CNj the energy 
supplied by source j, and uj the conversion factor to obtain 
the quantity of useful energy supplied by uj (since each energy 
source has a different yield coefficient depending on the 
sector of use and technology applied). The reader will recall 
that the choice of useful energy as the variable avoids biases 
that would otherwise affect the estimations in view of the 
switch from less efficient sources (solid fuels) to more 
See the box in Chapter I on the main definitions in energy balance sheets. 
and the discussion of useful energy in Chapter II. 
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efficient ones .(hydrocarbons, electricity) that occurred 
throughout most of the period under study. 
Energy prices are dealt with at two levels, to separate short-
term and long-term price effects. 
First, real prices are defined by reference to an appropriate 
detlator (consumer price CPI, for the residential/commercial 
sector, wholesale price of manufactures WPI, for the 
industrial sector) to identify the short-term price effects. The 
formulae for real energy prices as an average, weighted for 
quantities consumed, and expressed in useful energy, are as 
follows: 
Industry 
I: CNi, uH,J Pit 
J 
Pr~·=-----
U, WPI, 
P:; 
Residential/commercial 
U1 CPI1 
where P, is the final price to consumers of one gigajoule of 
energy from sourcej in national currency, fully taxed to the 
residential/commercial sector and net of VAT to the 
industrial sector. 
Secondly, to isolate the long-term price effect, real energy 
prices are calculated with reference to the cost of capital 
depreciation LRK, defined as follows: 
r, . e" · T 
LRK, = CGI, 
e''. T - } 
where: 
r, = the long-term interest rate; 
CGI, = the index of the price of gross fixed capital 
formation in the sector (i.e. housing in the residen-
tial/commercial sector; G FCF excluding housing in 
industry); 
T = the optimal period for capital depreciation; this 
should be determined by experiment to obtain the 
best possible adjustment. 
This leads to the formula for the second component of the 
real energy price P" as a weighted average price, which takes 
the same form for both sectors: 
P~, = 
~ CNi, ui!0 Pi, J 
U,LRK, . 
Finally, a variable noted D, is incorporated for both sectors to 
express annual changes in weather conditions through the 
number of degree-days each year. D, is equal to the sum, over 
a year, of the daily deviations of an indoor reference 
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temperature from an observed average outdoor temperature. 
The justification for including this variable in the energy 
demand function of the residential/commercial sector is 
obvious, but it has also been included in industry's demand 
function, since a fair share of the energy consumed by 
industry is used for space heating, and cannot be dis-
tinguished in total energy consumption of the sect<:>r. 
1.2. The energy demand function of industry 
1.2.1. As well as the price variables described above, specific 
variables are used in the model for the industrial sector to 
account for activity effects, i.e. both income or output effects 
and structural effects. For industry, account must be taken 
not only of changes in industrial output but also of changes 
in industrial structure, distinguishing between high-energy-
consumption branches and others. An index has thus been 
constructed to represent changes in energy-intensive output: 
Cl, = I: ro; Xii 
I 
where: 
Xii = index of output of branch i; 
Um 
(J).=--
1 V15 
ro; represents branch ts share in 1975 (U; 75) in total useful 
energy consumed by industry in 1975 (U 75); detailed 
information on energy consumption by branch is available 
for 1975 in energy input-output tables. 1 
The branch breakdown, isolating the high-energy-consump-
tion branches, is as follows: 
(i) ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals and metal 
products (NACE CLIO 130 + 190); 
(ii) non-metallic mineral products (NACE CLIO 150); 
(iii) chemical products, rubber and plastic products (NACE 
CLIO 170 + 490); 
(iv) paper and printing products (NACE CLIO 470); 
(v) other branches (NACE CLIO 210 to 510 except 490). 
Thus the industrial sector's demand for energy in year t can 
be expressed as: 
U, = U 1 _ 1A ( I':, ) 0 0 ( P:,_I ) 0 1 fI 
l':,-1 P:,-2 /=I 
( 
~~1-/ ) ~(/) ( ~) y c~ ) ~ St 
Pe1-1-1 CI,-1 D,-1 
See Energy balance sheets based on the input-output tables, 1975, SOEC. 
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The function takes the form of ra tios between the values of 
the explanatory variables in two consecutive years because: 
(i) multicolinearity leading to biased estimates is nearly 
always removed by such specification ; 
(ii) the equation can be used for forecasting without 
substantial forecasting error adjustments (which would 
be required if the predicted and actual values in the most 
recent period were too far out of line) ; 
(iii) estimates of the parameters are scale independent and 
the resulting model is sensitive to changes at the margin . 
Similarly, under this specifica tion the true variation can 
be adequately explained even with statistics of ap-
parently mediocre quality. 
1.2.2. Interpretation of parameters 
Below we explain the meaning of each of the demand 
function parameters, and point out its main features. 
A is a constant representing autonomous growth 
factors, i. e. changes in the demand for energy 
induced by technological or structural 
change, independent of prices and of levels 
or composition of output (i.e. of the other 
explanatory va riables). Its value is expected 
to be less than one, which implies other 
things being equal that autonomus tech-
nological progress improves the average 
efficiency of energy use for production even 
when real energy prices do not change. 
(a0 + a 1) represents the short-term price elasticity, i.e. 
the response of demand to price changes that 
does not involve new technologies, new 
machinery or substantial (and time-consum-
ing) changes to existing machinery. In other 
words, this response takes the form of 
administrative decisions, part of the day-to-
day work of managing industrial firms. 
P(I) = Po + P ii + P212 is a polynomial distributed lag 
structure subject to the following constraints: 
(i) either it is zero at the end of the period : P(/ + I) = O; 
(i i) or it is zero at the beginning and the end: P(O) = 0 and 
p(I + I) = 0. 
The long-term price elasticity of energy demand is thus 
L 
defined as equal to L P(I) . It represents the response to 
1- 1 
changes in energy prices involving investment decisions, the 
effects of which are lagged. Clea rly the long-term interest 
rate. which is an important factor in determining the price of 
capital Pk. strongly influences long-term responses to 
changes in energy price . 
Altogether, in view of the formula for the polynomial 
expression P(I) (second-degree function), the graphic 
representation of short-term and long-term price effects over 
time should give a parabola something like this: 
0 2 
\ PU) 
\ 
', a1 + P( I) 
'~ 
........... 
PC2) 
Price elas ticit y 
4 5 Lags (years) 
P(3) 
y is the output elasticity of energy demand. The term CI, 
representing output is weighted for the relative energy 
intensity of certain industrial branches ; it enables us to 
isola te the effects of changes in industrial structure from 
other effects: short-term and long-term price effects, 
autonomous technical progress, etc. At a ll events, the 
weightings adopted should mean that the value of 
output elasticity will be statistically more robust, but in 
general lower for the period 1960-81 than the elasticities 
obtained in most of the traditional studies that do not 
allow for the effects of changes in the pattern of output. 
8 is the elasticity of energy demand in relation to weather 
conditions (degree-days). This elasticity may be ex-
pected to be much lower for the industrial sector than 
for the residential/commercial sector. 
1.3. The energy demand function fo r the residential/commer-
cial sector 
1.3. 1. On the residential /commercial side, the basic ap-
proach must be supplemented with explanatory variables 
specific to this sector. Energy demand by the residential/ 
commercial sector is essentially derived from the need for 
heating, so space heating is the factor to be incorporated 
specifically. 1 Since centra lly-heated premises consume much 
more energy than others (from 1,3 times to twice as much), 
the share C, of centrally-heated premises, in the total 
dwelling stock, is adopted as an explanatory variable. 
Specific consumption of electricity. i.e. light uses such as for lighting. 
domestic appliances. etc. has been explicitly deducted from the 
consumption of the residential/commercial sector and therefore excluded 
from the field of study. 
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If H, is the dwelling stock in square metres, and µ the energy 
intensity factor of central heating in relation to heating by 
individual appliances, then the impact of the size of the 
dwelling stock on the demand for energy is defined as: 
The trend of this structural variable is indirectly linked to the 
trend of income; its effects are accompanied by the mainly 
short-term direct effects of the real disposable income of 
households, RDI,. 
Finally, the number of degree-days D, may be an important 
variable in explaining energy demand by the residential/ 
commercial sector. 
The energy demand function to be estimated is therefore: 
( pc) (pc) L U = U _ A -'-1 0 0 ~ 0 1 n I I I pc pc e1-I n-2 /=I 
Here again, the expression is in ratio form for the reasons 
given at the end of point 1.2.1. 
1.3.2. Interpretation of paramters 
Some of the parameters are simply mentioned here, as they 
are exactly parallel to those used in the demand function for 
industry (see point 1.2.2); only the parameters specific to the 
residential/commercial sector are explained in detail. 
A constant representing autonomous change 
(a0 + a1) short-term price elasticity 
L 
l: ~(/) = long-term price elasticity. 
/= I 
The aggregate price effect should develop over time along a 
similar parabola to that given above for the industrial sector. 
(y 1 + y2) may be interpreted as representing income 
elasticity in the hroad sense. It is the sum of two 
elasticities. 
y 1 covers part of the income effect, to the extent that the term 
SP, renects the penetration of central heating in the dwelling 
stock and the effects of the growth of this stock (in number of 
dwellings and area). 
y2 is the direct income effect, but because of the specification 
it does not cover the effects of an increase in the dwelling 
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stock or central heating penetration, and thus expresses only 
the marginal propensity to consume energy from disposable 
income. Since heating is considered a necessity, this income 
elasticity may well be very low. 
Using the formula, central heating saturation can be 
illustrated: as C, approaches 1, SP, tends towards~- In 
SP,_1 H,_ 1 
industrialized countries with low rates ofpopuiation growth, 
the rate of expansion of the dwelling stock is very small, so 
that ~ tends towards 1. Thus the aggregate income effect H,_, 
is correctly renected in y2, which is indeed income elasticity. 
On balance, comparison between estimated elasticities 
(y 1 + y2) or y2 on the one hand, and those calculated in a 
more traditional way on the other, will probably be rather 
difficult in view of the specifications: 
(i) estimations based on useful energy are different from 
those based in general on energy supplied; 
(ii) the distinction between direct income effects and the 
effects of central heating penetration should mean that 
income elasticity y2 is much lower than traditional 
income elasticities. 
Finally, 8 represents the degree-days elasticity of demand, 
which is included in the equation in order to sharpen the 
other parameters by removing the variation due to this 
obvious term. 
2. Summary results for the industrial sector 
Table 3.1 summarizes the main econometric results obtained 
in the Esteden study with regard to the industry sector. The 
goodness of fit represented here by the correlation coefficient 
(see also actual versus fitted demand in Graphs 2.1 to 2.5) 
can be considered as satisfactory, particularly since the 
model has been expressed in ratio form (i.e. it explicitly sets 
out to explain the changes in the levels rather than the levels 
themselves), while at the same time priority in this study was 
not given to high correlations, but rather to the 'economic 
logic' robustness of the resulting model. 
No autocorrelation of residuals was encountered (Durbin-
Watson statistics being in general marginally higher than 
two), conforming to early expectations that the problem 
would not occur given the ratio specification chosen. 
In all instances in the Esteden study, the elasticity of 
industrial energy consumption with respect to degree-days 
was found to be statistically insignificant, very small and was 
often omitted. Similarly, the constant term (representing 
'autonomous' growth) was found to be often insignificant 
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Table 2.1 
Energy demand elasticities: the main results for the industrial sector 
Cumulative price elas ticity Output Correlation 
FR of Germany 
France 
Italy 
The Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
R2 corrected for degrees or freedom . 
I year 
-0,08 
-0, 17 
-0,26 
- 0,31 
- 0,24 
and at times unreasonable and has therefore been excluded in 
many cases. 
With regard to price elasticities, it is worth noting that despite 
the apparent differences between countries, these are not 
sufficiently large to be statistically significant at the 99% level 
of confidence. fn fact, a broad assumption of a short-term 
price elasticity of - 0,2 and a long-term price elasticity of 
- 0,4 could serve as an adequate average approximation for 
the five countries studied her an approximation which 
would not deviate substantially from results such as those · 
used by the TEA (see Chapter ff). 
Short-term price elasticities (I year) range from - 0,08 in 
Germany (lowest probably because of the preponderance of 
vertical integra tion in energy-intensive industries) to - 0,31 
in the Netherlands (highest perhaps because of the relatively 
large size of its export and spot-market orientated chemical 
sector) . 
The estimated long-term price elasticities fall in the - 0,3 to 
- 0,4 range for all countries, with the notable exception of 
France with an estimated long-term price elasticity of - 0,53 . 
It is not immediately obvious why French industry should 
display such a strong sensitivity to energy prices in the longer 
term. It may, however, be worth noting that France has the 
smallest rela tive ponderation of energy-intensive industries 
in its total industrial output. The possible rationale here 
would be that energy-intensive industries are a priori energy 
price conscious, whereas industries where the energy bill 
represents a mall percentage of costs would tend to react 
strongest when prices surge. The la tter would also partly 
explain why earlier studies, which did not cover one or both 
of the energy price shocks, have failed to indicate the specia l 
price sensitivity of French industry. 
The mos t striking diITerence, however, between the present 
tudy and the earlier ones lies in the magnitude of the 
2 years Total elasticity coefficient I 
- 0,33 -0,37 . +0,65 0,951 
-0,5 1 -0,53 +0,35 0,926 
-0,27 -0,31 +0,56 0,961 
- 0,31 -0,38 +0,68 0,958 
-0,40 -0,40 +0,55 0,958 
elasticity operating beyond the third year. In the Esteden 
study this effect is in general much smaller. The main reason 
for this, we believe, is the effect of the model specification 
with regard to the income variable. The latter is a sum of 
industrial output weighted by energy intensity and it 
therefore takes into account structural change at the outset. 
In other words, a large part of what is termed as the very 
long-term elasticity in the earlier studies measures the extent 
to which lower energy prices over a sufficiently long period 
tend to encourage the growth in energy-intensive industries 
and the converse in cases of high energy prices. 
In this respect, the evidence of the present study suggests that 
investments into energy-saving equipment requiring long 
gestation periods have only a limited eITect in determining 
aggregate energy consumption patterns. Attention should, 
however, be drawn to the fact that the length of the sample 
period (21 years) is not sufficient to establish firmly long-
term behaviour. A more appropriate method to be used in 
order to obtain robust results in this respect is pooling time 
series and cross-section observations together and using 
perhaps only the most recent decade while leaving the earlier 
decade to establish the long-term pattern. Such an estimation 
would not produce long-term elasticities by country but 
should provide more definitive answers on the importance of 
long-tem1 price eITects on a Community-wide basis. 
The output elasticities range from + 0,35 (France) to + 0,68 
(The Netherlands) but again, although robust, do not diITer 
from each other in a statistically significant way at the 99% 
level of confidence. 
A comparison of the Esteden output elasticities with those 
obtained in ea rlier studies discussed in Chapter II presents 
some interest (see Table 3.2). 
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irable 2.2 
Elasticities with regard to output 
IEA 
(1960-79) 
FR of Germany + 1,10 
France +0,96 
Italy + 1,15 
The Netherlands 
United Kingdom +0,65 
Pindyck 
(1959-74) 
+0,76 
+0,78 
+0,86 
+0,78 
Estedcn 
(1960-81) 
+0,65 
+0,35 
+0,56 
+0,68 
+0,55 
It is strikingly apparent that the elasticities obtained in the 
Esteden study are markedly lower than those of the earlier 
studies. This could be entirely due to the specification of the 
ouput variable in the Esteden study, particularly if one 
considers that in the past energy-intensive industries have 
either experienced high growth rates (chemicals) or high 
volatility (iron and steel). An aggregate industrial output 
measure would mask this variability and subsequently 
produce higher elasticities (as the least squares technique 
attempts to explain variability of the dependent variable by 
means of a less variable independent one). The implications 
of our results are, however, wide and far reaching in the sense 
that if one assumes energy price stability and no reversion to 
industrial patterns of the past (no major revival of the iron 
and steel industry or no increase in the share of the chemical 
industry in aggregate industrial production), the growth in 
energy consumption is likely to be half what would be 
suggested by applying the same assumptions on, for 
example, the IEA model. 
Table 3.1 
3. Summary results for the residential/commercial sector 
Table 3.1 summarizes the main econometric results obtained 
in the Esteden study with regard to the residential/ 
commercial sector. 
The overall performance of the equations as measured by the 
correlation coefficients corrected for degrees of freedom is 
satisfactory (see also Graphs 3.1 to 3.5 of actual versus fitted 
energy demand), except for the United Kingdom where the 
erratic movement of energy consumption in the domestic 
sector ( decline between 1962 and 1967, sharp increase 
between 1967 and 1969, a sharp drop in 1970-72 and a steep 
- increase in 197 5-79) are hard to explain in terms of existing 
variables. Consequently a shortened interval ( 1972-81) had 
to be used. 
Conforming to prior expectations, no autocorrelation of 
residuals was encountered-the Durbin-Watson statistic 
exceeding 2 in all cases. The inclusion of the constant 
(autonomous growth or decline term) invariably produced 
either perverse or unreasonable results and has thus been 
omitted. The implication is that there is no systematic effect 
over time other than that captured by the included variables. 
Regarding price elasticities, a working hypothesis of a short-
term ( I year) elasticity of - 0,26 and a long-term one of 
- 0,45 for the whole of the five countries would not be 
significantly different from the results obtained for the 
individual countries. These price elasticities are somewhat 
larger than those obtained for the industrial sector. More 
significantly, the longer-term effects (from the third year 
onwards) seem to be more pronounced for the domestic 
sector than for the industriai sector. A possible explanation 
of this observation could be the greater diversity of criteria 
used by consumers in the residential sector when deciding on 
energy-saving investments. 
Energy demand elasticities: the main results for the residential/commercial sector 
Cumulati,·c price elasticities Elas~~ Elasticity 
respect to with Degree- Correlation 
respect days D1 coefficient I year 2 years Total structural to RD!, 
variable SP, 
FR of Germany -0,10 -0,26 -0,29 +0,96 +0,31 +0,68 0,974 
France -0,49 -0,65 -0,72 +0,60 +0,98 0,966 
Italy -0,26 -0,37 -0,45 +0,19 +0,73 +0,15 0,993 
The Netherlands -0,22 -0,25 -0,31 +0,39 +0,38 +1,16 0,966 
United Kingdom -0,27 -0,48 -0,49 +0,32 +0,04 0,546 
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These general observations apart, it is clear from the above 
table that energy price elasticities in the Esteden study do 
display considerable variation from country to country, 
namely from - 0, 10 (FR of Germany) and - 0,49 (France) 
with regrad to the short term ( one year), and from - 0,29 
(FR of Germany) to - 0, 72 (France) in the long term. These 
differences are not easy to explain except by a much closer 
scrutiny of the actual data used. 
For example, in Germany the data on central heating 
penetration indicated early saturation in the late 1970s while 
in France central heating penetration appeared to be 
proceeding at a rapid pace during the same period. Thus in 
Germany the slowdown in penetration adequately explains 
the levelling off in consumption when, as in France, the same 
phenomenon could only be adequately explained by a strong 
energy price reaction. Since the data on central heating 
penetration were from entirely different sources (surveys), 
differences in coverage and definitions could by themselves 
explain the differences in behaviour and some homogeniz-
ation of sources could have resulted in more standardized 
results. It was not possible to carry out this homogenization 
for the Esteden study and substantial possibilities for 
improvements on the models exist through future work in 
this area. 
The degree data (crucial in this sector) also suffer from 
similar defects with regard to standardization and coverage 
(see below). · 
A direct comparison with other studies in the sphere of 
income elasticities would not be fruitful for the reasons 
mentioned in the section dealing with the theoretical 
specification of the model: namely the introduction in this 
study of two 'income' type variables, the one incorporating 
information about the housing stock, its average size and 
central heating penetration, and the other theoretically 
capturing the marginal propensity to consume energy out of 
disposable income. Neither would it be fruitful to examine 
the sum of those two elasticities and compare it against 
earlier studies because to do so would by default imply that 
there exists perfect proportionality (an elasticity of unity) 
between real disposable income and the composite variable, 
a very debatable proposition in view of the various 
penetration and saturaion effects encountered when dealing 
both with the housing stock and central heating. Be that as it 
may, it is worth noting that in all countries under 
examination, population growth is slower, the net additions 
to the housing stock have been gradually declining over time 
and central heating penetration has gradually moved into the 
saturation phase. The combined effect of all the above is to 
imply that increments in income in the future would result in 
less than proportional increments in the composite variable. 
In this context the sum of the two elasticities (y1 + y.;J would 
represent an overestimate of an implied income elasticity 
when applied to the present or for the purpose of projections. 
As can be directly observed in Table 3.1, only Germany 
displays results exactly consistent with a priori expectations 
(namely the first elasticity y1 close to unity and the second y2 
considerably smaller). 
For France and the United Kingdom the inclusion of the first 
parameter caused distortion of results and has had to be 
excluded. The overall rather disappointing performance of 
the composite variable as an explanatory factor can be 
mostly attributed to data inaccuracies. 
Less than satisfactory results were also obtained for the 
estimate of the elasticity with respect to degree-days (see 
Table 3.1). The range here is from +0,04 (United Kingdom) 
to + 1,16 (The Netherlands). Degree-days is a concept 
specifically devised to measure the magnitude of heating 
requirements, and in this respect such differences in the 
estimates would appear to be unjustifiable. However, it was 
clear from the outset that definitions of degree-days for 
different countries, as available for the Esteden study, were 
widely different from country to country. Furthermore, one 
'station' was often used to represent the whole territory, and 
certainly no attempt at population weighting was made. 
Finally, the existing time series were short and they had to be 
used in conjunction with data for average temperature for 
the six coldest months, an exercise which required a 
considerable amount of simplifying assumptions to be made, 
thus further jeopardizing the robustness of the results. With 
the intensification of the effort on collection of homogenized 
degree-day data currently under progress in the Statistical 
Office, it is hoped that more meaningful series could lead to 
more satisfactory modelling results when extending the scope 
of the Esteden models in the future. 
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GRAPH 2: Energy demand, industrial sector GRAPH 3: Energy demand, residential/commercial sector 
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The foreign trade of the Community, the United States 
of America and Ja pan 
With the slackening-off of the high growth rates recorded in 
the industrialized economies ever since the war, the countries 
concerned have attempted to offset the contraction in 
domestic activity by developing exports . Another reason for 
this strategy, which was adopted by all the countries 
concerned, was the need to restore trade-balance equilib-
rium, adversely affected by the new trend of energy costs. 
With everyone resorting to the same tactic, international 
trade relations inevitably came under pressure and , in 
Europe, the question of the Community's competitive 
capacity in the face of the commercial dynamism of its 
principal world partners came to the fore . 
Since the early 1980s Commission departments 1 and the 
European Parliament2 have on several occasions considered 
the problem of Community competitiveness in relation to the 
United States and Japan. Their thinking was based on 
existing studies of market shares and import and export 
structures, where the pace of change has been increasingly 
rapid over the past few years . 
Sec ' Ex ternal trade and competitiveness' in European Economy No 14, 
Brussels, 1982, Chapter I 0, p. 138 ; Commission of the European 
Communities, Dossiers, 'The competiti veness of the Community 
industry', Brussels, 1982. 
S. Leonardi: 'Report on the competitiveness of the Community industry' , 
Doc. 1-1335/82 of 14.3. 1983, and resolution of the European Parliament 
on the competitiveness of Community industry (OJ L 135, 24. 5.83). 
Since then, the statistical basis for such studies has been 
brought up to date and considerably improved by estim-
ations of foreign trade series in volume, so that observed 
magnitudes can now be interpreted without interference 
from the trends due specifically to changing prices. · 
Two chapters deal with the exploitation of this new 
information. The first follows on from earlier work and 
presents the findings of a comparison of real foreign trade by 
the Community, the individual Member States, the United 
States and Japan. The conclusions reached confirm that the 
key sectors of Community industry have not always 
managed the technological adjustment required if the 
Community is to keep control over its development choices. 
Chapter II examines series for the price and income 
elasticities of those countries' foreign trade on the basis of 
systematic estimations of export and import functions 
evaluated from 1964 to 1981. The main advantage of this 
approach, based on a tried and tested methodology, is that it 
provides up-to-date and comparable results that reflect the 
features of trade between the protagonists on the inter-
national stage. It establishes that there is a direct link 
between the elasticities obtained and the choice of import or 
export specialization of producers in the industrialized 
countries. Greater adaptability to international demand on 
the part of some of these producers enables them to take 
better advantage of current changes in international trade. 
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Chapter I: Community foreign trade: 
the equipment goods industry under threat I 
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Community foreign trade: the equipment goods industry under threat 
The analysys of the volume of foreign trade leads to a simple 
conclusion: the Community, the world's premier exporter of 
manufactured goods, has preserved that share of world trade 
which its industrial prowess and service expertise allowed it 
to conquer, but its relative slowness in the field of 
technological innovation has weakened its position in the 
area of equipment goods and made it more vulnerable to 
foreign import penetration. 
Such underachievement affects most of those industrial 
sectors that export machines and material which comprise 
fi xed capital investment for a developed country and this led 
to a deterioration of a balance of payments which had been 
traditionally in surplus. For the Community this denoted its 
dominant position on the foreign equipment goods markets 
based upon the uncontested hold over its internal market, 
thus allowing the exercise, together with the USA, of a 
determining influence upon the development of production 
structures and the process of innovation. The Community is 
in the process oflosing its lead both on the home and foreign 
markets. The nature and design of high technology products 
which now account for a rising proportion of Community 
imports lead its principal partners to play a growing and, 
sometimes, determinant role in the modernization not only 
of Community industrial enterprises but also of those which 
produce services for both households and producer sectors. 
These imports certainly have the effect of contributing to the · 
restructuring and adaptation of production systems, but they 
also increase Community dependence on foreign tech-
nological innovation. 
This deterioration in the Community pos1t1on on both 
internal and external markets has increased during the course 
of the last few years, especially for the overall industrial 
machine sector, and even more so for the machine tool 
sector. This has lead to protectionist reactions on the part of 
some producers just as in the USA, which, like the 
Community, is subject to Japanese competition in frontier 
technology robotics and flexible manufacturing systems. 
However, accepting the 'simple answer' of protectionism 
would in the end damage the Community's competitiveness 
by further widening the technological gap and reinforcing 
external constraints. While the Community certainly must 
reconquer its position · in relation to the most advanced 
industrialized countries ifit is to consolidate its international 
standing, it will not be restored to its proper place unless 
Community industry first re-establishes itself on its own 
market. This new approach, which may well be under way in 
the auto sector, is the only one that can lead to the restoration 
of trade equilibrium . To gain control of the Community 
market. not only a massive effort of research 1V1d investment 
in new products and processes is required. but also an 
improvement in the functioning of this vast domestic market. 
These conditions are necessary if the Community's equip-
ment goods industry is to be in a position to offer a 
competitive range of products. 
Introduction 
Since 1973 the three main competitors of world trade have 
further expanded their openness to foreign trade as the share 
of their imports of goods and services in GDP increased 
between 1973 and 1981 from 11 to 16% for extra-Community 
trade, from 6 to 10% for the USA and 10 to 14,6% for Japan. 
The reltive importance of exports grew in a similar fashion. 
This growing openness 1s in evidence for trade in goods as 
much as in services. However, neither the other OECD 
member countries nor non-OECD countries experienced a 
similar growth. 
On the basis of the analysis of the world trade of these three 
partners over the period 1973-81 presented in this chapter, 
we may observe the categories of products on which this 
internationalization of production is based, compare the 
relative performance of each economic zone and draw a 
certain number of conclusions on the extent to which the 
Community, the USA and Japan have managed to keep 
control of their trade. The main contribution of this analysis, 
based on a volume data bank, is to highlight those changes 
and the real growth which resulted from the many upheavals 
of the 1970s, without their growth being disguised by price 
changes which were sometimes quite rapid and greatly 
differentiated between one product and another. 
After examining the principal characteristics of overall 
performance by the Community and its Member States in 
relation to the USA and Japan, the analysis concentrates on 
trade in equipment goods and the principal sectors which 
produce them. The production of such products, spearhead 
of Community success on world markets, is now finding it 
increasingly difficult to maintain its share of world trade 
and---even more worrying- on its own markets . 
The availabi li ty of statistics means that the analysis must be 
limited to trade in goods, excluding services, even though 
they account for a large part of international trade on a 
commercial basis. For this reason it is worthwhile to outline 
the overall relationship of flows of merchandise trade to 
corresponding flows of services, before proceeding with a 
detailed analysis of flows of merchandise imports and 
exports. 
Graph I shows, overall, not only that the situation differs 
greatly between countries but also, that those countries 
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GRAPH I : Net transactions In goods and senices, In '000 million ECU from 1976 to 1981 (annual average) and in 1981 
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Community foreign trade: the equipment goods industry under threat 
characterized by a 'structural' surplus in goods trade 
(Germany, Japan) finance a large deficit on the import 
services, with the contrary situation holding in general for 
other countries. This may be partly explained by the 
comparative advantage of certain countries in the export of 
services, which consequently reduces their import require-
ments. The surplus on tourism receipts accumulated by a 
country, for example, is related to the material advantage of 
geographical location or climate; predominance in inter-
national merchandise transport, for which maritime navig-
ation has always played a determining role, depends as much 
on the possession of a modern fleet as on a maritime tradition 
which by definition, is difficult to acquire. (The Japanese 
balance, for example, is in constant deficit on this item.) The 
importance of insurance (cover for goods in transit) stems 
from the existence in certain countries of long-established 
companies which operate world-wide and enjoy a monopoly 
in this activity. 
As a result, those countries which experience a large deficit 
on service trade are subject to a greater constraint to remain 
competitive on the international goods market since so as to 
generate surpluses that will finance this deficit. Thus, the 
trade surplus of 9 700 million ECU recorded by Japan in 
1981 on bilateral trade with the Community is reduced by 
60% by Japan's deficit on services. 1 
On the contrary, the Community as a whole, France, Italy, 
the Benelux countries, Greece and, above all, the USA 
recorded positive balances on service trade thus limiting the 
effects of their deficits on goods trade, the USA even 
managing in 1981 to exceed by I O OOO million ECU the 
deficit recorded on goods trade. The United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands occupy a special position, being in surplus 
on goods thanks mainly to energy; they are traditionally net 
exporters of services, something which allowed them to 
achieve a particularly high surplus on goods and services in 
1981. recorded mainly with the Community by the Nether-
lands and with the rest of the world by the United Kingdom. 
Thus the conclusions arrived at in the analysis of goods trade 
must be placed in the context of 'goods and services'. France 
and Italy have not, as a result of their relative strength in 
services trade, experienced all the pressures necessary for the 
adaptation of their production apparatus. Likewise Japan, 
lacking natural energy sources and depending on externally-
provided services, is forced to depend on the success of its 
exports of goods which has encouraged it to resort, to a 
greater extent than its competitors, to aggressive industrial 
strategies so as to reinforce its competitiveness. But the 
commercial and industrial dynamism of the Community's 
partners' exports also has more direct consequences: within 
Sec D. Wilson: "Japan: The other side of the trade war· in The Bank,•r. 
London. Vol. 132. No 681. p. 315. 
the context of competition among the large economies, 
whose objective is to conquer new markets or to defend their 
production in competition with more competitive foreign 
suppliers, the Community would appear to be menaced in the 
sectors where success will determine the success of its process 
of structural adjustment. An accentuation of its dependence 
in the trade of high technology products would prove more 
disturbing than equal imbalance in goods and services trade: 
it could gravely affect both the rate and direction of changes 
in its production structures. 
1. Merchandise trade : an overall view 
The examination of series of foreign trade data expressed in 
value terms (US dollars) disguises the real importance of 
changes that have occurred in the flows of exports and 
imports. The trends of prices and exchange rates partially 
distort any assessment of the industrialized countries' 
capacity to react to the economic disturbances which have 
occurred since 1973 and which have caused them to seek to 
bolster their growth by developing their trade. 
Consequently, unless otherwise indicated, the following 
analyses of the external trade of the OECD countries have 
been made at constant prices and exchange rates (on the basis 
of 1975 prices) by deflating the figures for merchandise trade 
in value terms (US dollars) by price indices-in unit values-
using a new method explained in the annex. 
The Community's good overall performance on world 
markets 
Between 1973 and 1981-a period in which it was thrown off 
balance by two oil price shocks and was affected even more 
than its major trading partners by weak growth (twice 
negative, in 1975 and 1981 }-the Community succeeded in 
maintaining a high growth rate in the volume of its exports to 
the rest of the world (see Table I). At 4.9~-~ per year on 
average, its perfornrnnce was better than the OECD average, 
almost one percentage point better than that of the United 
States but more than three percentage points worse than that 
of Japan. The efforts made to tap new markets and to 
maintain its world market share are reflected even more 
clearly in the apparent average elasticity of its exports with 
respect to GDP. which increased from I, 7 between 1964 and 
1973 to 2,5 between 1973 and 1981. Over the same periods, 
the change for the United States was from 1,4 to 1,9 and for 
Japan from 1,5 to 2,3. 
The perfornrnnce of these three major industrial powers 
bears witness to their growing control over world trade. 
According to GA TT figures, this same elasticity at world 
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level stood at 1,4 on average between 1964 and 1973 (thus 
broadly matching the figures mentioned above), but it then 
fell to 1,2 during the following period. 
A new distribution of growth in world trade appears to be 
emerging gradually. Following a period, before 1973, in 
which the sharp growth of GDP and exports was shared by 
the various world areas, the contraction in the rate of 
economic growth since then is having a greater adverse effect 
on the export gains of Third World and State-trading 
countries than on those of the major OECD countries. 
This trend, which first was masked by the positions of the oil-
producing countries, has been particularly noticeable in the 
new period of sharply deteriorating economic growth, which 
began in 1980. Whereas at world level the volume of exports 
increased by an annual average of only 0,7% between 1979 
and 1981, the Community maintained a high rate of export 
growth (almost 4,5% per year) and the United States and 
Japan even succeeded in increasing their rates appreciably, 
while the other industrialized countries did not experience a 
similar level of growth. 
In 1982 the negative growth of GDP in the industrialized 
countries generally and the decline in slaes to non-oil 
Table 1 
Growth of GDP and total exports 
(average annual growth in volume terms) 
1964-73 
World 
GDP 6,0 
Exports 8,5 
OECD 
GDP 5,0 
Exports 9,4 
Exports excluding intra-
Community trade 8,7 
EC JO 
GDP 4,8 
Exports, extra-Community 8,1 
Exports, intra-Community 11,4 
United States 
GDP 4,1 
Exports 5,9 
Japan 
GDP I0,7 
Exports 15,7 
Source: GA TT and Volimc,. 
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developing countries probably entailed a slight fall in the 
export volme not only of the OECD countries, but also of the 
developing countries, whether or not they export energy 
products; only the Eastern bloc countries seem to be 
increasing their sales abroad. I 
Maintenance of Member States' positions on third markets 
and sharp cyclical fluctuations in their exports within the 
Community 
International markets have remained prime outlets for 
almost all the Community Member States (see Table 2). As 
from the first oil shock, Italy and France seized the new 
international opportunities to maintain the rate of their 
exports outside the Community at a very high level; most of 
the other countries succeeded in compensating for the fall in 
the growth of their exports on Community markets by 
positive rates of growth on world markets. 
According to 'GATI international trade 82/83, provisional figures'. 
(%) 
1973-81 1973-7S 197S-79 1979-81 
3,0 0,7 4,7 1,2 
3,5 0,2 6,6 0,7 
2,3 0,3 3,9 1,3 
4,4 0,0 7,6 2,8 
4,9 0,8 7,2. 4,5 
2,0 0,3 3,6 0,5 
4,9 3,7 5,8 4,4 
3,2 -2,0 8,7 -2,2 
2,2 -0,8 4,3 1,0 
4,1 2,3 3,7 6,8 
3,7 0,7 5,1 3,8 
8,5 5,3 7,5 13,9 
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Table 2 
Extra-Community trade in volume terms; average annual growth rates 
All products 
1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979- 1964-
73 81 75 79 81 73 
Exports 
B 9,2 5,0 - 1,4 8,0 5,6 - 3,1 
DK 8,4 4,6 3, 1 3,7 8,1 1,6 
D 8,8 5,0 2,8 4,6 8,2 15,1 
GR 12,3 7,8 14,8 6,7 3,6 1,8 
F 8,3 6,5 7,9 6,3 5,5 6,6 
IRL 15, 1 13,1 0,7 19,1 14,6 6,2 
I 9,4 8,3 11 ,3 10,4 1,5 4,4 
NL 7,2 4,9 3,2 4,9 6,7 4,6 
U K 6,3 0,6 - 1,0 3,5 -3,6 11 ,3 
EC 10 8,1 4,9 3,7 5,8 4,4 5,9 
USA I 5,9 4,1 2,3 3,7 6,8 7,7 
Japan 1 15,8 8,5 5,3 7,5 13,9 - 2,3 
OECD 2 8,7 4,9 0,8 7,2 3,9 6,1 
Imports 
B 7,7 2,2 - 5,4 8,6 - 2,2 - 1,4 
DK 7,7 - 0,7 - 5,9 3, I - 2,9 1,6 
D 7,0 3,8 - 2,1 8,8 0,0 2,3 
GR 9,7 - 1,0 0,5 10,1 - 21,2 7,4 
F 7,3 2,5 - 3,5 7,7 - 1,6 1,8 
IRL 5,7 5,7 - 6,1 15,0 0,5 3,0 
I 8,2 0,6 - 8,2 7,8 - 4,2 6,1 
NL 9,7 - 0,4 - 8,1 6,5 - 5,6 4,5 
UK 5,2 - 1,9 - 9,9 5,8 - 8,2 -2,2 
EC 10 7, 1 1,1 - 6,0 7,5 - 3,6 
USA I 9,8 0,6 - 9,5 8,6 - 3,9 
Japan 1 13,9 0,5 - 6,4 6,6 - 4,2 
OECD 2 9,0 0,8 - 5,0 6,0 - 3,6 
I To ta l trade. 
l OECD excluding int ra-Community trade. 
Souru : Volimcx. 
While the subsequent upturn saw a return to a high rate of 
growth of in tra-Community trade (even higher than that of 
exports to the rest of the world), the results fo r the last two 
yea rs (1 980 and 198 1), during which growth in the 
Community again cont racted, are even more divergent (see 
Table 3). With the exception of Denma rk and a marginally 
positive figure fo r Ireland, the exports of a ll the other 
Member States to their partner Community countries all fell 
in volume terms (by up to 5,4\ in the case of Italy) , whereas 
the ra te of expansion of their extra-Community sales was 
clea rl y positive. Italy's poor perfo rmance in these last two 
years fo llowed outs tandingly good results between 1973 and 
1979. This deteriora tion was caused by reduced sales of 
1,9 
2,5 
10,4 
4.1 
(%) 
Agricultural products Energy prod ucts 
1973- 1973- 1975- 1979- 1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979-
8 1 75 79 81 73 81 75 79 81 
11 ,7 29,8 7,7 3,6 11 ,7 - 0,5 - 0,6 -2,8 4,1 
6,3 6,2 4,3 10,7 18,0 - 7,9 - 4,8 0,3 -24,7 
4,7 - 2,7 1,5 19,7 3,8 7,0 - 9,0 11 ,1 16,4 
- 1,7 0,8 - 1,8 - 3,8 36,1 - 2,5 -8,9 8,4 - 15,7 
10,3 3,8 3,9 31,8 4,7 5,3 -3,2 14,5 -3, 1 
30,8 8,2 22,8 79 ,5 14,4 -20,2 - 29,1 - 13,5 -23,6 
5,9 1,5 9,6 3,1 8,8 - 4,7 - 16,0 4,7 - 10,5 
9,0 4,1 7,0 18,4 6,4 - 3,5 -6,4 0.6 8,3 
12,9 1,6 6,1 42,3 4,2 13,5 - 13,7 26,5 20,4 
8,4 3,1 4,9 2,7 6,8 2,6 -9,2 9,3 2,1 
4,4 -5,5 11 ,5 1,0 1,0 6,1 - 0,3 4,6 16,0 
- 5,0 - 24,7 6,5 - 4,5 15,2 6,3 -5,7 17,3 - 1,5 
4,0 -5,1 8,9 4,1 6,7 1,0 -8, 1 7,9 -2,6 
5, 1 6,9 3,7 6,4 12,2 -2,2 - 11 ,6 5,9 - 7,7 
4,6 - 2,2 6,7 7,6 8,0 - 4,1 - 0,5 - 4,4 -6,8 
0,7 -2,0 4,0 -2,9 8,4 - 1,3 - 6,5 4,1 - 6,4 
0,4 14,8 4,0 - 18,4 17,2 - 5, 1 0,1 3,8 - 24,7 
- 0,2 - 6,0 3,8 - 2,0 11 ,0 - 1,9 - 8,0 6,2 - 10,5 
- 4,3 - 10,7 - 4,7 3,3 7,0 - 11 ,8 - 0,8 - 0,4 -38,4 
- 2,5 - 9,8 4,4 - 8, 1 9,1 - 2,4 - 9,5 4,0 -7,2 
4,1 10,7 2,2 1,6 15,2 - 8,5 - 22,8 2,6 - 13,9 
-2,2 - 12,2 6,9 -8,8 5,7 -9,8 - 13,2 -7,0 - 11,8 
0,2 - 4,0 4,3 - 3,3 9,5 - 3,9 - 10,7 2,8 - 9,5 
0,6 - 4,6 2,8 1,4 11 ,6 - 0,9 - 4,1 8,4 - 14,4 
0,2 - 6,8 8, 1 - 7,3 15,6 - 0,5 - 3,4 3,0 - 4,3 
0,7 - 3,5 4,5 - 2,7 10,5 - 2,2 - 6,4 3.8 - 9,4 
intermediate products and part icularly by the fa ll in its 
exports of basic consumer items to the rest of the world , 
which had grown by 15% between 1973 and 1979 and which 
declined by 4% between 1979 and 1981. Exporters in the 
United Kingdom, by contrast, pursued a different strategy. 
Taditionally, a t least since 1963, United Kingdom exports to 
the Community have increased more rapidly than those to 
non-member countries. Following accession in 1973, this 
trend was reinfo rced, although the United Kingdom's 
perfo rmance was adversely affected both by fa lling demand 
in European countries (particularly during the two reces-
sions) and by its inability to change its trade fl ows rapidly 
enough to tap new markets in the growth areas of the world . 
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Table 2 ( continued) 
Extra-Community trade in volume terms; average annual growth rates 
(%) 
Manufactured products lnlcrrncdialc products Equipment goods 
1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979- 1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979- 1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979-
73 81 75 79 81 73 81 75 79 81 73 81 75 79 81 
Exports 
B 8,9 3,7 -2,3 6,1 5,3 7,6 1,0 -6,l 4,2 2,1 10,2 4,5 10,4 -0,8 9,8 
DK 8,7 5,4 3,3 4,5 9,6 11,3 6,4 1,5 7,7 9,1 8,1 5,7 8,2 2,5 10,l 
D 8,2 4,9 3,1 4,9 6,7 ll,5 4,3 -1,l 7,8 2,8 6,7 4,6 6,2 2,3 8,0 
GR 19,l 13,l 27,2 9,0 8,4 30,0 ll,6 28,5 2,7 14,3 16,7 21,5 66,4 3,3 22,6 
F 8,1 7,0 8,5 7,1 5,4 9,3 5,4 1,0 8,0 4,8 8,9 7,6 18,4 4,9 2,9 
IRL 17,7 13,4 1,4 20,9 11,4 26,4 14,2 ll,2 20,3 5,8 10,9 16,4 4,8 21,3 18,9 
I 9,2 9,5 13,3 11,2 2,6 9,8 10,3 16,9 11,5 2,0 9,6 8,4 16,9 5,9 5,2 
NL 7,5 5,7 3,1 6,1 7,7 13,9 3,5 -4,2 7,2 4,3 3,9 8,2 15,3 4,6 8,6 
UK 6,8 -0,5 -1,9 2,7 -5,6 7,7 -0,4 -6,4 6,1 -6,5 4,4 0,8 6,2 -1,2 -0,4 
EC 10 8,0 4,9 3,8 6,0 3,9 10,0 4,1 -0,5 7,7 1,9 6,6 5,2 10,0 2,7 5,5 
USA 8,1 7,5 6,6 6,1 11,4 7,2 4,6 -2,8 11,2 -0,3 11,6 8,7 11,0 3,4 17,6 
Japan 13,8 8,8 5,3 7,9 14,4 16,4 4,1 9,2 3,8 -0, 15,8 11,5 4,3 ll,1 19,9 
OECD' 9,0 5,8 2,6 7,0 6,7 9,9 3,7 -0,5 8,1 -0,4 9,1 7,4 7,5 5,2 11,8 
Imports 
B 7,3 4,3 -4,3 11,3 0,2 8,2 1,3 -8,7 7,5 0,1 6,4 7,9 5,5 9,5 7,1 
DK 9,2 -0,9 -7,4 5,1 -5,6 10,2 -2,1 -10,8 5,1 -6,8 9,1 0,0 -1,1 1,8 -2,2 
D 9,1 6,3 -0,6 12,0 2,5 8,3 3,1 -3,0 9,6 -2,9 ll,3 11,1 5,1 15,3 9,1 
GR 10,3 -0,2 -1,4 17,4 - 26,8 -13,0 -1,5 -4,6 1,0 -1,8 12,9 3,3 4,4 27,0 -32,4 
F 8,7 6,1 -0,8 11,0 3,8 9,0 3,2 -1,4 7,5 -0,3 12,8 8,7 1,7 12,3 8,6 
IRL 5,5 11,0 -5,7 23,8 5,1 11,1 5,5 - 16,5 27,0 -8,1 1,5 18,3 3,4 29,7 12,7 
I 8,3 4,3 -5,9 13,2 -1,9 9,6 3,0 -5,5 12,4 -5,6 10,5 7,1 2,0 10,6 5,4 
NL 7,8 5,0 1,0 10,4 -1,2 9,5 4,5 -0,2 9,1 0,5 7,9 6,7 5,9 11,6 -1,7 
UK 6,0 0,5 -7,4 9,1 -7,6 5,5 -1,3 -3,0 4,4 -10,2 14,1 6,7 -1,3 14,6 -0,1 
EC 10 7,7 3,9 -3,6 11,0 -1,6 8,1 2,0 -3,9 8,2 -3,9 11,1 8,0 2,4 13,5 3,3 
USA' 9,2 4,8 -9,9 13,7 3,4 8,6 4,1 -8,3 11,3 3,2 13,3 6,2 -7,5 14,5 4,8 
Japan I 14,0 2,1 -8,2 9,7 -1,8 12,7 2,1 -12,0 11,1 -0,1 10,1 3,8 -1,4 7,3 2,1 
OECD2. 9,1 3,3 -3,7 8,7 0,1 9,4 1,9 -5,2 7,4 -1,2 10,5 5,1 0,6 8,6 2,7 
I Total lradc. 
2 OECD excluding inlra-Communily trade. 
Sourct: Volimcx. 
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Table 2 ( continued) 
Extra-Community trade in volume terms; average annual growth rates 
(%) 
Food products Basic consumer items 
1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979- 1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979-
73 81 75 79 81 73 81 75 79 81 
Exports 
B 16,8 12,1 - 15,2 26,4 16,4 9,9 5,3 -7,6 14,6 1,2 
DK 6,4 4,5 2,8 6,4 8,1 12,0 5,1 1,4 4,1 11 ,2 
D 13,9 13,3 -8,2 21,9 20,9 8,5 5,9 -2,0 9,8 6,4 
GR 8,9 14,0 17,3 24,2 - 6,6 20,4 11 ,8 17,0 10,6 9,3 
F 7,5 10,6 -5,0 17,5 14,1 4,4 5,4 - 0,1 7,0 8,0 
IRL 17,1 11 ,9 - 7,3 24,2 9,5 14,5 8,8 - 1,7 12,9 11 ,7 
I 3,5 15,4 13,9 13,5 20,8 . 8,8 9,9 0,9 22,7 -4,0 
NL 7,2 6,5 -2,8 7,8 13,7 4,3 2,4 -5,0 6,0 2,7 
UK 8,9 0,2 - 1,8 1,1 1,1 11 ,0 - 4,3 - 14,1 8,9 - 17,7 
EC lO 8,4 8,4 -3, 1 12,5 12,6 8,5 3,9 -5,2 11 ,8 - 1,7 
USA I 0,9 7,9 0,6 11 ,2 9,2 7,8 6,5 6,2 8,4 3,2 
Japan 1 5,8 3,3 - 6,8 5,5 9,8 4,1 3,3 1,1 - 0,3 13,1 
OECD 2 5,2 6,7 - 3,5 10,1 10,3 7,7 3,8 -5,2 9,9 1,1 
Imports 
B 2,5 0,4 - 5,5 3,4 0,6 9,4 5,9 - 6,4 20,2 - 7,2 
DK 3,4 4,7 - 1,5 11 ,4 - 1,8 10,5 -2,3 - 12,5 7,3 - 9,3 
D 4,7 2,3 - 9,0 8, 1 3,0 10,2 5,6 -0,3 11 ,9 - 0,4 
GR 6,5 - 12,2 - 13,2 10,8 - 44,3 5,9 0,4 -3,7 2,6 0,1 
F 0,3 2,3 - 2,0 4,7 2,0 11,0 7,3 -2,8 16,0 1,3 
IRL 3,5 5,8 0,9 14,1 -4,7 8,1 6,0 - 11 ,0 17,9 2,1 
I 2,6 - 1,6 - 14,3 10,9 - 11 ,1 8,8 4,9 - 10,4 18,2 -3,2 
NL 5,0 5,4 - 1,1 8,9 5, 1 7,9 3,1 -2,5 10,7 -5,4 
UK - 2,6 - 5,9 - 8,2 - 4,5 - 6,2 8,0 - 1,4 - 13,7 12,4 - 13,3 
EClO 0,7 - 0,2 - 7,0 4,2 - 1,8 9,0 2,9 -7,4 13,2 -5,4 
USA I 6,7 - 0,2 - 11 ,3 7,1 -2,7 5,3 4,7 - 15,2 - 16,8 3,8 
Japan I 11 ,4 3,3 11 ,3 2,0 - 1,7 24,3 - 0,2 - 18,1 15,2 - 8,8 
OECD 2, 4,2 0,0 - 3,9 3,3 - 2,5 9,0 3, 1 - 8,6 12,5 -2,3 
I Total trade. 
2 OECD excluding intra-Community trade. 
Sour~t : Volimtx. 
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Thus, betweeIJ 1979 and 1981, the United Kingdom recorded 
two negatieve rates of export growth: - 2,4% with the 
Community and - 3,6% with the rest of the world. These 
figures include oil exports, which increased by almost I 0% on 
average to the Community and by 20,4% to non-member 
countries during these last two years. Taking manufactured 
products alone, the United Kingdom's exports fell by 5,0% 
and 5,6% respectively. 
Great variability in the growth rate of OECD country 
imports but slower contraction of import penetration 
following the second oil shock 
The major industrialized countries show great similarity of 
import behaviour. The cyclical sensitivity of their import 
penetration ratios to variations in their economic growth has 
been particularly marked during the various phases of 
recession and expansion (see Table 2). 
Taking all imported products together, the average apparent 
elasticity of imports with respect to GDP has fallen sharply 
since 1973, with a drop between the periods 1964-73 and 
1973-81 from 1,5 to 0,55 in the case of the Community and 
from 1,3 to 0,2 in the case of Japan. 
The overall results are considerably distorted, however, by 
the reduction in energy imports, which fell in volume terms 
by 3,9% per year in the Community between 1973 and 1981 
(by 2,2% for all OECD countries). It is therefore more 
relevant to consider only imports of manufactured products 
(i .e. excluding agricultural and energy products). Their 
average elasticities with respect to GDP are around 2, which 
means an increase in the case of the Community and no 
change in the case of the USA. Only that of Japan falls from 
1,4 before 1973 to 0, 7 after 1973. 
The first recession of 1974-75 had, even for this type of 
product, caused a sharp drop in import growth rates, which 
turned heavily negative in the United States, Japan and each 
of the Community countries (except the Netherlands). Since 
1980, however, and despite the further general decline in 
national GDP levels, a number of Member States have 
maintained a relatively sharp growth of extra-Community 
imports, thus helping to keep the international trading 
system open. 
Once again, the picture in the United Kingdom is difTerent 
from that in its main European partner countries. Whereas, 
in 1974-75, its GDP fell by an average of 0,9%, its imports 
from the Community continued to grow by 4,3% a year. By 
contrast, while in 1980 and 198 1, following two years in 
which its GDP fell by 2% a year, the United Kingdom 
recorded a reduction in the rate of growth of its imports from 
the Community of - 1,2%, but this reduction is less than that 
of its non-Community imports ( - 7,6%) whereas that of the 
Community excepting the United Kingdom coming from the 
rest of the world remains positive, at + 0,6%. 
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Thus, at intra-Community level, and in terms of both 
imports and exports, a slowdown in activity in the Member 
States generally leads to a more than proportional contrac-
tion of intra-Community imports and exports. On the other 
hand, both the nature of the manufactured products 
imported from third countries (which are frequently not 
replaceable by European products) and acceptance of the 
implications of the Community's participation in open 
international division of Jabour tend to keep the rate of 
growth of extra-Community imports at a higher and more 
stable level. 
In the medium term and over this period of analysis ending in 
1981 , it can be seen that, while the pressures brought to bear 
at individual industry level in the Community to restrict the 
penetration of certain foreign products have Jed to a 
reduction in some import penetration ratios, this efTect has 
been ofTset overall by the growth in imports of other 
categories of product. 
The Community, a key promoter of the open trading 
system 
Besides the volume growth in import and export flows, or the 
trend of its average elasticities with respect to GDP, the 
extent to which a country is open to trade in industrial 
products is shown by the proportion of its industrial output 
which is exported (export ratio) and by the ratio of imports to 
industrial output (penetration ratio). These data are given 
here in dollars at current prices, but since they consist in a 
relationship between two values, any distortions largely drop 
out (Table 3). 
The Community's export ratio vis-a-vis the rest of the world 
is the highest of the industrialized countries. In 1980, it stood 
at 18,4%, more than three percentage points higher than that 
of Japan (15%) and more than twice that of the United States 
(8,9%). However, the difTerence is even wider in the case of 
import penetration ratios. At 13,8%, the Community's ratio 
is five percentage points higher than that of the United States 
(8 ,6%) and more than twice that of Japan (5,7%). 
These figures, which are unrelated to the size of the country 
concerned, demonstrate more than anything else the 
Community's acceptance of increased import penetration as 
a counterpart to the efTorts it makes to maintain its presence 
on third-country markets. Its surplus on trade in industrial 
products, which has remained relatively constant since 1970, 
enables it to finance its purchases of energy and agricultural 
products. The imbalance in Japanese trade stands out by 
contrast. In 11 years, the export ratio for manufactured 
products increased by five percentage points, whereas its 
import penetration ratio changed by only 1,2 percentage 
points, making for a growing surplus on industrial trade. 
Community foreign trade: the equipment goods industry under threat 
Table 3 
Share of exports (X) and imports (M) in output (P) in value terms 
(% ) 
1970 1973 1975 1980 
X M X-M X M X-M X M X-M X M X-M p p -p- p p - p- p p - p - p p - p -
Manufactured products 
EC9 
Total 23,8 19,8 4,0 28,0 23,2 4,8 31,0 23 ,6 7,4 35,8 31 ,0 4,8 
I. Intra-EC 11 ,0 11 ,0 0,0* 13,6 13,6 0,0* 14,0 14,0 0,0* 17,4 17,2 0,2 
2. Other industria lized countries 6,9 5,7 1,2 7,5 5,9 1,6 7,2 6,0 1,2 8,2 8,4 -0,2 
3. Rest of the world 6,0 3, 1 2,9 6,9 3,8 3, I 9,7 3,5 6,2 10,2 5,4 4,8 
USA 
Total 5,8 5,5 0,3 6,3 6,9 -0,6 8,3 6,9 1,4 8,9 8,6 0,3 
I. Intra-EC 1,4 1,4 0,0 1,4 1,7 - 0,3 1,6 1,5 0, 1 2,1 1,7 0,4 
2. Other industrialized countries 2,2 2,8 -0,6 2,6 3,3 -0,7 3,0 3,2 - 0,2 2,9 3,9 -1,0 
3. Rest of the world 2,2 1,3 0,9 2,3 1,9 0,4 3,7 2,2 1,5 4,0 3,0 1,0 
Japan 
Total 10,0 4,5 5,5 9,6 4,6 5,0 12,9 4,5 8,4 15,0 5.7 9,3 
I. Intra-EC 0,9 0,7 0,2 1,1 0,7 0,4 1,2 0,7 0,5 1,8 0,8 1,0 
2. Other industria lized countries 4,3 2,3 2,0 3,6 2, 1 1,5 4,0 2,1 1,9 5,1 2,6 2,5 
3. Rest of the world 4,8 1,4 3,4 4,9 1,7 3,2 7,7 1,8 5,9 8, 1 2,3 5,8 
Equipment goods 
EC9 
Total 32,7 20,3 12,4 37,4 24,3 13, 1 42,8 24,9 17,9 46,3 32,8 13,5 
I. Intra-EC 13,4 13,3 0,1 16, 1 16,0 0,1 16,2 16,2 0,0 19,7 19,3 0,4 
2. Other industrialized countries 10,1 6,2 3,9 10,9 6,9 4,0 10,7 7,3 3,4 11 ,3 10,5 0,8 
3. Rest of the world 9,2 0,8 8,4 10,4 1,4 9,0 15,9 1,4 14,5 15,3 3,0 12,3 
USA 
Total 9,2 5,8 3,4 10,0 7,6 2,4 14,8 7,9 6,9 15,7 11 ,6 4,1 
I. Intra-EC 2,0 1,7 0,3 2,0 2, 1 - 0, 1 2,4 2, 1 0,3 3,4 2,8 0,6 
2. Other industrialized countries 3,9 3,7 0,2 4,3 4,7 - 0,4 5,6 4,8 0,8 5,3 6,7 - 1,4 
3. Rest of the world 3,3 0,4 2,9 3,7 0,8 2,9 6,8 1,0 5,8 7,0 2, 1 4,9 
Japan 
Total 12,6 3,7 8,9 14,4 2,8 116 20,2 3,2 17,0 26,7 3,6 23, 1 
I. Intra-EC 1,2 0,8 0,4 1,9 0,7 1,2 2,3 0,8 1,5 3,8 0,8 3,0 
2. Other industrialized countries 5,7 2,7 3,0 6,0 1,8 4,2 7,1 2,0 5, I 10,4 2,2 8,2 
3. Rest of the world 5,7 0,2 5,5 6,5 0,3 6,2 10,8 0,4 10,4 12,5 0,6 11 ,9 
Sourc, : World Bnnk dn1n bnnk. Wnshinglo n. 
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Table 4 
Intra-Community trade in volume terms, average annual growth rates 
All products 
1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979-
73 81 75 79 81 
Exports 
B 11,9 2,9 -4,4 8,5 -0,5 
DK 5,4 4,3 2,0 5,5 4,1 
D 10,6 3,1 -3,5 9,1 -1,7 
GR 15,3 2,3 5,8 2,6 -1,6 
F 13,7 2,8 -2,8 8,4 -2,4 
IRL 7,5 7,5 8,5 10,6 0,7 
I 12,0 5,0 2,1 12,1 -5,4 
NL 12,7 1,2 -2,1 5,3 -3,3 
UK 9,4 5,0 0,4 I 1,3 -2,4 
EC 10 intra 11,4 3,2 -2,0 8,7 -2,2 
For information 
EC 10 extra 8,1 4,9 3,7 5,8 4,4 
Imports 
B 12,0 1,9 -2,0 6,7 -3,5 
DK 5,6 0,6 -2,9 6,5 -6,9 
D 12,4 2,2 0,1 7,3 -5,3 
GR 7,8 5,7 -3,0 10,3 5,6 
F 12,4 4,1 -3,0 9,1 1,3 
IRL 11,4 4,8 -8,7 15,3 -0,7 
I 12,7 4,1 -4,6 9,0 3,3 
NL 9,0 2,3 -0,1 7,3 -4,7 
UK 9,9 5,6 3,1 11,2 -2,5 
ECIO I 1,2 3,2 -1,3 8,4 -2,1 
For information 
EC 10 extra 7,1 1,1 -6,0 7,5 -3,5 
Sour~: Volimcx. 
The outward-looking nature of the European productive 
system becomes even clearer if intra-Community trade is 
taken into account, since this is roughly equivalent in volume 
to extra-Community trade. Taken as a whole, therefore, the 
Member States have on average traded almost 361~ of their 
industrial output without curbing the growth of import 
penetration. 
As already poited out, the international competition which 
the industrialized countries have been engaged in since the 
beginning of the 1970s in order to increase their market 
shares has proved particularly successful outside the 
economic area which they form. Whether we take the 
Community, the United States or Japan, the ratio of their 
exports to other industrialized countries has varied only 
slightly, increasing by no more than 1,5 percentage points or 
so between 1970 and 1980. Exports to the rest of the world, 
by contrast, have increased much more sharply (by 1,7 
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(%} 
Agricultural products Energy products 
1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979- 1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979-
73 81 75 79 81 73 81 75 ·79 81 
8,4 4,2 11,1 1,5 3,2 9,2 4,5 1,6 4,4 7,7 
-0,2 6,6 11,7 4,6 5,5 20,3 4,2 -3,5 5,6 9,5 
14,4 3,4 7,7 1,2 3,4 0,2 -1,6 -7,3 9,4 - 15,5 
-3,4 3,5 27,4 -3,0 -4,4 - -21,7-11,8 -13,0-43,7 
17,0 2,0-11,1 9,1 2,3 7,4 2,0 -8,5 9,8 -2,I 
-2,8 -6,3 8,9 -12,5 -7,7 8,2 -18,3 -5,2 -24,5 -17,7 
2,1 4,6 12,8 5,5 -4,7 9,8 -11,7-27,2 I 1,5 32,9 
9,4 5,7 14,5 2,1 4,4 8,5 -4,5 -17,7 4,4 -7,I 
6,8 8,3 14,7 0,4 -3,0* 5,6 16,9 -1,2 31,3 9,6 
8,6 3,9 4,8 4,5 1,7 6,6 -0, - 13,2 9,8 -4,9 
5,9 8,4 3,1 4,9 21,7 6,8 2,6 -9,2 9,3 2,1 
14,4 2,7 -1,9 5,0 2,7 6,8 0,4 -1,4 3,7 -4,2 
7,5 12,4 -2,9 16,7 20,6 2,9 -3,8 - 10,3 7,4 -17,1 
6,3 2,6 0,5 3,1 3,8 17,0 -1,9 -3,7 2,6 -8,6 
9,2 3,7 -22,6 14,3 20,2 15,6 -15,6 -31,4 4,0 -30,1 
5,3 7,2 22,5 3,0 1,4 2,1 4,1 -4,0 13,1 -4,2 
2,7 8,3 1,3 7,6 17,2 14,9 -0,1 -12,8 4,9 3,7 
12,4 3,1 -3,I 8,3 -0,6 8,5 11,6 35,5 -6,8 31,9 
12,7 3,0 2,2 4,0 1,7 1,1 8,4 -8,2 26,8 -6,6 
4,1 1,8 9,9 -5,4 9,1 8,7 -4,7 -4,3 3,6 -20,0 
7,9 3,3 3,3 3,2 3,7 8,1 0,3 -3,3 6,2 -7,1 
1,9 0,2 -4,0 4,3 -3,3 9,5 - 3,9 - 10,7 2.8 -9.5 
percentage points in the case of the USA, by 3,3 percentage 
points in the case of Japan and by as much as 4,2 percentage 
points in the case of the Community). This trend has been at 
the expense of the developing countries which, despite the 
increased value of their exports, have not benefited to the 
same extent from improved penetration of OECD markets. 
European integration is continuing at a slow pace but the 
disruptions happen at a time of oil price increase 
Between 1964 and 1973, intra-Community trade in manu-
factured products increased annually by between 9 and 13 % 
depending on the Member State, that is by between four and 
five percentage points more than trade with the rest of the 
world. Helped by this buoyancy, trade between the United 
Kingdom and Ireland on the one hand and the rest of the 
Community foreign trade: the equipment goods industry under threat 
Table 4 ( continued) 
Intra-Community trade in volume terms, average annual growth rates 
(%) 
Manufactured products Intermediate products Equipment goods 
1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979- 1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979- 1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979-
73 81 75 79 81 73 81 75 79 81 73 81 75 79 81 
Exports 
B 11 ,9 2,2 -5,4 7,6 - 0,8 12,5 0,4 - 10,3 8,4 - 4,0 10,8 3,3 - 1,3 7,7 - 0,5 
DK 5,2 4,4 0,1 6,5 4,5 11 ,6 8,7 -3,4 18, I 3,2 11 ,5 3,0 - 0,9 5,3 2,5 
D 10,8 3,7 - 3,7 9,4 0,2 11 ,7 3,0 -6,9 10,5 - 1,5 8,9 2,7 -4,5 8,1 -0,2 
GR 24,3 5,9 5,0 6,9 4,9 28,8 - 1,4 - 10,3 9,3 -11 ,8 14,9 11 ,9 26,9 3,0 16,4 
F 13,3 3,0 - 1,6 8,6 -2,9 11 ,8 3,5 -3,9 10,5 -2,6 15,5 2,6 0,1 8,4 -5,8 
IRL 11 ,6 10,7 11 ,0 14,7 2,7 18,0 11 ,9 2,2 21,8 3,4 15,3 22,0 5,5 34,4 16,3 
I 13,0 6,3 3,4 12,9 - 3,3 14,3 7,0 3,3 11 ,8 1,3 11 ,8 4,1 - 1,2 11 ,5 -4,5 
NL 13,5 2,5 -0,3 6,5 -2,5 18,6 2,3 - 4,5 8,8 -3, 1 12, 1 1,6 5,9 4,7 -8,4 
UK 10,3 3, 1 - 1, 1 9,7 -5,0 10,4 5,9 0,1 13,1 - 1;9 9,2 1,3 -3, 1 6,6 -4, 1 
EClO 11 ,7 3,6 - 1,8 9,1 - 1,6 12,9 3,0 -5,4 10,4 -2,2 10,7 2,9 - 1,8 8,2 -2,5 
For information 
EC 10 extra 8,0 4,9 3,8 6,0 3,9 10,0 4,1 - 0,5 7,7 1,9 6,6 5,2 10,0 2,7 5,5 
Imports 
B 12, 1 2, 1 -2,2 7,2 - 3,4 12,4 2,9 - 3,1 8,6 . -2, 1 10,5 0,4 - 0,7 3,8 -5,0 
DK 5,6 1,4 - 1,5 6,4 -5, 1 7,9 2,6 -5,8 9,3 - 1,8 3,9 -1 ,6 0,5 2,6 - 11 ,3 
D 13,1 3,4 - 0,6 8,7 -2,8 12,9 2,9 - 4,9 10,1 - 3,2 13,5 4,0 0,9 9,9 -3,9 
GR 8, 1 10,7 - 1,7 17,4 10,9 10,1 2,5 - 6,7 7,7 2,0 6,2 13, 1 1,9 23,7 4,7 
F 13,0 4,0 - 4,0 9,4 1,6 13,2 3,1 - 7,9 10,4 - 0,5 11 ,6 2,9 -5,0 6,9 3,3 
IRL 12,4 2,8 - 15,6 16,5 -2,7 13,9 5,6 - 7,9 18,6 - 4,3 12,6 -2,3 -27,0 16,0 -7, I 
I 12,5 3,9 - 5,7 10,0 2,0 12,9 3,2 - 10,7 14,2 - 3,0 10, I 4,3 -3,6 6,8 7,8 
NL 9,2 1,9 - 0,0 6,4 -4,6 10,5 1,5 - 5,4 7,0 -2,2 6,7 0,3 2,6 4,2 - 9,2 
UK 9,6 7,7 4,3 14,1 - 1,2 13,9 8,8 5,3 14,3 1,1 13,7 7,5 0,6 17,9 - 4,7 
EC IO 11 ,5 3,8 - 1,9 9,4 - 1,2 12,4. 3,0 -5,5 10,7 - 1,8 10,5 3,3 - 1,6 8,7 - 2,1 
For in forma tion 
EC 10 extra 7,7 3,9 - 3,6 11 ,0 - 1,0 8, 1 2,0 -3,9 8,2 -3,9 11 ,1 8,0 2,4 13,5 3,3 
Source : Volimcx. 
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Table 4 ( continued) 
Intra-Community trade in volume terms, average annual growth rates 
Food products 
1964- 1973- 1973- 1975-
73 81 75 79 
Exports 
B 15,8 6,7 3,0 7,3 
DK 1,0 2,8 2,7 3,2 
D 21,0 10,9 13,9 12,1 
GR 16,9 0,1 6,4 -2,6 
F 13,I -2,7 6,1 -1,0 
IRL 6,9 4,6 23,3 4,9 
I 8,7 10,7 11,2 15,0 
NL 10,6 4,9 3,0 6,1 
UK 13,2 7,9 10,2 9,7 
EClO 10,3 5,9 6,4 7,3 
For information 
EC 10 extra 8,4 8,4 -3,1 12,5 
Imports 
B 12,8 6,2 1,1 10,5 
DK 6,6 11,5 11,4 9,6 
D 9,8 4,1 3,3 4,5 
GR 12,9 12,9 -4,2 11,9 
F 13,6 9,0 8,2 10,9 
IRL 12,7 12,3 5,7 16,7 
I 17,4 4,6 5,5 6,7 
NL 14,6 8,7 6,1 12,7 
UK 3,7 3,1 14,0 0,8 
EC 10 10,3 5,8 6,6 6,8 
For information 
EC 10 extra 0,7 -0,2 -7,0 4,2 
Sourer: Volimcx. 
higher for imports originating in Member States than for 
those originating outside the Community (an exception was 
the last period 1974-81 where the slight fall-ofT in intra-
Community trade is almost entirely attributable to German 
trade since 1975). 
The favourable growth of intra-Community trade was, 
however, determined more by agricultural and energy 
products than manufactures: the share of intra-Community 
trade in the Community's total volume of imports of 
manufactured products (at constant 1975 prices and 
exchange rates) reached a maximum close to 11% in 1976, 
falling consistently until 1980 to rise again slightly in 1981 
(see Graph 2). If food products are excluded, the majority of 
groups of manufactured products have followed similar 
growth patterns, moderately for intermediat~ products and 
for current consumption goods but markedly on the 
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Basic consumer items 
1979- 1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979-
81 73 81 75 79 81 
9,4 11,2 2,1 -4,4 6,5 0,2 
2,3 9,7 8,7 -4,6 12,2 16,l 
5,9 15,3 5,5 -0,1 10,3 2,0 
-0,4 30,1 13,9 18,9 10,6 15,8 
-13,9 13,0 3,0 -4,1 -S,O 0,5 
-12,0 15,1 5,3 -0,1 9,3 3,2 
1,9 14,8 7,9 8,3 14,8 -5,2 
4,2 11,6 0,8 -4,8 5,4 -2,3 
2,0 12,4 1,8 -1,1 11,9 -19,3 
3,2 13,2 4,2 -0,7 9,9 -1,5 
12,5 8,5 3,9 -5,2 11,8 -1,7 
3,1 14,6 2,4 -4,8 10,2 -5,1 
15,4 6,8 2,9 -3,1 10,6 -5,5 
4,2 14,5 2,9 1,0 7,3 -3,7 
35,2 10,3 15,7 -3,0 7,7 19,5 
6,1 16,6 6,2 1,1 12,1 0,0 
10,3 9,9 6,3 -4,5 14,7 1,3 
-0,4 15,3 3,6 -13,8 13,9 . 3,1 
3,6 11,5 2,6 0,4 7,0 -3,8 
-2,4 5,1 11,0 1,4 19,0 5,8 
3,0 12,8 4,5 -1,3 10,4 -0,9 
-1,8 9,0 2,9 -7,4 13,2 -5,4 
contrary, for equipment goods, whose share of intra-
Community trade in imports fell from a maximum of71% in 
1970 to 60% in 1981. Furthermore, the aberrant trend of UK 
trade, which contributed to maintaining the level of intra-
Community trade, should be borne in mind. The volume of 
intra-Community trade excluding the UK share expanded by 
only 3,3% from 1973 to 1981 (compared with 3,8% for the 
whole Community), while, even more significantly, the 
volume of extra-Community exports by the Community 
countries other than the United Kingdom expanded by 6,2% 
(compared to 4,9% with the UK) and that of imports by 5,2% 
(compared to 3,9%). Behind the favourable growth ofintra-
Community trade on the whole, therefore, a more disturbing 
state of affairs is discemable in relation to manufactured 
goods imports, particularly equipment goods, which is 
reinforced by the analysis of extra-Community flows. 
Community foreign trade: the equipment goods industry under threat 
GRAPH 2: Percentage share of intra-Community trade in volume terms in total trade of EC 10, 1963-81 
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Table 5 
Rate of cover of imports by exports, 
In value terms 1963-81 
1963 1973 1981 1963 1973 1981 1963 1973 1981 1963 1973 1981 1963 1973 1981 
BI DK ' DI GR' FI 
Agricultural products 0,10 0,10 0,18 0,37 0,46 0,59 0,04 0,10 0,12 2,54 1,17 0,74 0,18 0,36 0,66 
Energy products 0,23 0,23 0,19 0,06 0,24 0,16 0,22 0,14 0,13 0,02 0,22 0,17 0,17 0,09 0,09 
Manufactured products 1,12 1,20 1,01 1,13 0,91 1,30 1,90 2,03 1,71 0,16 0,32 0,85 1,65 1,46 1,54 
intermediate products 1,54 1,27 1,19 0,62 0,66 1,02 1,37 1,68 1,86 0,22 0,69 1,84 1,61 1,44 1,67 
equipment goods 0,82 1,37 0,91 1,7 1 1,00 1,42 5,90 4,50 2,62 0,03 0,06 0,23 2,50 1,94 1,86 
food products 0,33 0,73 1,62 2,16 2,63 2,82 0,19 0,39 0,85 0,39 0,48 3,19 0,68 0,84 1,75 
basic consumer items 1,08 1,1 0 0,83 0,55 0,52 0,80 0,77 0,74 0,59 0,14 0,39 0,75 1,99 1,17 0,81 
Total 0,76 0,92 0,70 0,84 0,78 0,91 1,01 1,37 1,05 0,44 0,38 0,55 0,88 0,93 0,79 
lRL I JI NL' UIP EC 10 I 
Agricultural products 0,10 0,12 1,21 0,12 0,12 0,20 0,17 0,19 0,24 0,02 0,07 0,22 0,11 0,17 0,29 
Energy products 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,23 0,19 0,12 0,29 0,20 0,22 0,15 0,13 0,79 0,19 0,16 0,19 
Manufactured products 0,53 0,79 0,77 1,09 1,37 2,05 1,23 1,13 1,17 1,21 1,01 1,20 1,37 1,37 1,47 
intermediate products 0,17 1,18 1,49 0,68 0,91 1,60 1,40 1,64 1,58 1,06 1,10 1,46 1,19 1,32 1,60 
equipment goods 0,38 0,53 0,39 2,02 2,84 2,83 1,56 1,30 1,26 5,50 1,99 1,70 3,41 2,45 1,97 
food products 1,09 2,04 3,12 0,38 0,28 1,06 1,30 1,25 1,61 0,21 0,38 0,80 0,41 0,62 1,28 
basic consun:er items 0,28 0,31 0,36 1,36 1,29 1,82 0,62 0,43 0,35 0,83 0,62 0,60 0,95 0,77 0,75 
Total 0,38 0,64 0,76 0,64 0,76 0,82 0,76 0,68 0,65 0,80 0,79 1,03 0,83 0,94 0,80 
USA I Japan I OECD 2 
Agricultural products 1,52 2,72 2,84 0,07 0,04 0,02 0,47 0,63 0,75 
Energy products 0,51 0,24 0,13 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,26 0,19 0, 15 
Manufactured products 1,47 0,97 1,04 1,60 1,81 3,14 1,24 1, 16 1,37 
intermediate roducts 1,14 0,96 0,96 0,85 1,13 1,49 1,09 1,09 1,27 
equipment goods 3,86 1,29 1,33 2,16 5,87 9,66 1,9 1 1,52 1,75 
food products 0,81 0,87 1,13 0,39 0,20 0,24 0,56 0,65 1,00 
basic consumer items 0,64 0,44 0,49 6,26 0,89 1,24 1,12 0,87 0,89 
Total 1,35 1,01 0,83 0,81 0,96 1,08 0,94 0,94 0,90 
Extra-CommuniZ, trade only. 
Excluding intra- mmuoity trade. 
Sauret: Volimex 
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The Community's openness to extra-Community trade has 
scarcely altered the structure of its exports, while its 
imports of equipment goods account for a growing 
proportion of that trade 
The almost total stability since 1963 in the structure ofintra-
Community trade by major product category has been 
accompanied by a virtually constant breakdown of exports 
to the rest of the world. In the last 20 years or so, equipment 
goods have accounted for 50% of total extra-Community 
exports, intermediate products (steel and chemical products) 
for 25%, basic consumer items for 15% and agri-foodstuffs 
for 10% (see Graphs 3 and 4 ; the figures exclude energy, both 
in the case of imports and exports). 
This structural rigidity bears witness both to the strength and 
weakness of the Community productive system: strength 
because, since the beginning of the 1960s, the Community's 
sales abroad have consisted principally of products with a 
high value-added content such as equipment goods and its 
share of this market has remained substantial; weakness 
because the Community has not succeeded in increasing its 
specialization in products for which world demand has 
remained strong throughout the period of slower growth 
since 1973. On the contrary, Japan and, to a lesser extent, the 
USA h_ave concentrated their efforts on using their 
technological lead to increase their control over this market.' 
By contrast, the breakdown by product type of the 
Community's purchases from the rest of the world has 
altered appreciably. From 1973 to 1981, the proportion of its 
total extra-Community imports accounted for by energy 
increased from 20 to 37%; leaving aside energy, the shares of 
intermediate products (20%) and basic consumer items (25%) 
remained stable, while that of equipment goods increased in 
eight years from 23 to 33%. Over the same period, this share 
increased from 41 to 45% in the United States and from 12 to 
16% in Japan, thereby returning in the latter country to the 
same level as in 1963. 
This major .change may reflect the Community's greater 
participation in the international division of labour, which is 
tending to restore better balance to extra-Community trade 
(the Community's rate of cover of imports by exports in 
respect of equipment goods fell from 3,4 in 1963 to 2 in 198 1 ), 
although this transformation is occurring at a time when the 
Community's investment ratio is fa lling (19,9% in 1981 as 
opposed to 22,4% in 1973 or 1963) and when all sectors are 
undergoing rapid and fundamental technological change. Is 
this process due to a technological gap or is better use being 
made of the comparative advantages of the various 
manufacturing countries? The following section attempts an 
explanation . 
Sec ·Economic mondialc : la montee des tensions·, Report of CEPII , Paris 
1983. p. 149 et seq. 
2. The Community's trade in equipment goods 
in difficulty - The central role played by 
equipment goods in international trade 
Equipment goods account for almost half of the OECD's 
total exports (see Graph 3). This category of products 
therefore plays a key role in international trade, and a 
country's trading performance in this field generally has an 
appreciable impact on its balance of payments. The 
important part that equipment goods play in international 
trade is further explained by their place in the operation of 
the economy, since the countries which dominate the market 
in equipment goods- and more particularly the market in 
industrial machinery-exert a decisive influence on changes 
in production structures in all countries. Consequently, a 
strong position on the world market in equipment goods 
appears to be the surest way of reducing external constraints, 
since it means not only that competing countries will not 
have different production structures but also helps to guide 
the changes in these structures and thus assure a certain 
degree of control over techn_ological progress. 
The loss of the Community's dominant position 
As pointed out, the sharp fall since 1963 in the Community's 
export/import ratio in respect of equipment goods best 
indicates the loss of the Community's dominant position in 
this field. From 3,4 in 1963, it fell to 2,5 in 1983 and to below 
2 in 1981. While the United States export/import ratio has 
generally fallen even more sharply (see Table 5), it has, unlike 
that of the Community, stabilized somewhat since 1973. 
These substantial losses contrast with the situation in Japan, 
which has quadrupJed its export/import ratio over the last 
20 years. This fall in the export/import ratio for equipment 
goods is not a reflection of the Community's increased 
participation in the international division of labour, but 
stems from the loss of a dominant position, as is shown by the 
breakdown by major manufacturer of OECD exports of 
equipment goods (see Graph 5). In 1964, the world market in 
equipment goods was dominated by the United States (33%) 
and the Community (44%), enabling these two economic 
powers to impose their production structures on other 
countries to a large extent. Since 1970 this bipolar structure 
has been replaced by a tripolar structure. In 198 1 Japan held 
25% of the OECD market and this share has been continually 
rising, while the relative shares of the United States and the 
Community have fa llen to 26% and 33% respectively. Japan 
is therefore now in a position to exert a growing influence on 
changes in production structures at the expense of both the 
Community and the United States. And this Japanese 
influence is not restricted to third countries, since the 
increase in the Community's and the United States' imports 
of equipment goods compared with the imports of these 
goods by all OECD countries (see Graph 6) clearly 
demonstrates the growing dependence of these two areas. 
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GRAPH 3: l>efflopmeat of export 11ractures by puups of prodadB, 1963-1981, 11 a % of total exports (exdadiag energy) 
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GRAPH 4: Development of import structures by groups of products, 1963-81, as a% of total imports (excluding energy) 
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GRAPH 5: OECD exports (excluding intra-EC trade) in -volume terms (1964 = 100) and breakdown by area 
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GRAPH 6: OECD imports (excluding intra-EC trade) in volume terms (1964 = 100) and breakdown by area 
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An unfavourable trend both in exports and in imports 
In the case of exports in volume terms, the lack of buoyancy 
in extra-Community sales of equipment goods is increasingly 
apparent as from 1975 (see Table 2). Whereas, up to that 
year, Community exports increased at a rate which was 
roughly a third slower than that of the OECD as a whole, and 
following the remarkable effort in 1974/75 which led to the 
Community out-performing all other competitors except for 
the United States, the growth of Community sales of 
equipment goods dropped to less than half the rate of the 
OECD. The gap between the Community and its main 
competitors, the United States and Japan, has become even 
wider. This deterioration has been so marked that the 
Community's market share fell by 5 percentage points 
between 1975 and 1981 (4 percentage points between 1979 
and 1981). In the case of imported equipment goods, on the 
other hand, the Community is the only area in which the rate 
of growth, since 1973, has continually been above that of the 
OECD and that of its main competitors. Thus, between 1975 
and 1981, the share of extra-Community imports in total 
OECD imports of equipment goods increased by 5 per-
centage points. Since 1980, however, the Community's 
import growth has somewhat slackened like most OECD 
countries', except for the United States whose share of the 
market in imported equipment goods increased by almost 
9 percentage points between 1975 and 1981 (see Graph 6). 
Clearly, therefore, the Community's increasing vulnerability 
with regard to equipment goods is due to unfavourable 
trends of both imports and exports and the slight deceler-
ation in the growth of imports from 1980 has had no effect 
owing to the worsening export performance. 
A comparison of the trade data with the value of the 
production of equipment goods in each of the countries 
merely confirms this analysis (see Table 3). In 1980, the 
Community exported 46% of its output. Almost 27% went to 
the rest of the world, but this extra-Community share had 
remained constant between 1975 and 1980, whereas world 
demand expanded to such an extent that Japan in particular 
was able to increase its export ratio from 20 to 26, 7% over 
those six years. Conversely, the Japanese import penetration 
ratio hardly increased (from 3,2 to 3,6%), whereas that of the 
Community increased by almost 5 percentage points to 
13,5% in 1980 and that of the United States by 3,7 percentage 
points to 11,6% in 1980. However, this growing imbalance in 
trade flows is not affecting all Member States to the same 
extent. The weakening of this dominant position is common 
to most Community States though the individual level can 
differ considerably. 
The Federal Republic of Germany, principal producer, is 
worst affected 
The main reason for the decline in the Commupity's position 
is undoubtedly the combined trend of Germany's extra-
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Community exports and imports of equipment goods, this 
country being the Community's principal manufacturer and 
exporter. Under the impact of the first oil shock, the volume 
of Germany's extra-Community sales of equipment goods 
already increased much less rapidly than that of the 
Community as a whole. This weak performance continued 
until 1979, but during this period it was less apparent owing 
to the contraction in the United Kingdom's extra-Com-
munity exports. While Germany's position appears to have 
improved somewhat since 1980, it has still not been able, even 
after that date, to profit fully from ballooning exports of 
equipment goods by the OECD countries generally. At the 
same time, the volume of Germany's extra-Community 
imports has continued to grow at an average rate of 11 % per 
year, giving an increase of 125% in eight years, compared 
with 60% for the Community as a whole. This explains why 
Germany's extra-Community export cover of imported 
equipment goods fell from 4,5 in 1973 to 2,6 in 1981 and is 
now slightly below that of Italy (see Table 5). In general this 
weakness in the German equipment goods sector could result 
mainly from the technological gap in relation to the USA and 
Japan, due mainly to the delay in introducing new 
semiconductor innovations. Great efforts have been made to 
overcome this delay and it would appear that within the 
automobile sector this initiative has already begun to bear 
fruit.I On the contrary the strong tendency to produce 
custom-made machine tools, while Japan and the USA have 
given a greater priority to series production of high-
technology machines would appear to constitute an obstacle 
to innovation which may not be overcome as rapidly as in the 
case of automobiles.2 While Germany still enjoys a 
comfortable lead over most of its competitors, the loss of its 
dominant position is sufficiently marked and rapid to 
compromise its futi,re performance--and hence that of the 
Community as a whole-as regards extra-Community 
export capacity in equipment goods. This is essentially an 
extra-Community problem, since Germany's intra-Com-
munity trade has remained in much better balance. 
Deterioration in the United Kingdom's position, stability in 
that of France and Italy 
Of these three countries, each of whose exports of equipment 
goods to the rest of the world amount to roughly half the 
volume of Germany's only the United Kingdom has seen its 
er. W. Gerstenberger: 'Die Westdeutsche Wirtschaft in der Zange: Die 
Herausforderung <lurch Japan, die USA und die Schwellenliinder', in 
Beihefte ::ur Konjunkturpolitik, No 29, Berlin, 1983. 
er. W. Scheider: 'lntemationale Wettbcwerbsfiihigkeit aus der Sicht des 
Untemehmens', in lnternationale Wettbewerbsfiihigkeit bei un-
terschied/icl,e,r Sozia/ordnungen. Gespriiche der List-Gesel/schaft, NF, 
Vol. 7, Baden-Baden. 1983, p. 47. 
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position deteriorate sharply since 1973, while France and 
Ita ly have genera lly mainta ined their positions. Thus, by 
198 1, the volume of the United Kingdom's extra-Com-
munity exports of equipment goods was roughtly back to its 
1973 level. After a healthy recovery between 1973 and 1975, it 
subsequently fe ll , recording a loss of some I 0% in 1981 a lone. 
Over the same period, to ta l OECD extra-Community 
exports of equipment goods increased in rea l terms by a lmost 
80%, thereby reducing the United Kingdom's market share 
from 7,6% in 1973 to 6,6% in l 98 1. At the same time, with its 
imports having increased sharply, its export/import ratio 
( I, 7) is now below tha t of France ( 1,9). Its position on the 
intra-Community market has also deteriorated slightly, with 
the result that the imbalance in its tota l trade has worsened. 
France and Italy, on the o ther hand , saw neither a reduction 
in their share of ex tra-Community exports of equipment 
goods between 1973 and 198 1 nor an explosive expansion in 
the volume of their extra-Community imports which might 
have undermined their overa ll equilibria. This is confirmed 
by their export/ import ra tios, which have remained fa irly 
stable (see Table 5). T he trend of their intra-Community 
trade was a lso fa irly balanced during that peri od . However, 
for both countries, but much more so in the case of France, 
these resul ts are based prima rly on very good performances 
during the peri od of the fi rs t oil shock, which subsequently 
gave way to increasingly unfavo ura ble trends, which to a 
la rge extent expla ins the growth in Fra nce's trade deficits. 
T hus, between 1979 and 198 1, France's extra-Community 
exports of equipment goods increased annually by only 3% in 
real terms, whereas those of the OECD grew by 12% ; during 
the same period, its exports to other Communi ty countries 
fell by 6%, while its to ta l imports of equipment goods 
increased by 3,3%. 
Lesser influence of the other Member States on the volume 
of trade 
The five countries, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland and 
the ethcrlands. which , because of their size, together 
accoun t for less than 15% of Commu nity exports have not 
decisively influenced the Commu nity's positi on with rega rd 
to equipment goods. Not only is their role in this product 
category rela tively small but developments there have 
sometimes also differed quite markedly. no tably between 
Belgium and the Netherl ands. Belgi um. whose exports to 
and imports from the rest of the world have. in volume terms. 
followed much the same trend as those ofGem1any, has thus 
contributed to the weakening of the Community's inter-
national position on equipment goods. The Netherl ands on 
the other hand has recorded favourable trends in both 
imports and exports and. unlike France, has not experienced 
any reversal in the trend of it s exports to non-member 
countries in the ea rly 1980s. 
It can be seen from this country-by-country analysis that the 
weakening of the Community's position is a ttributable first 
and foremost to developments in Germany. Restoring the 
Community to its fo rmer position on the world market 
remai ns closely tied up with a recovery in Germany's 
performance but the impact would be limited if the 
difficulties tha t have been apparent recently in France and 
Italy were to continue. 
The deterioration in the Community's position is affecting 
virtually all categories of equipment goods 
The Community's declining competitiveness in the equip-
ment goods sector is common to all the product categories 
making up this sector, with the exception of meta l products, 
which account, however, for only 8% of Communi ty exports 
of equipment goods to the res t of the world. T his reduced 
presence of the Community on world markets shows up in 
fo ur product ca tego ries which together represent over 80% of 
the value of trade in equipment goods : electrical goods, 
offi ce machines, agricultural and industri al machinery, and 
motor vehicles. It is in these categories that we find the 
products most exposed to pressure from Community or US 
manufacturers fo r some regula tion of trade fl ows of certain 
products: consumer electronics in the case of electrical 
goods, data-processing equipment in the case of office 
machines, machine tools and robots in the case of industrial 
machinery and , of course, motor vehicles . These are at the 
same time the products in which Ja pan has recorded its most 
striking successes. 
The product groups 'electrica l goods and office machines' 
(see Table 6) embrace industrial and consumer electronics 
and electrical equipment as well as the entire range off data-
processing machines (main-frame, mini- and micro-com-
puters, pe riphera ls, electronic office equipment, etc.). 
Following an average an nual ra te of growth of exports of 5% 
to 7% between 1973 and 198 1 the Community experienced a 
ra te of change similar to preceding years and only slightly less 
than tha t fo r the OECD as a whole. Nevertheless, whereas 
after the first oil shock the Communi ty recorded an export 
performance in these sectors which was above those of the 
indust ri alized countries, this si tuation was reversed after 
l 975. Since then the gap has grown considerably wider- so 
fa r tha t after l 979 the Community perfonnance plummeted , 
only managing a ra te 40% below that of the OECD. 
The adverse perfo rmances of France and Ita ly and the poor 
results achieved by the Uni ted K ingdom. in particular, in 
office electronics and da ta-processing equipment drag down 
the Community average significa ntly. T he Benelux countries 
and Germany are experiencing a somewhat stronger 
expansion but the buoyancy of US and Japanese exports 
illustrates only too clearly the appropriateness of their 
industrial strategies. which they a re st rengthening by 
entering into industrial and trade cooperation agreements . 
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Table 6 
Exports of equipment goods by product category in volume terms, 
average annual growth rates 
(%} 
1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979- 1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979- 1964- 1973- 1973- 1975- 1979-
73 81 75 79 81 73 81 75 79 81 73 81 75 ' 79 81 
llc,(glum I Denmark I FR of Germuy I 
Me1al produclS 2,4 12,6 13,0 11,0 15,4 4,9 7,5 15,6 2,1 10,9 6,1 7,4 14,9 4,8 5,4 
Agricultural and industrial machinery 11,0 5,0 22,8 -2,6 4,2 6,8 4,4 14,3 -1,6 7,4 7,8 3,8 11,6 0,3 3,4 
Office machines 19,6 6,7 16,9 4,6 1,4 9,7 9,8 10,1 8,6 11,7 8,2 3,8 -1,1 4,3 8,1 
Eleclrical goods 5,9 9,7 13,6 6,0 14,1 9,0 6,1 11,7 5,8 1,5 8,7 6,5 9,3 6,5 3,8 
Motor vehicles 25,6 -2,7 -8,4 -6,0 10,7 13,1 8,8 14,4 3,3 14,8 7,6 2,2 -1,5 0,5 9,8 
Other transport equipmenl -8,I 5,3 33,5 -16,2 31,1 11,5 5,5 -12,6 9,9 17,5 -4,5 13,0 -4,4 5,8 52,3 
Total equipmenl goods 10,2 4,5 10,4 -0,8 9,8 8,1 5,7 8,2 2,5 10,1 6,7 4,6 6,2 2,3 8,0 
Gl'ftCe I Fruce I Ireland I 
Me1al producta 40,7 14,2 48,9 1,0 11,9 4,1 10,8 25,8 5,2 8,2 29,6 2,0 -1,7 -4,1 19,7 
Agricultural and industrial machinery 31,3 65,7 4,6 64,1 11,1 6,7 25,4 -0,4 4,1 13,0 14,2 1,6 18,1 19,8 
Office machines 27,7 52,9 7,7 49,9 4,9 8,8 10,6 12,8 -0,6 
Electrical goods 17,2 20,7 n.o 8,6 1,6 10,6 9,5 19,9 7,8 3,0 37,2 10,0 -11,2 23,8 7,7 
Mo1or vehicles 32,7 103,3 -0,3 53,4 10,0 6,9 17,6 2,9 5,0 15,4 6,2 -28,8 77,1 -43,1 
Other transport equipment 6,7 5,9 1,0 13,9 -4,0 -3,0 6,6 11,6 -33,2 
Tola( equipment goods 16,7 21,5 66,4 3,3 22,6 8,9 7,6 18,4 4,9 2,9 10,9 16,4 4,8 21,3 18,9 
Italy I The Netberlaods I United Kingdom I 
Melal products 13,2 11,6 24,6 7,6 6,0 8,9 7,8 8,9 2,6 17,6 -0,3 2,6 11,6 0,2 -1,1 
Agricultural and iodustrial machinery 12,5 8,0 17,0 6,4 2,5 10,4 7,1 16,I 4,4 4,1 5,2 1,9 11,2 -3,9 5,0 
Office machines 6,8 4,3 2,4 9,4 -3,5 6,4 9,3 23,0 5,4 4,3 6,3 2,2 4,3 1,7 1,3 
Electrical goods 11,2 10,3 14,3 9,6 7,8 -1,I 15,1 18,1 12,5 17,7 6,3 -1,2 -5,1 -1,3 3,0 
Motor vehicles 11,9 4,0 21,0 -1.2 -1,1 11,5 14,3 44,0 -1,0 20,9 1,1 -2,8 5,9 -7,3 -2,2 
Other transport equipment -7,I 13,2 3,9 12,5 24,9 9,8 -5,5 8,1 -8,3 -12,3 9,7 6,5 10,5 22,3 -22,2 
Total equipment goods 9,6 8,4 16,9 5,9 5,2 3,9 8,2 15,3 4,6 8,6 4,4 0,8 6,2 -1.2 -0,4 
ECI USA 
Melal producll 5,2 8,4 17,9 4,4 7,4 4,4 6,9 9,3 3,8 11,0 
Agricultural and industrial machinery 8,1 4,6 14,6 0,2 4,1 10,1 28,5 -1,6 17,6 
Office machines 7,2 5,3 4,3 6,2 4,3 18,4 10,I -0,7 10,5 21,2 
Electrical goods 6,7 6,7 8,7 6,3 5,5 13,7 7,8 1,8 6,7 16,4 
Motor vehicles 7,1 2,4 4,8 -0,7 6,3 1,8 11,2 -3,2 4,1 
Other transport equipment 1,5 7,7 2,2 10,7 7,4 10,4 -4,4 13,9 19,8 
Total equipment goods 6,6 5,2 10,0 2,7 5,5 11,6 8,7 11,0 3,4 17,6 
Japan OECD2 
Metal products 6,3 9,2 5,9 8,5 14,0 5,7 7,6 11,8 5,6 7,5 
Agricultural and industrial machinery 17,1 13,2 8,6 11,9 20,8 6,9 6,9 15,9 1,2 10,2 
Office machines 10,4 11,8 -5,3 17,4 19,6 9,5 8,2 -0,7 10,0 13,9 
Electrical goods 15,1 15,0 -2,9 19,7 25,6 10,7 9,0 3,8 9,4 13,6 
Motor vehicles 31,2 15,6 15,4 15,8 15,2 12,4 4,9 5,8 2,0 9,8 
Other transport equipment 16,5 , -0,6 3,3 -10,0 16,9 8,9 8,5 -0,2 10,8 13,3 
Total equipment goods 15,8 11,5 4,3 II.I 19,9 9,1 7,4 7,5 5,2 11,8 
Extra-Communig trade. 
Excluding intra- ommunity trade. 
Sauret: Volimcx. 
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In the agricultural and industrial machinery sector, which 
comprises, in addition to machine tools, the entire range of 
machinery and mechanical equipment used in industry, 
Member States' performances on third-country markets 
have been particularly poor. Between 1973 and 1981 , the 
volume of Community exports probably rose by no more 
than 40%, as against 120% for the United States and as much 
as 170% for Japan. In spite of the existence of long-standing 
marketing networks and growing world demand, the 
Community is gradually losing its market shares. The main 
reasons are to be found in the technological gap separating it 
from its main competitors, as is demonstrated by the results 
for high-technology products (see Box 3). 
Admittedly, as slight recovery has been under way since 1980 
thanks primarily to the better performances of Belgium, 
France and the United Kingdom. The improvement was, at 
least up to the end of 1981, less pronounced in Germany and 
did not materialize at a ll in Italy. This recovery though was 
preceded by a period ( 1975-79) in which the volume of 
exports did not change, and it did not exceed an average 
annual growth rate of 4, I%, compared with I 0,2% for the 
OECD as a whole, 17,6% for the United States and as much 
as 20,8% for Japan (see Table 6). For this reason, it can 
hardly be seen as a reversal of trend. The most one can say is 
that the worsening of the Community's competitive position 
is no longer gaining momentum . 
Machine tools, a prime example of how the Community's 
industry is falling behind 
Machine tools are capital equipment used in the manufacture 
of other capital equipment and hence of other machine tools. 
Even more so than in the case of equipment goods generally 
and industrial machinery, the central importance that 
attaches to the machine-tool sector goes well beyond the 
mere dimensions of va lue added, employment or indeed 
export performance (see Table 7) . This is because the trend in 
the productivity and hence competitiveness of all equipment 
goods sectors is la rgely dependent on the performance of the 
machine tools essential to equipment goods manufacture. 
If there is one sector above a ll others in which the operation 
of the investment accelerator is strongly felt , it is the 
machine-tool sector. which is as a result highly sensitive to 
nuctuations in the business cycle. This does not make it easy 
to generate a return on capital invested in this sector and 
constitutes an obstacle to the introduction of new tech-
nologies . In Europe and the United Sta tes alike, this 
difficulty is magnified by the fact tha t the sector is made up of 
medium-sized companies which. being unable to invest 
sufficientl y in the R&D activities essential to the introduc-
tion of new technologie . whether production or product 
technologies. ri sk an increase of their technology gap. These 
are the reasons why the main traditional machine-tool 
manufacturers, the Community and the United States, have 
been hardly prepared for the fa r-reaching changes now 
taking place. 
By contrast, the structural features in Japan appear to have 
been more conducive to carrying out this ti;ansformation. 
First, the organization of the credit system and the industrial 
structure in Japan certainly faci litate investment in high-risk 
areas. Second, in comparison with the United States and the 
Community, Japan was handicapped in the early 1970s by a 
shortage of skilled labour capable of producing high-quality 
industrial machinery. By attempting to rectify this shortcom-
ing by introducing microprocessors, Japan without doubt 
placed itself in the vanguard of a radical transformation in 
the machine-tool sector, involving a switch from numerically 
controlled to computer-controlled machine tools. In ad-
dition , the introduction of robots capable of handling parts 
for machining made it possible to install multi-purpose 
machining stations that permit a rate of capacity utilization 
three times that for machinery forming part of a traditional 
production line. The expected improvement in robot 
performance in the years ahead should make it possible to 
increase this gap even further. 
Given the scale of this transformation, it seems clear that the 
only manufacturers that will remain competitive will be those 
that manage to ensure that the progress on software and 
data-processing components keeps in step with that on the 
more mechanical part of machine tools . There is little doubt 
that, for the moment, Japan has best managed this 
combination and that it has solid achievements on which to 
build. By contrast, the United States. which combined from 
the outset a strong position in computers with an efficient 
i:nachine-tool industry, has been less successful in this respect 
and , as a result, has been a net importer since as early as 1978 
(see Table 7). Lastly, it would seem that the machine-tool 
industry in the Community has been handicapped by the fact 
that the dissemination of innation technology has lagged 
behind that in other countries. Nevertheless, the Community 
is still the world 's leading exporter, and it would therefore be 
a mistake to believe that it cannot close the gap. But this will 
be possible only if the Community dimension is harnessed in 
such a way that this sector is able to retain the important 
position that its hold on the internal market has always 
conferred upon it. 
Automobiles: a changing sector 
The automobile sector is undergoing a long and difficult 
phase of technological and competitive adjustment which 
first became apparent in about 1975, when exports to the 
USA and Third World markets fell. Among the large 
producers only G ermany, France and Japan have been 
permanently in trade surplus. Expressed as a proportion of 
national production this surplus has, since 1970, remained 
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Table 7 
Main indicators of international trade in machine tools, 1963-81 
Exports SI 3 Import Exports SI 3 Import Exports Sfl Import 
Year 1 Import~ pcnetra- Impor~ penetra- Impoi pcnetra-tion lion tion 
ratio ratio ratio 
4 4 4 
FR or Germany France Italy 
1963 368 2,0 59 0,7 63 1,1 59 96 Ill 
1970 690 1,9 10,5 116 0,7 35,7 191 1,5 21,7 179 191 124 
1978 2 515 1,7 12,5 471 0,7 30,6 676 1,2 20,6 574 387 249 
1981 2 912 1,7 16,5 5 510 0,6 38,2 5 918 1,2 29,9 5 766 699 369 
Exports Sfl Import Exports Sfl . Import Exports SI 3 Import 
Year l Impor~ pcnetra- lmpo1 pcoetra- Impoi pcoetra-tioo tioo tion 
ratio ratio ratio 
4 4 4 
Unlttd Kingdom USA Japan 
1963 126 0,9 195 0,9 17 0,2 77 42 83 
1970 21 1 1,1 34,1 305 0,9 3,3 90 0,4 6,6 136 135 159 
1978 551 0,8 42,1 841 0,7 9,3 I 139 1,0 2,9 505 914 142 
1981 657 0,8 50,1 5 I 583 0,9 13,6 5 I 824 1,1 4,6 550 I 876 263 
For 1963 and 1970, SITC Rev. I. code 7151; for 1978 and 198 1, SITC Rev. 2, code 736. 
Values in ·ooo million current US Jollars, for expurts and imports. 
Specialization index. The method of calcula tion ts described in the box on trade in high-technology products. 
lmrorl pcnclrulion ra tio (in rclRLion LO sector's output). 
19 0 data. 
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static m Franc_e and risen slightly in Germany and very 
strongly in Japan (see Table 8). Although the increase in 
Japan is largely explained by the rapid expansion of its 
exports to the rest of the world , it would not have happened 
if, as in the past, the Japanese market had not remained 
tightly closed to foreign imports. Thus, Japan imports less 
than I% of the value of domestic production, i.e. in current 
1981 values, about the same as France and Germany in 1963, 
while prices have quadrupled since then. Those two countries 
on the contrary, have continued to open their domestic 
markets to foreign suppliers: the ratio of imports to domestic 
production rose, in 1980, to 23% for France and 15% for 
Germany. However, the two countries differ greatly as to 
their success on export markets: the value of Germany 
exports is more than twice that for France at a level which, 
since l 980, has been just below the equivalent level for Japan. 
The position of the Italian and British auto industries has 
greatly deteriorated in the meantime, since the early 1970s in 
the United Kingdom and since l 978 for Italy. The latter has 
become a net importer since l 979. while the United Kingdom 
succeeded in maintaining a degree of balance between 
imports and exports. The outlook is however, improving in 
both those countries. Finally the US automobile balance has 
been in deficit since l 968 but it should be noted that for a 
long time US producers have adapted the strategy of direct 
investment in overseas markets. 
These country-by-country developments highlight Japan's 
success in penetrating foreign markets, at the expense of its 
partners because it occurred against a background of 
shrinking world markets. In real terms, demand, output and 
international trade in motor cars all contracted from 1979 to 
1981 .' These distortions provoked a reaction among other 
Sec 'Internat ional trade in 198 1/82' . GATI. 1982. pp. 97 et seq. 
world manufacturers, and led to more and more political 
negotiations that have resulted in some relaxation of the 
pressure from Japanese output. Since 1981 , Japan has been 
prevailed upon to limit exports to the USA to I 680 OQO cars 
a year (by an agreement in force until March 1984), and those 
to Canada to 202 OOO cars between January 1983 and March 
1984. The Europeans have only managed to persuade Japan 
to moderate exports for an unspecified period; this 
commitment, which was confirmed early in 1983, does not 
involve definite quotas but will be adaptable to the trend of 
Community demand. The restrictions adopted by some of 
the Member States will nevertheless remain in force, such as 
the Italian import quota (adopted in 1956) of2 200 Japanese 
cars, or the French and British quotas of 3~{ and 11 % for the 
Japanese shares of their respective markets. 
At best, these measures may offer some respite on the 
Community's internal market, but they obviously do not 
reinforce the position of the Community auto industry on 
third markets. The Community has undertaken large 
investments in the modernization of production structures 
which should permit it to reinforce its position on the internal 
market while at the same time reducing impediments to 
trade. These investments can only be made profitable. and 
thereby allow further investment, if the Community can 
continue to succeed in selling about one quarter of its 
production on foreign markets. However, it is quite possible 
that the limitation measures, which will divert the Japanese 
export effort towards other markets, will reinforce the 
Japanese on markets which are vital for the Community. If 
this should prove to be the case the protectionist measures in 
the automobile trade, even if the period of their applicability 
is limited, will have adverse effects for the future of the 
European auto industry. paradoxically placing in jeopardy 
the restructuring which they were intended to facilitate . 
117 
Foreign trade 
Table 8 
Main indicators of international trade in automobiles, 1963-81 
Exports SI Imports Exports SI Imports Exports SI Imports 
Year I lmpor~ VP(a) penelra- lmpor~ VP(a) penelra- Import! VP(a) penelra-
VU(bJ lion VU(bJ tion VU(bJ lion 
ratio ratio ratio 
4 4 4 
FR of Germany France Italy 
1963 I 914 2,2 671 1,7 355 1,3 226 1,2 257 0,8 287 0,6 
1970 4 755 1,5 12,6 I 897 1,5 15,7 I 125 1,0 19,6 I 274 1,0 849 0,7 649 0,5 
1978 20 451 1,4 17,7 9 750 1,3 20,I 4 647 0,7 30,3 6 848 0,8 4 648 0,6 3 334 0,6 
1981 25 705 1,4 15,0 5 10 527 1,1 22,6 s 4 776 0,4 41,8 5 6 518 1,0 6 476 0,7 6 027 0,6 
Exports SI Imports Exports SI Imports Exports SI Imports 
.Year 1 lmpor~ VP(a) penetta- lmpo~ VP(a) peneira- lmpo~ VO(a) penelra-VU(bJ lion VU(bJ lion VU(bJ tion 
ratio ratio ratio 
4 4 4 
Uailed Klnadom USA Japan 
1963 I 392 1,4 I 463 0,4 153 0,2 84 1,8 575 1,3 28 1,1 
1970 2 012 0,8 6,6 3 599 0,5 11.2 I 469 0,8 0.8 398 1,1 5 163 1,0 94 1,2 
1978 5 712 0,4 36,3 13 250 0,6 18,I 17 183 1,6 0,9 6 034 0,6 22 525 0,8 520 2,1 
1981 6 284 0,4 41,4 5 16 035 0,4 16,6 s 29 128 2,0 0,9 5 6 534 0,5 27 743 0,5 461 2,1 
I For 1963 and 1970, SITC Rev. I, codes 7321 to 7328 and 7333; for 1978 and 1981, SITC Rev. 2, codes 781 lo 784, 78611, 78681, 78612, 78689. 
l Values in 'OOO million current US dollars, for exports and imports. 
J Specializalion index. The method of calculalion 1s described in lhc box on trade in high-technology products. 
4 lmrort penetration ratio (in relation to sector's output). 
5 19 0 dala. 
Sauret: Volimcx and World Bank dala bank, Washinglon. 
(a) Passenger can. 
(b) Transport vehicles. 
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1. Bilateral trade between the Community and the 
United States, 1973-81 
In the period 1973-81, the volume of bilateral trade between the 
Community and the United States grew at broadly comparable 
rates in the two directions. However, Community exports to the 
United States did not keep pace with the buoyancy of that 
market since US imports of Community goods expressed as a 
proportion of total imports fell, by over 6 points in the closing 
years of the period, while the US share of the Community market 
contracted by only 2 percentage points. There was still a large 
structural deficit in the Community's merchandise trade with the 
United States, the Community's rate of cover of imports by 
exports slipping here from 0,86 in 1973 to 0,84 in 1981 (after 
dipping to a low of 0,65 in 1980). 
In the case of agricultural products, Community exports to the 
United States expanded rapidly although, given their very low 
initial level, the Community's rate of cover did not show any 
significant change. It remained at a sufficiently low level to 
enable the United States, in spite of the criticisms directed by the 
US Administration at the common agricultural policy, with 
charges that it encourages unfair competition, to go on running 
large surpluses with the Community, mainly due to US sales of 
soya and gluten-to replace traditional grain feedingstufTs-
which European livestock converts into elaborate agricultural 
products. 
The United States' edge was at times also very great in 
manufactures, for which the Community recorded a cover rate in 
bilateral trade that was greater than unity in 1973 but had fallen 
to 0,86 by 1981. This deterioration in the Community's 
competitive position reflects the growth-rate differential and the 
Community's contracting shares of the US market, contrasting 
with a gain in American market shares in the Community. 
Trade in intermediate products appears to have escaped this 
adverse trend to some extent. judging by the respective growth 
rates and by the cover rate, which rose from I in 1973 to 1.4 in 
1981 although the result in terms of market shares is less positive. 
This is attributable mainly to the Community's healthy 
performance on chemical products and the contraction in steel 
imports. The changing pattern of trade in intermediate products 
induced some improvement in the US share of the Community 
market and a reduction in the Community's share of the US 
market, but Community steel products still make up a 
substantial proportion of US imports ( 11 % in 1981 ), and this 
explains why US steel producers are so sensitive about them. 
Bilateral negotiations have produced an agreement on voluntary 
export restraint by the Ten. 
In equipment goods, the Community performed badly in the 
United States, not only in growth-rate terms but also in terms of 
120 
its market shares and cover rate. This adverse trend was apparent 
in virtually all product categories but was particularly pro-
nounced for office machines (computers), electrical goods 
(electronic equipment) and motor vehicles, even though the 
cover rate for the latter remained high, not because of a strong 
performance by the Community but on account of the weakness 
of US sales abroad. Agricultural and industrial machinery was 
the only sector in which trade remained relatively balanced and 
the cover rate actually improved; this therefore, was one of the 
very few success stories in Community trade with the United 
States. 
The United States itself, though unable to take full advantage of 
the expansion in Community imports of equipment goods from 
non-member countries, stepped up its exports by an average of 
5% a year, a healthy performance that enabled it to improve its 
trade balance with the Community by over 20% in eight years. 
Two sectors accounted for the bulk of this improvement, 
electronical goods and office machines. Together, they made up 
24'.\ of Community imports. As a result, the United States now 
has a market share of over 50% in imports from outside the 
Community of computers, office electronics and other data-
processing equipment. 
It is in basic consumer items though that the United States' pre-
eminence was most apparent, showing up a wide gap between the 
growth rate of imports and that of exports, in declining shares of 
Community products on the US market and in a very 
pronounced deterioration in the Community's cover rate. This 
situation is largely attributable to the collapse in textile, clothing 
and footwear exports to the United States, which, for its part, 
managed to consolidate its position on the corresponding 
markets in the Community. However, in view of the rapid 
appreciation of the dollar since 1981 and the high price elasticity 
of these products, some weakening of the US position may be 
expected. 
Since 1958, bilateral trade has invariably shown a large surplus 
for the United States, the record year being 1980 with a surplus of 
17 800 million ECU. In 1982, the surplus stood at I O 900 million 
ECU and was spread over a very wide range of product 
categories. In bilateral trading relations, therefore, the Com-
munity is in the weaker position. None the less, with the crisis 
continuing, the accusation of protectionism is often made on 
both sides by pressure groups who have encountered obstacles to 
sales of their products or who are afraid of a diversion of exports 
from other producer countries, whose traditional outlets have 
been closed up. 
In the context of this triangular competition in trade between the 
world's three leading producers, the recent increase in broad-
ranging industrial agreements between US and Japanese firms 
may represent a further threat to the Community. 
Community foreign trade : the equipment goods industry under threat 
Community-United States bilateral trade 
Average Share of EC rate of Structure 
annual imports from: import cover I of bilateral 
growth Uni ted States EC imports 
rate of in to tal (%) 
bilateral imports by: 1981 
trade EC (extra-EC) United States 
(volume) 
1973-8 1 (value) 
EC USA 1973 198 1 1973 198 1 1973 198 1 EC USA 
l. Agricultural products 1,9 9,2 22,0 24,3 8,2 10,2 0,12 0,17 13,7 2,8 
2. Energy products 11 ,4 8,3 2,7 2,9 5,6 7,5 0,81 1,72 7,1 14,5 
3. Manufactured products 4,0 2,0 20,5 22,6 26,5 20,5 1,05 0,86 78,1 79,9 
3. 1. Intermediate products 0,6 3,6 17,8 20,1 30,0 25,5 1,01 1,14 16,3 22,2 
- ores and meta ls -5,4 2,3 7,9 9,0 24,5 21,1 1,92 2,60 3,6 11 ,2 
- non-metallic minerals 1,5 ~ 2,3 18,4 19,2 37,5 29, 1 1,80 1,13 1,6 2,2 
- chemica l products 2,6 7,5 38,9 33 ,9 41,1 33 ,3 0,50 0,67 11 ,0 8,8 
3.2. Equipment goods 5,0 2, 1 38,5 34,1 28,4 21, 1 0,96 0,73 45,2 39,5 
- metal products 3,9 2,0 22,3 21,4 23 ,1 18,3 1,13 0,95 1,4 1,6 
- agricultura l and industrial mac-
hinery 3,1 7, 1 40,7 40,5 45,5 40,4 0,92 1,02 12,8 15,6 
- office machines 13,1 0,7 47,3 50,8 29,0 16,1 0,42 0,19 11 ,5 2,7 
- electrical goods 5, 1 2,4 35,1 31,2 15, 1 10,6 0,46 0,34 12,3 5, 1 
- motor vehicles 0,3 - 6,3 15,7 6,9 28,3 16,6 10,17 7,74 1,1 10,6 
- transport equipmen t - 1,5 6,7 53,9 38,3 29,7 34,3 0,37 0,57 6,0 4,0 
3.3 . Food products 4,8 - 1,7 13,7 18,3 22,9 19,9 0,88 0,76 5,6 5,1 
3.4. Basic consumer items 5,0 0,7 9,3 10,9 21,6 14,6 1,60 1,00 11 ,1 13, 1 
- textiles and clothing 6,0 -4,3 6,7 6,4 18,6 10,1 1,83 1,02 2,1 2,5 
- ·leather and foo twear 3,9 - 2,5 2,9 2,6 33,3 17,6 17,12 9,27 0,2 2, 1 
- wooden products and furniture 6,4 20,9 5,3 8,2 2,4 6,7 0,24 0,51 1,3 0,8 
- paper and printing products 4,5 5,7 13,4 15,1 6,9 6,6 0,27 0,24 3,4 1,0 
- rubber products 5,5 - 2,0 28,3 24,8 44,1 28 ,2 2,61 1,42 1,1 1,9 
- other manufacturing products 4,3 11 ,5 16,0 39,3 24,7 2,23 1,39 3,0 4,9 
4. Products n.e.s . 9,7 33 ,4 11 ,9 25,8 24,9 1,52 2, 16 1,1 2,8 
5. Total 3,3 3,2 17,4 15,3 22,6 16, 1 0,86 0,84 100,0 100,0 
US imports from EC di vided by EC imports fro m the USA . 
Source : Volimcx. 
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2. Bilateral trade between the Community and 
Japan, 1973-81 
In bilateral trade between the Community and Japan, the volume 
of Community imports has risen three times as fast as that of 
Japanese imports since 1973; Japan's share of the value of 
Community imports has therefore grown while the Community's 
share of the value of Japanese imports has contracted. However, 
this contraction was due to the enormous size of Japan's energy 
imports (accounting for over 50% of total imports in 1981) and to 
the associated price effect. In volume terms, imports from the 
Community as a proportion of Japan's total imports rose from 
6,6% in 1973 to 7,8% in 1981. 
The Community's share of Japan's manufactured imports 
remained virtually unchanged at 15% but, bearing in mind the 
fact that Japan's imports increased at an average annual rate of 
2%, this is attributable more to the sluggish growth in Japan's 
manufactured imports generally than to a genuine breakthrough 
by the Community. The growth rate of Japan's exports to the 
Community (averaging 9% a year), the increase in their share of 
total Community imports from the rest of the world (up 50%) 
and the deterioration in the Community's cover rate for 
manufactures are clear indications of the growing imbalance in 
trade with Japan. In 1982, the bilateral trade deficit amounted to 
11 600 million ECU. 
The main cause of the deficit is the growing trade imbalances in 
equipment goods and in basic consumer items. Leaving aside 
transport equipment other than motor vehicles, the equipment 
goods sector is not one in which the trend of bilateral trade has 
been favourable to the Community. In all cases, the growth rates 
for Japanese exports to the Community were well in excess of 
those for Community exports to Japan, which were actually 
negative in a fair number of cases. This resulted in a general 
decline in the rate of cover by Community products of purchase 
of equipment goods from Japan. The decline reached dramatic 
proportions in the case of industrial machinery, officie machines, 
electrical goods and motor vehicles. The consequence is severe 
imbalance in export structures, with equipment goods now 
accounting for over 80% of Japanese exports to the Community 
but for under 35% of Community exports to Japan. 
The same deterioration is discernible in trade in basic consumer 
items. Billlleral trade, which showed a surplus of 50% in 1973, 
was in deficit in 1981. This turnaround was caused in large 
measure by the worsening trend in textiles and clothing, which 
was not offset by the more favourable movement in trade in 
leather goods and in wooden products and furniture. 
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The Community's trade deficit with Japan would have been even 
larger if it had not stepped up exports of food products and 
intermediate products. While the Community's performance in 
food products, remarkable as it may be, is based on its natural 
comparative advantage, the satisfactory gains in trade in 
intermediate products are probably the only positive feature in 
what is a particularly sombre picture. The improvement in trade 
in ferrous and non-ferrous metals, primarly steel products, was 
mainly due to the sharp contraction in trade in steel products 
coupled with a significant slowdown in Community imports 
from the rest of the world in 1981; the Community's stronger 
competitive position therefore rests on the firm foothold it has on 
the Japanese market for chemical products. 
Foreign products and firms have to overcome many barriers that 
have less to do with tariffs than with Japan's socio-cultural and 
socio-economic system if they are to penetrate the Japanese 
market or set up there. I This disequilibrium in trade relations 
between the Community and Japan has been the cause of 
frequent negotiations between them although these have not 
prevented the Community from lodging a general complaint 
with the GA TT. But the matters giving cause for concern to 
economic policy-makers and Industrialists in the countries 
trading with Japan go beyond the direct effects of the mounting 
trade deficit. Japan in fact needs its surpluses in order to finance 
its imports of agricultural and energy products and, above all, its 
deficit on services (see introduction to this chapter). The problem 
is Japan's extreme concentration on exports of products that 
shape today's on-going technological revolution. Its success on 
export markets for motor vehicles, public-sector electronics 
equipment or robotics is, by virtue of the information technology 
these product categories embody, a sign of its technical and 
commercial supremacy in areas in which the influence of 
European industry is gradually waning. If the Community does 
not manage to harness its own potential, it will have to undergo 
structural changes that are imposed from outside. 
See J. Zerche: 'Sozialpolitische Kosten and ihr EinfluJ3 auf die 
Wettbewerbsfiihigkeit', in Internationale WeltbewerbsJahigkeit bei 
unterschiedlichen Sozialordnungen. USA, Japan, Bundesrepub/ik 
Deutsch/and, Gespriiche der List-Gesellschaft, New Series, Vol. 7, 
Baden-Baden, 1982, pp. 103 et seq. 
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Community - Japan bilateral trade 
Awrngc Slrnrc of EC ra te Structure 
illlllU:11 imports from : of import of bil"lcrnl 
grnwth Japan EC cover I imports 
r:11c of in total (" ,, ) 
hil.itcr.il imports hy: 198 1 
imports EC (cx lrn- ECJ Japan 
(volume) 
1971-81 (va lue) 
EC Japan l'/7.1 198 1 197.1 198 1 197.1 198 1 EC Japa n 
I. Agricu ltural products - 7.4 0,5 0,5 0,4 1,0 0,8 1,06 1,39 0,6 2,0 
2. Energy products 30.3 12,1 0.0 0.1 0,1 0, 1 4,64 0,73 0,5 0,9 
3. Manufactured products 9.0 1.6 6,4 10,1 15,3 15,7 0,71 0,40 98 ,8 95,5 
3. 1. Intermediate products -2.5 1.8 4.7 3.8 10.2 10.5 0,98 1,34 8,8 28,3 
- ores and metals - 10.2 2,2 3,9 2, 1 1.8 2,5 0,24 0,72 2,4 4,2 
- non-metallic minera ls 1,2 . 2.3 5,5 4,7 11 .5 10.4 0,66 0,62 1, 1 1,7 
- chemical products 2.6 3.1 6,2 5,6 36,2 26, 1 2,06 1,77 5,2 22,4 
3.2. Equ ipment goods 12,7 I. I 14.7 2 1.2 30,1 23,7 0,40 0,18 80, 1 34,3 
- metal products 4,0 - 0.4 9.4 8,7 33. 1 26.3 0,49 0.35 1.6 1,4 
- agricultural and industrial 
machinery 9,1 - 1.8 7.0 9.6 36.4 3 1,0 1,23 0,52 8,6 10,9 
- o flice machines 14,3 -3,5 18,6 21 ,2 3 1,4 15,7 0,44 0,11 13,7 3,7 
- electrica l goods 13,9 4.2 18,5 26,8 19.4 13.8 0.19 0,08 30, 1 6,2 
- motor vehicles 16.5 2. 7 29,0 4 1,5 50,4 68,2 0.20 0.09 19,8 4,2 
- transport equipment 5.8 9,5 12.7 14.2 19,2 26,5 0.2 1 0,52 6,3 7,9 
3.3. Food products - 2.7 9,5 1.2 0.9 7.8 14,2 1.86 6,5 1 0,8 12.1 
3.4 . Basic consumer items 3, I - 0,9 · 2,8 3,2 17,4 15,5 1,57 0,93 9,2 20,8 
- textiles and clothing 5,1 -2,4 2,8 2,8 16,8 16,9 2,48 1.39 2,5 8,6 
- leather and footwear -6.4 10,7 3,8 1,4 26,5 31 , 1 1.03 4,04 0,3 2,9 
- wooden products and furniture - 8, 1 2,6 1, 1 0,7 2, 1 2, 1 0,42 0,70 0,3 0,6 
- paper and printing products 9.7 - 1,7 1,0 1,4 13,0 7,8 1,34 0.73 0,9 1,6 
- rubber products 4.6 11,6 .9 ,3 8.2 25,9 3 1,3 0,38 0,60 1,0 1,5 
- o ther manufacturing prod ucts 2,6 - 3.6 5,4 7.7 32.3 25,9 1,75 0,58 4,1 5,7 
4. Prod ucts n.e.s. 1.9 0,2 14.6 12,3 1,23 15,23 0,0 1,6 
). Total 8.3 2.3 4,2 5.4 8,3 5,4 0,72 0.41 100,0 100,0 
.l ap;rn imporls from EC divided by EC imports from lllpan. 
· ' ""', 1 ' Voli1m:x. 
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3. Innovation and trade in high-technology 
products 1 
Technological advance takes two main forms: the technology of 
new production processes and the technology of new products. 
While the former involves improving the productivity of an 
economy's productive system, the latter is reflected in sectoral 
switches in production to high technology, more sophisticated or 
entirely new products. Together, they contribute directly to 
structural change in the economy and are the main source of 
long-term economic growth. 
The possession of technology, or a relatively high level of R&D 
spending will not by itself trigger technological change or induce 
economic growth. Technology needs to be translated into actual 
manufacturing processes and products. In the absence of 
technological innovation, structural change and economic 
growth are impossible. 
An economy's competitiveness and hence the growth-rate 
differentials between countries are determined by the relative 
progress made in the field of technological innovation. Such 
progress essentially means expanding international market 
shares for new-technology products and a growing concent-
ration on exports of such products, coupled with an increasingly 
high degree of national self-sufficiency in high-technology 
products and processes. 
The following tables give the main findings of international 
comparisons of innovation based on trade in high-technology 
products. 
Table I lists, using the United Nation's Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC, Rev. 2) adopted by most indus-
trialized countries in 1978, product groups which, within 
manufacturing as a whole, are characterized by a fairly high level 
of R&D spending on production processes or on the product 
marketed. An effort was made to find the corresponding groups 
from the SITC, Rev. I, so as to estimate the results for the period 
prior to 1978. Selection posed no problems for the sectors with a 
high R&D content, but delimitation was more arbitrary in the 
less high-technology sectors. 
Table II gives the values of exports (fob) and imports (cif) of 
these products, expressed in current dollars, for the Community, 
the United States and Japan for the years 1963, 1970 and 1981. 
The Community as a whole emerges as the most important 
trading area for high-technology products, recording a positive 
balance, yet also remaining a major importer (USD 43 OOO 
million), a testimony to its firm commitment to free trade 
principles. 
Taking Community trade, the strong position of Germany is 
clearly apparent. While, in 1981, the Community and the United 
States were still the largest exporters of products in this category, 
Japan, which played only a minor role in 1963, now ranks 
between the two. The Community and the United States have 
imported gradually more high-technology products, so that their 
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cover rates fell from 3,3 to 1,4 and from 3, I to 1,0 respectively in 
the period 1963-81, whereas Japan's cover rate increased from 
2,2 to 6,9. 
Table III shows the relative importance of trade in high-
technology products in each country's total in manufactures. 
The twofold increase since 1963 in the share of these products in 
Japan's exports indicates the progress it has made by concentrat-
ing on 'knowledge-intensive', high value-added and export-
oriented products. 
The United States' performance is slightly better than the 
Community's but is still overshadowed by Japan's. The 
individual Community countries' performances differ depending 
on the degree of their scientific development, with Italy, 
Denmark and the Netherlands showing remarkably poor results 
considering the relatively advanced state of their scientific and 
technological infrastructure. 
The high score for Ireland is influenced by high-technology 
investment from abroad, while the results for the United 
Kingdom reflect the much worse figures obtained for exports of 
low-technology products than for exports of high-technology 
products. 
Table IV gives the results of the calculations2 of the comparative 
advantage enjoyed in trade in high-technology products by the 
Community countries, the United States and Japan, by reference 
to each country's relative importance in total trade in 
manufactures in the industrialized world (OECD). 
It can be seen that the degree of specialization in high-technology 
exports has risen rapidly in Japan and showed a long-term 
decline in the United States. The index would be higher though if 
the definitions of 'high-technology products' were more 
restrictive. 
The Community index has fallen since 1963, as has the index for 
the United States although the level there is still high in absolute 
terms. However, the gap between the Community and the United 
States is much narrower if we focus only on Community trade 
with the rest of the world. 
Table V gives the values of bilateral trade flows of high-
technology products between the Community, the United States 
and Japan; these again reveal Japan's tendency to concentrate on 
achieving self-sufficiency in these products. 
The Community's large deficit with Japan and its somewhat 
smaller deficit with the United States confirm that much of the 
Community's trade in this sector is with technologically less 
advanced countries. 
The index of specialization is calculated as follows: 
where Xij = exports of product j by country i; ~x. = total world 
exports ofproductj; X, = total exports of manufactures by country i; 
~ = total world exports of manufactures. 
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Table I Table II 
Classification of selected high-technology sectors: Trade in high-technology products, 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) 1963, 1970, 1981 
Revision 2 for 1978 and 1981 and Revision 1 for ('IXJO million current US dollars) 
1963 and 1970 data Counlry 1963 1970 1981 
SITC2 Dcscriplion of producl scclor SITC I Belgium/Luxembourg 0,57 1,67 9,08 
CODE CODE 0,49 1,27 6,57 
523 Other inorganic chemicals; inorganic or organic Denmark 0,11 0,31 1,52 
compounds of precious metals 514 
524 Radioactive and associated materials 515 0,27 0,70 2,16 
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 541 
714 Engines and motors, non-electric (reaction en- France 1,29 3,36 19,3 
gines, gas turbines, turbo-propellers) 7116 0,79 2,38 17,53 
716 Rotating electric plant 
7187 Nuclear reactors 7117 FR of Germany 3,53 7,77 41,99 
736 Machine tools for working metal 7151 0,76 3,37 22,98 
752 ADP machines and units thereof (including 
peripheral equipment) 7143 Greece 0,00 0,00 0,15 
761 Television receivers I 724 0,11 0,28 1,00 
763 Gramophones and other sound recorders 8911 
764 Telecommunications equipment 1 Ireland 0,01 0,06 1,42 
771 Electric power machinery other than that shown 0,10 0,22 1,71 
under 716 7221 
773 Equipment for distributing electricity 723 Italy 0,75 2,35 10,75 
774 Electric medical apparatus including radiology 726 0,83 1,77 12,68 
775 Household equipment, electrical or not 7250 
776 Valves, tubes, diodes, transistors, microcircuits 7293 The Netherlands 0,68 1,40 6,14 
781 Passenger motor-cars 7321 0,91 2,11 7,92 
7821 Motor vehicles for transport of goods 7323 
7911 Electrical rail locomotives 7312 United Kingdom 2,26 3,79 18,79 
792 Aircraft and associated { 734 0,59 1,72 18,65 equipment 8999 
871 Optical instruments and apparatus 8613 
872 Medical instruments and appliances 8617 EC total 9,22 20,68 109,16 
874 Measuring, checking, controlling { 7295 4,85 13,82 91,21 instruments 8619 
881.J Photographic cameras and equipment (other 
Extra-EC than cinematographic) 8614 5,61 11,60 61,10 
8812 Cinematographic cameras, projectors including 1,69 4,86 42,91 
sound recorders 8615 
8822 Photographic films, plates and paper 8624 United States 4,32 8,45 52,22 
8841 Lenses, prisms and other optical items 8611 1,40 7,97 50,55 
885 Watches and clocks 864 
Japan 0,81 4,61 56,09 
Total Total of high technology Total 0,37 1,33 8,09 
For SIT(' I. Code 724 includes bolh TV rcecivers and telccommunicalions Canada 0,32 3,25 12,61 
equipment (764 and 761 of SITC 2). 0,66 2,87 14,36 
Firsl line: exporls fob; 
second line: imporlS cif. 
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Table III 
Share of exports of high-technology products in total manufactured exports 
1963, 1970, 1981 I 
1963 
1970 
1981 
B/L 
15 
17 
22 
DK 
15 
17 
17 
F 
21 
24 
25 
D 
27 
25 
28 
GR 
2 
2 
6 
1963 and 1970 data based on SITC Rev. I; 1981 data based on SITC Rev. 2. 
Table IV 
Specialization indices in trade in high-technology 
products 
IRL 
10 
14 
30 
19 
21 
17 
Table V 
NL 
25 
20 
18 
UK 
23 
22 
28 
EC 
23 
22 
24 
Estimated imports of high-technology products 
Community, United States, Japan - 1963-81 
USA 
29 
28 
33 
Japan 
16 
25 
38 
(OECD a~rage = J.(JQ) ( '()()() million current US dollars) 
Country 1963 1970 1978 1981 
~, Imports (CIF) 
Belgium/Luxembourg 0,65 0,72 0,81 0,80 EC USA Japan 
Denmark 0,65 0,70 0,63 0,60 
1963 
France 0,93 1,00 0,96 0,88 EC (3,16) 0,86 O,Q7 
FR of Germany 1,20 1,06 0,99 1,00 USA 0,75 0,26 Japan 0,11 0,21 
Greece 0,07 0,07 0,16 0,20 
Ireland 0,42 0,61 0,92 1,07 1970 
EC (8,86) 2,42 0,40 
Italy 0,83 0,87 0,65 0,60 USA 2,21 1,93 
Japan 0,33 0,85 
The Netherlands 1,10 0,85 0,68 0,64 
United Kingdom 1,02 0,94 0,92 1,00 1978 
EC (37,72) 9,9 5,13 
USA 7,45 11,14 
EC total 1,01 0,94 0,88 0,87 Japan 1,31 2,60 
Extra-EC 1,11 1,07 0,96 1,04 1981 
EC (48,30) 15,35 9,58 
USA 9,86 20,76 
United States 1,27 1,18 1,27 1,19 
Japan 1,64 4,96 
Japan 0,72 l,Q7 1,27 1,37 
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Methodological annex: The assessment of volume trade flows 
I. The Volimex data bank 22 - Other manufacturing products 
23 - Products n.e.s . 
Volimex is the Commission's bank of annual bilateral trade 
data, in volume and value terms, for 22 OECD member 
countries that send in returns and 29 partner areas or 
countries, broken down into 23 products. It contains a 
coherent set of satistics for each OECD country on 
commercial trade in current dollars and at constant 1975 
prices and exchange rates . Construction of the price (or unit 
value) series raised a number of methodological problems; 
the main ones are dealt with below, but the estimated price 
series obtained cannot, at all events, be regarded as more 
than a sectoral approximation to true import and export 
prices. Until 1980, basic statistics were supplied by the 
OECD; since 1981 , they have come from the United Nations 
Statistical Office in Geneva. 
1. 1. Grouping the products 
The figures are broken down into 23 product groups 
compatible with NACE-CLIO (R25) grouped into broad 
categories. This classification was obtained by drawing up 
two keys (one for the I 500 products of the SITC-Rev. I and 
one for the I 900 products of the SITC Rev. 2),' which lead 
to the establishment of continuous series covering the period 
1963-81 for the following 23 product groups: 
I - Agriculture, forestry , fisheries 
2 - Coal, lignite, briquettes 
3 - Products of coking 
4 - Oil and natural gas 
5 - Electric power, gas, steam and water 
6 - Nuclear 
7 - Ores and metals 
8 - Non-metallic minerals 
9 - Chemical products 
10 - Metal products 
11 - Agricultural and industrial machinery 
12 - Office machines 
13 - Electrical goods 
14 - Motor vehicles 
15 - Other transport equipment 
16 - Food product 
17 - Textiles and clothing 
18 - Leathers, skins, foo twear 
19 - Wooden products and furniture 
20 Paper and printing products 
21 - Rubber and plastic products 
See SIT Rev. 2. Untcd ations. Depa rtment of Economic and Social 
AfTnirs. Statistical Office. tatistical Papers No M34. New York . 1975. 
and the following broad categories: 
Energy products (2 to 6) 
Manufacturing products (7 to 22) 
comprising: 
- Intermediate products (7 to 9) 
Equipment goods (10 to 15) 
- Current consumption goods ( 17 to 22) 
1.2. Volume figures 
The basic figures supplied by the OECD and the UN are in 
terms of value, usually with data on the quantity traded for 
each basic product category. This provides a statistical basis 
for the calculation of unit value indices (exports or imports in 
value divided by the corresponding quantity) for all bilateral 
flows . The calculation implies a certain number of meth-
odological alternatives. First, classical unit value indices may 
be calculated on the basis of a basket of goods whose 
composition does not change over the calculation period . 
The disadvantage of this approach is that it considerably 
narrows the statistical basis of the index: calculations can 
cover only products for which bilateral trade values and 
quantities are given each year. If information is missing for a 
single product in the finest SITC breakdown for a single year, 
that product must be eliminated from the calculations. This 
restriction holds for any index, but it is particularly 
important in foreign trade indices- so much so that 
numerous bilateral flows do not exist at all during a period. 
Consequently, a traditional price index calculated for a 
basket of products is not really representative of prices as a 
whole for a group of products, and cannot therefore be used 
as the basis for defla ting. To correct this shortcoming, 
Volimex unit value indices have been calculated using the 
chain-linked method, where all the products bilaterally 
traded in at least two consecutive years -are taken into 
account. Unit value indices are calculated on the basis of 
changing baskets and weights that are assumed to provide a 
fairly faithful representation of the trend of unit prices for 
goods traded; the indices are evaluated from one year to the 
next, aggregated and chain-linked to form a series of price 
indices both for imports and for exports. 
The problem of choosing between Paasche and Laspeyres 
indices arose when the unit value series for the 23 product 
groups were aggregated. The main advantage of the 
Laspeyres index is that it uses constant weights ; but this 
ceases to be particularly useful when chain-linked indices are 
available. Chain-linked Laspeyres and Paasche indices for 
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year (t + 1) in ~elation to year t for all products together are 
as follows: 
u 
l: 
I/ i= I I +I, I = _u ____ _ l: I I 
i•I qipi 
u 
l: 1+! 1+! qi Pi t i-1 
1+1,1 = -u--1+-1- 1-
l: qi Pi i-1 
(Laspeyres) 
(Paasche) 
Every year, the system of weights (q;) changes, with the 
weights used in the Paasche index for year t equal to those 
used in the Laspeyres index for year (t + 1). Consequently, 
except for the quantities used as weights in the first year of 
the series of Laspeyres indices, or the final year of the series of 
Paasche indices, the same system of weights is used in both 
series with one year's difference, one being an arithmetic and 
the other a harmonic mean. Although there is little change 
from one system of weights to the next, it has been found that 
the Laspeyres index for any year is always higher than the 
Paasche-as could be expected in view of the negative sign of 
most import and export price elasticities. The advantages of 
the methodological clarity of the Laspeyres index are not 
apparent once the indices are chain-linked, so there is no 
reason to give preference to either base-year or current-year 
weights. Consequently, it seemed best to adopt the classic 
middle way: Fisher's 'ideal' index, which is the geometric 
mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche indices. 
1.3. The quality of the figures 
Apart from their drawbacks in relation to true price indices, 
the quality of unit value indices calculated in this way 
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depends mainly on the statistical quality of the import and 
export returns sent in by the countries. This quality improves 
as the percentage of return covering both value and 
quantities rises. 
In most cases, the percentage is satisfactory-for example, 
both magnitudes are given for over 90% of Belgium's exports 
in 1980--, but the United States and Canada have much 
lower than average statistical coverage (under 60%, and 65% 
respectively). This implies a more cautious approach in 
analysing the indices and thus the real figures for these 
countries' imports and exports than for others. 
The United Kingdom's exports in 1981 cause a problem 
because the long drawn-out civil service strike meant that 
figures for exports from May to August were incomplete. 
The missing figures have been estimated by UK statisticians 
on the basis of a sample survey, so that the annual values for 
1981 are less reliable. 
2. The treatment of intra-Community trade 
Intra-Community trade raises a problem for comparative 
studies of the Community and the other countries or areas. 
On the assumption that the Community participates as such 
in the international division oflabour, it seems logical to base 
comparisons on figures for external trade excluding intra-
Community trade. This approach thus logically implies 
excluding intra-Community trade from the reference figure 
for the total trade of OECD countries. This was done in 
Table 2, where the OECD row gives total trade of all OECD 
countries with the rest of the world excluding trade between 
Community countries. However, there is no need to correct 
the figures for the United States and Japan, which obviously 
include trade with the Community countries, just as figures 
for extra-Community trade cover all trade by all Community 
countries with all non-Community countries, and in 
particular with the United States and Japan. 
Chapter II : The external constraint and the operation of the price 
and income elasticities of external trade 
in the Community countries, the United States of America and 
Japan 1, 2 
Introduction 131 
1. Trade with the rest of the world 132 
- Trade in goods and trade in manufactures: the unevenness of 
constraints in the Community and in the industrialized world 
generally 132 
- Trade by main product categories 136 
- Breaks in trend since 1973 140 
2. Intra-Community trade 142 
- Trade in goods and trade in manufactures 142 
- Intra-Community trade by product category 146 
3. Conclusion 146 
Box I: Export and import functions 152 
Box 2: Operation of the price and income elasticities of external 
trade and the external constraint 153 
Bibliography 154 
This chapter has been written by Ph. Rollet, Researcher at the CNRS, Centre de rccherchcs europccnnes et intemationales. University of Lille I. 
The opinions expressed in this chapter arc those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Commission. 
129 
List of tables 
I. Income and price elasticities of merchandise exports and imports (trade 
with the rest of the world; annual figures 1964-81) 133 
2. Income and price elasticities of exports and imports of manufactures 
(trade with the rest of the world; annual figures 1964-81) 134 
3. Price trends in the internationally traded goods sector (average annual 
rate of increase) 135 
4. The external constraint expressed by the relationship between the 
income elasticities of exports and that of imports 135 
5. Price elasticities of exports; world trade broken down by main sector 
(annual figures 1964-81) 137 
6. Price elasticities of imports, broken down by main sector (annual 
figures 1964-81) 137 
7. Income elasticities of exports with respect to world demand, by main 
sector (annual figures 1964-81) 138 
8. Income elasticities of imports from the rest of the world, by main sector 
(annual figures 1964-81) 139 
9. Income elasticities of imports from the rest of the world, by main sector 
( 1964-73 and 1973-81) 140 
10. Income elasticities of exports with respect to world demand, by main 
sector ( 1964-73 and 1973-81) 141 
11. Income and price elasticities of merchandise exports and imports (intra-
Community trade; annual figures, 1964-81) 143 
12. Income and price elasticities of exports and imports of manufactures 
(intra-Community trade; annual figures, 1964-81) 144 
13. Income elasticities of exports with respect to world demand and 
Community demand (1964-73 and 1973-81) 145 
14. Income elasticities of imports from the rest of the world and from the 
Community ( 1964-73 and 1973-81) 145 
15. Price elasticities of intra-Community exports, by main sector (annual 
figures, 1964-81) 148 
16. Income elasticities of intra-Community exports, by main sector (annual 
figures, 1964-81) 148 
17. Price elasticities of intra-Community imports, by main sector (annual 
figures, 1964-81) 149 
18. Income elasticities of intra-Community imports, by main sector 
(annual figures, 1964-81) 149 
19. Income elasticities of exports with respect to Community demand, by 
main sector (1964-73 and 1973-81) 150 
20. Income elasticities of imports from the Community, by main sector 
( 1964-73 and 1973-81) 151 
130 
The external constraint and the operation of the price and income elasticities of external trade in the EC, the USA and Japan 
Introduction . 
The estimation of import and export demand functions has 
always been of interest in trying to understand the factors 
that govern international trade and the implications of the 
!nt~rplay of those factors for economic policy. For example, 
1t 1s necessary to know price and income elasticities of 
external trade to assess the consequences for a country's 
trade balance and those of its partners of changes in par 
values, tariff policies or subsidies; to comprehend the 
mechanisms by which changes in price or growth ra'.ies are 
transmitted between countries; and, more generally, to 
evaluate the severity of the external constraint on each 
country as a result of its degree of openness and the extent of 
its participation in the international division of labour. 
Many relevant studies have been carried out, especially since 
the work of Houthakker and Magee [I] I and that of 
Adams [2] in the early 1970s, which atempted to estimate 
sufficiently reliable parameters-in spite of the uncertainty 
that inevitably surrounds foreign trade data-to inform 
economic policy decisions. Some of these studies concentrate 
on international comparisons and deal with the foreign trade 
of the main Community countries, the United States and 
Japan; unfortunately, the periods they cover are usually 
rather distant: the late 1950s and the 1960s (Houthakker and 
Magee, Basev [3] and Taplin [4] under the Link project), or at 
best, for the most recent study (Deppler and Ripley [5]), the 
very early 1970s. Little work has been done to date to take 
account of the changes in international trade since 1973 
described in Chapter I. The data bank for foreign trade 
statistics in volume terms 2 now makes possible international 
comparisons with a fairly fine breakdown, so knowledge of 
the mechanisms that regulate foreign trade has been updated 
and the general view provided by available studies has been 
supplemented in three main ways: 
(i) systematic international comparisons have been made 
between the Community countries, the USA and Japan; 
(ii) elasticities have been estimated over a long period 
(1964-81), but also over shorter periods to allow in 
particular for changes following the first oil shock; 
(iii) elasticities have been estimated for trade with the rest of 
the world, but also, in view of the importance of the 
Community to our economies, for trade with the 
Community itself. 
The exercise is not without risk, in view of the numerous 
problems of methodology and the controversies surrounding 
Figures in brackets rercr to bibliography at the end of this chapter. 
Sec methodological annex on the evaluation of real trade nows (Chapter I 
of the section 'Foreign Trade' of this report). 
this matter-studied in detail in recent work by M. Goldstein 
and M.S. Khan [6], particularly in connection with the 
specification of models and the choice of variables: problems 
of estimating export and import supply functions, problems 
relating to the choice of price indices (difficulties of 
measurement, differences in price structures from one 
country to another, biases introduced by the use of unit 
values rather than the true prices of imports and exports, 
which are incompletely known), to the stability of relation-
ships over time and to lags in adjustment. As always in these 
cases, the availability of statistics largely determines the 
nature of the relations estimated; there is sometimes a wide 
disparity between what is possible and what is formulated 
theoretically. The approach adopted here is traditional, and 
the formulations used for export and import functions are 
th?se most often used in the relevant literature (see Box 1), 
bemg confined to variables of relative price and national or 
international demand. 
By confining the enquiry to the essential factors of external 
competitiveness and by concentrating on the international 
comparison aspect rather than theoretical refinements, it has 
been possible to define more precisely the nature of the 
external constraint that affects each of the European 
c?untries and their main industrialized competitors in very 
different ways, reflected in particular in differences between 
the trends of their trade balances and the number of currency 
realignments since the introduction of the EMS. 
This constraint, which is largely determined by the extent to 
which a country's productive system is adapted to the 
~tructures and trends of domestic and world demand and by 
its degree of price competitiveness, is reflected both in the 
price and income elasticities of imports and exports and in 
the comparative rates of inflation and economic growth (see 
Box 2). The trend in the trade balance thus depends, first, on 
price elasticities and inflation differentials: if, for example, a 
country exhibits high price elasticities, this means that its 
trade balance will be especially sensitive to changes in relative 
prices where these are not offset by exchange rate move-
ments,_ an_d th~t it will therefore have to attempt to bring 
down its mflatton rate to a level comparable to that of its 
i~ternational trading partners. It depends, secondly, on the 
difference between the income elasticities of imports and 
exports and on economic growth differentials, the combined 
impact of which may accentuate or mitigate that of price 
elasticities and relative prices. Even if inflation rates are 
~omparable, _a . country may experience an underlying 
improvement m its trade balance if the income elasticity of its 
exports is greater than that of its imports, as long as its 
economic growth rate is identical to that of its trading 
partners. 
The present analysis seeks to identify the nature and extent of 
the external constraint arising from the operation of these 
elasticities by estimating them over an extended period 
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(1964-81) for the Community countries, the United States 
and Japan, first in respect of their trade with the rest of the 
world and then in respect of their trade with the Community. 
It does not, however, attempt to measure the effect of specific 
exhange rate movements, which depend partly on the trend 
in the trade balance and partly on monetary factors. 
1. Trade with the rest of the world 
The extent of the external constraint on each country is, of 
course, dependent on the trends in its total trade and trade in 
manufactures but a finer analysis by main product category 
reveals that the trade results achieved reflect both the 
changes in international specialization and the breaks in 
trend that have occurred since the first oil shock. 
Trade in goods and trade in manufactures: the unevenness of 
constraints in the Community and in the industrialized world 
generally 
The results in terms of price and income elasticities are given 
in Tables I and 2. On the whole, they are fairly satisfactory: 
the coefficients of determination are usually very high, 
problems of auto-correlation are rare, and few problems 
arise with colinearity. 
Price elasticities: exports more sensitive to relative price 
trends than imports 
By and large, the estimations of price elasticities are only 
mediocre, particularly those for exports. This may be 
because of statistical phenomena (average values being only 
approximate indicators of the actual prices in external trade) 
or becat1se of real phenomena in that a number of factors 
have in the last decade tended to restrict the role of prices in 
the regulation of international trade: 
(i) in general international competition is more in the 
nature of oligopolistic competition than in that of pure 
and perfect competition and acts more on product 
differentiation than on prices; 
(ii) a large and increasing proportion of international trade 
is intra-company trade carried on at transfer prices that 
bear no relationship to market prices, or barter trade, 
for which prices are not the essential variable. 
In spite of these methodological problems, which may 
influence the results, some interesting conclusions can be 
drawn from the tables. 
In the first place, a large number of price elasticities of 
imports, whether total imports or manufactured imports, are 
significant. But they are not very high (ranging from - 0,3 to 
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-0,5), an indication of the minor role played by prices in the 
regulation of imports, which would seem to be more 
influenced by the level of economic activity caused by the fact 
that a large proportion of goods which can be substituted for 
only with difficulty, either for physical reasons (energy 
products, raw materials, agricultural products) or for 
reasons to do with the increased participation of the 
Community countries in the international division oflabour. 
The price elasticities of exports are also significant in a 
number of countries. This is notably the case in Italy, whose 
total and manufactured exports are highly sensitive to price 
changes (elasticity of - 2) probably because the country is 
highly specialized in the manufacture of unsophisticated 
products in which there is keen price competition, especially 
because the markets concerned (textiles, clothing, etc.) are 
also supplied by low-wage countries [8]. Elsewhere elasti-
cities are very close to unity: Germany, France, United 
States, Japan (total exports), Belgium (manufactured 
exports). 
The relatively high value of combined elasticities means that 
countries with high inflation rates are more vulnerable 
Subject to the uncertainty attaching to data of this kind, it 
would therefore appear that the sum of the price elasticities 
of imports and exports in most Community countries is 
greater than unity. As a result, the likelihood is that trade 
balances react positively to any currency depreciation and to 
any fall in relative prices (and vice versa) although we are 
unable here to indicate the extent of the phenomenon and its 
mechanics (in particular, the lag in the beneficial effects). At 
the same time, this relatively high value of the combind 
elasticities means that the Community countries must not 
allow any widening of inflation differentials between them 
and the rest of the world as this may induce a deterioration in 
their trade balance and a fall in the value of their currencies. 
The countries with the greatest inflation problem taking the 
long-run trends, France, the United Kingdom and Italy 
(Table 3), thus have had no alternative but to bring down 
inflation sharply (a strategy successfully pursued in the 
United Kingdom) or to allow the value of their currencies to 
fall in order to keep their external accounts in balance. The 
latter constraint, in the shape of an adjustment via the 
exchange rate, weighs particularly heavily on Italy on 
account of the high value of its export price elasticities. 
The external constraint does not, however, depend solely on 
the impact of price elasticities and relative prices. It can be 
mitigated or amplified by the impact of income elasticities 
and economic growth differentials. 
Income elasticities 
The estimates for income elasticities are invariably highly 
significant. Differing widely between countries, they not only 
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Table 1 
Income and price elasticities of merchandise exports and imports (trade with the rest of the world; annual figures, 1964-81) 
Exports Imports 
Con- Elaslicilies R2 DW Con- Elasticities R2 . DW 
stant slant 
World Prices GDP Prices 
demand 
-7,92 1,24 -0,63* 0,99 2,08 Belgium -6,03 1,83 -0,38 0,99 2,18 
(41,9) (- 1,63) (49) (-4,4) 
-8,15 1,25 0,99 1,86 -6,36 1,86 0,98 1,87 
(41,4) (34,4) 
-8,!5b 1,31 -0,99 0,99 2,31 FR of Germany -7,95 1,95 -0,23 0,99 2,13 
(24,8) (-4,2) (52) (-3,4) 
-4,64 1,13 0,98 1,85 -8,77 2,00 0,99 1,90 
(30, 7) (47,5) 
-9,87 1,37 +0,2• 0,98 1,97 France -6,96 1,85 -o,45a 0,99 2,21 
(28,5) (0,38) (56) (-6) 
-9,79 1,36 0,98 1,78 -4,81 1,70 0,99 1,87 
(29,8) (40,1) 
-1,14 2,27c -0,83 0,99 
(42) (- 2,3) 
-7,42 1,22 -1,873 0,97 2,47 Italy 2,72 1,81 -0,28 0,99 2,28 
(14, I) ( - 3,70) (34) (-4,8) 
-10,9 1,40 0,96 1,66 4,86 1,62 0,98 1,86 
(20,3) (28,6) 
-6,22h 1,16 +0,27* 0,99 1,88 The Netherlands -0,11 1,50 -0,33 0,99 2,26 
(24,7) (1,35) (34,4) (-4,4) 
-7,30 1,21 0,99 1,88 -1,72 1,63 0,98 1,89 
(47,09) (34,4) 
-1,05 0,92 +0,22• 0,98 1,87 United Kingdom -6,15 2,00 -0,24 0,98 2,27 
(24,7) (1,62) (26,9) ( - 3,7) 
-1,15 0,93 0,97 1,87 -5,18 1,92 0,96 1,91 
(25, I) (20,2) 
+4,9 l,51C -0,29 0,98 
(34,5) (-2,9) 
na na na na na EC 9 extra na na na na na 
-4,4 1.16 0,95 1,78 0,48 1,34 0,98 1,92 
( 17,8) (28,4) 
-8.10 1,30 -1,503 0,95 2,56 USA -19,8bb 2,68 -0,40 0.98 2,50 
(12,2) (- 3,3) (19, I) (- 5, 18) 
-10,45 1,42 0,92 1,51 -7,97 1,86 0.9~ 1,77 
(13,5) (12,8) 
18,64 1,80 -0,89 0,97 2,29 Japan 5,86 1,24 -0,31 0,97 2,23 
( 16,4) (-2,1) (22,6) (- 2,6) 
-21,9 1,96 0,97 1,45 7,11 1,15 0,97 1,74 
(22,6) (22,5) 
Nott: ( ) Student's l. 
a - one-year log on relative prices. 
b - colincority problem. 
C - regression by rcfercnc-c to world GDP. 
no - data not orniloblc. 
. 
- non-signiliconl elasticity (with a possible error of 5"/.) . 
For each country, the results of the multiple regression (as a function of demand and relative prices) arc given first. followed by the results of the simple regression (as a function of 
demand). 
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Table 2 
Income and price elasticities of exports and imports of manufactures (trade with the rest of the world; aonoal figures, 1964-81) 
Exports Imports 
Con- Elasticities R2 DW Con- Elasticities R2 DW 
Stan! stanl 
World Prices GDP Prices 
demand 
-3,72 1,05 -0,98a 0,99 2,11 Belgium -12,56b 2,26 -0,20 0,99 2,24 
(53,0) (-2,9) (22,0) (-2,6) 
-3,48 1,03 0,99 1,90 -8,92 2,01 0,99 1,88 
(51,0) (47,8) 
-2,92b 1,07 -0,48* 0,99 2,20 FR of Germany -16,05 2,50 -o.o• 0,99 2,00 
(16,5) (-1,7) (61,0) (-0,1) 
-0,88 0,96 0,99 1,89 -16,05 2,50 0,99 1,90 
(43,3) (61,0) 
-5,99 1,18 +0,12• 0,98 1,98 France -12,40 2,21 -o,55a 0,99 2,17 
(33,8) (0,2) (30,4) (-2,5) 
-6,00 1,19 0,98 1,81 -10,16 2,05 0,99 1,82 
(34,9) (39,9) 
-4,78 1,11 -2,05a 0,99 2,49 Italy -0,93b 2,08 0,03* 0,98 1,93 
(22,2) (-5,5) (14,8) (0,4) 
-8,90 1,32 0,97 1,70 -1,6 2,13 0,98 1,81 
(26,8) (35,7) 
-5,73 1,14 0,05• 0,99 1,99 The Netherlands -3,63 1,76 0,02• 0,99 1,98 
(40,0) (0,0) (49,0) (0,27) 
-5,73 1,14 0,99 1,86 -3,45 1,75 0.99 1,92 
(40,0) (58,5) 
1,80 0,80 -0,11• 0,98 2,10 United Kingdom -17,9 2,99 -0,30 0,97 2,21 
(33,0) (-1,7) (19,4) (-2,0) 
1,63 0,80 0,98 1,91 -16,03 2,83 0,97 1,83 
(35,0) (27,4) 
na na na na na EC9 na na na na na 
-3,50 1,14 0,82 1,45 -7,69 1,89 0,98 1,85 
(8,7) (29,1) 
1,56b 0,99 -0,74 0,98 2,96 USA -26,67b 3,13 -0,65 0,97 2,63 
(5,4) ( - 2,6) (11,5) (-3,8) 
-10,67 1,45 0,96 1,58 -12,56 2,15 0,97 1,79 
(22,3) (18,6) 
-12,96 1,55 -0,42• 0,98 2,10 Japan 5,27 1,22 -0,33* 0.96 2,14 
(22,9) (-1,0) (15,6) (-1,0) 
12,11 1,51 0,97 1,61 4,58 1,27 . 0,97 1,67 
(26,9) (20,4) 
Nott: ( ) Student's l. 
a - one-year lag on relative prices. 
b - colinearity problem. 
c - regression by reference lo world GDP. 
na - data no! available. , 
• - non-significant elasticity (with a possible error of 5%). 
For each country, the results of the multiple regression (as a function of demand and relative prices) arc given first, followed by the results of the simple regression (as a function of 
demand). 
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Table 3 
Price trends in the internationally traded goods sector 
(average annual rates of inrease) 
1963-73 
Belgium 3,2 
FR of Germa ny 2,4 
France 4,3 
Italy 4,1 
T he Netherlands 3,5 
United Kingdom 4,9 
USA 3,6 
Japa n 2,7 
Source: IMF lntcrnationar Financial Statistics - 1982. 
(%) 
1973-81 
5,6 
5,7 
8,9 
18,4 
6,4 
16,2 
11 ,6 
7,7 
express the rank order of the constraints that external trade 
places on economic growth in each country but also denote 
the ex tent to which growth in other countries frees them from 
this constraint. 
Japan : well adapted to world demand; European countries: 
mediocre performance 
The export elasticities are measured by taking as the 
indicator of demand the demand for imports in volume terms 
in the OECD area. 1 They thus permit an assessment of the 
degree to which export structures are geared to the trend in 
world demand : the countries that have shifted their 
specializa tion to products fo r which there is rapidly growing 
demand inevitably have higher elas ticities than those 
specia lizing in products fo r which demand is sluggish on the 
world market [8]. 
The fo llowing classifica tion emerges : 
(i) First we have Japan, which has clearly adapted best to 
trends in world demand (elas ticity of 1,8) and whose 
export growth can be put down largely to its abil ity to 
channel its resources towards products wi th the fastest 
growing markets. 
(ii ) Then we have the United Ki ngdom, which has an 
income elas ticity of exports lower than unity, notably in 
the field of manufactures (elasticity of0 ,8), reflecting its 
low structura l competitiveness. 
(i ii) Lastl y, we have a group comprising several Community 
count ries (Belgium, F R of Germany, Fra nce, Italy, the 
This acco unts for most of the international demand faci ng the 
industrialized countries. although some aspects of in ternational 
demand that of the OPEC coun tries. for cxamplc--are not included . 
Netherlands) and the United States with elasticities in 
the region of 1,3. The differences within this group are 
fairly small although the elasticities for France, Italy 
and the Netherlands in respect of manufactures are a 
little higher than those for the other countries, reflecting 
a significant shift in their specialization over the last 
15 years. 
Import elasticities with respect to GDP vary even more 
The disparities between these countries are, however, much 
more pronounced where imports are concerned, and this 
corroborates the view that the problem of competitiveness in 
a number of Community countries has more to do with lesser 
resistance to imports than with a loss of market shares 
abroad. Generally speaking, the elasticities of imports with 
respect to GDP are in fact well in excess of I and not far from 
2, reflecting the increasing openness of the different 
economies. If we take total trade, the external constraint 
imposed by imports is particularly weak in Japan (elasticity 
of 1,2) and the Netherlands (elas ticity of 1,5), the other 
countries having elasticities of between 1,8 and 2. The 
differences are even wider in the case of manufactured 
imports, with elasticities of 1,2 for Japan and 1,8 for the 
Netherlands but 2,5 for Germany and even 3,0 fo r the U nited 
Kingdom . 
These differences in the income elasticities of exports and 
above all imports reflect the differing abilities of countries to 
keep their trade balance in equilibrium, bearing in mind their 
economic growth rate and that of their main international 
trading partners (Table 4). 
Table 4 
The external constraint expressed by the relationship 
between the income elasticity of exports ( ).) 
and that of imports ( p ) 
Total Manu fac tures To tal Manufactures 
Belgium 
FR of G ermany 
France 
Italy 
The Netherla nds 
U nited Kingdom 
USA 
Japan 
0,68 
0,67 
0,73 
0.7 1 
0,77 
0,46 
0,49 
1,45 
0,46 
043 
0,53 
0,57 
0,63 
0,27 
0,32 
1,27 
1,14 
1,00 
1,2 1 
1,28 
1,49 
0,78 
0,88 
2,35 
Income elastici ties of exports wi th respect to OECD demand fo r imports. 
Income elastici ties of cxpons wi th respect to world G DP. 
0,87 
0,76 
1,03 
1,15 
1,25 
0,5 1 
0,64 
2,43 
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The external constraint is tightest on the United Kingdom, 
and loosest in Japan. Taking total trade, we find that the 
external constraint arising from the income effects alone is 
particularly heavy in the United Kingdom and probably also 
in the United States, allowing for the fact that trade 
represents only 10% of GDP there compared with almost 
30% for the United Kingdom. Even if UK prices were to rise 
at the same rate as prices in the rest of the world, a rate of 
economic growth identical to that in other countries would, 
in the long run, produce a deterioration in the UK trade 
balance. In order to keep its trade balance (and its exchange 
rate) unchanged, the United Kingdom would, other things 
being equal, have to register growth 25% lower than that of 
its partners (0,78 times the rate recorded there). This 
probably goes a long way towards explaining the slower 
economic growth in the United Kingdom in the last 15 years. 
By contrast, the external constraint imposes very little strain 
on Japan and the Netherlands, whose economies are able, or 
so it would seem, to grow at least half as fast again as those of 
their partners without this inducing a deterioration in their 
trade balance. To a lesser extent this is also true of France 
and Italy, which are thus able to make up somewhat for the 
highly unfavourable long-run trend in their relative prices. 
The same rank order is discernible for manufactures, 
although the income elasticities have a rather unfavourable 
effect in Germany. 
The strength of the external constraint also depends on initial 
positions 
To a large extent, however, the effect of income elasticities 
depends on the initial positions; in this sense, countries with 
an export cover of imports much higher than I (Japan and 
Germany) have greater freedom of manoeuvre than the other 
countries. Having started with a large trade surplus in 
manufactures, Germany for instance could, other things 
being equal, have appreciably higher economic growth rates 
than the other countries over a very long period before 
suffering a significant deterioration in its trade balance, and 
this in spite of the high income elasticity of its manufactured 
imports. 
The fact remains that the external constraint weighs very 
unevenly on the industrialized countries, with the Com-
munity countries roughly divided into two groups: the low-
inflation countries (Germany, Belgo-Luxembourg Econ-
omic Union, the Netherlands), which benefit from the 
favourable effect of price elasticities and, in the case of the 
Netherlands, from that of income elasticities, and the 
countries where inflation is or has been high (United 
Kingdom, Italy and, to a lesser extent, France), where price 
elasticities impose a severe external constraint, with the 
United Kingdom also having to contend with the burden 
imposed by income elasticities. 
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Trade by main product categories: income elasticities as a 
reflection of the trend in international specialization 
The impact of the external constraint can be measured with 
somewhat greater precision by evaluating the import and 
export functions at a disaggregated level. 
Price elasticities: rather poor results by sectors 
Estimating these elasticities for the major product categories 
is complicated by additional econometric problems, and it is 
virtually impossible to make any international comparisons 
(see Tables 5 and 6). It should be noted, however, that: 
(i) price elasticities are invariably very low for imports; 
(ii) in the case of exports, it is virtually only basic consumer 
items and, to a lesser extent, food products that 
generally have significant elasticities. Since these 
categories tend to include a high proportion of 
unsophisticated products exposed to keen price com-
petition, their elasticities are usually close to unity. In 
the other categories, the results are more diverse 
although some exports from certain countries at times 
react quite markedly to changes in relative prices 
(equipment goods in Belgium and the United States and 
virtually all categories in Italy). 
Income elasticities reflect developments in international 
specialization 
The results obtained for income elasticities are, of course, 
better (Tables 7 and 8). On the export front, the salient 
feature is that, for each product category, the observed 
ranking of countries in respect of total trade changes and 
becomes more accentuated, reflecting clearly the trend in 
international specialization in each country: 
(i) For intermediate products, the rank order is identical to 
that observed for total trade; however, the elasticities 
for the Netherlands (1,5) and Italy (1,3), both of which 
have increased their market shares and degree of 
specialization in this branch (with· the index of 
specialization I rising respectively from 0,9 to 1,4 and 
from 0, 7 to 0,9 between 1963 and 1981 ), approach that 
for Japan (1,6). 
(ii) For equipment goods, which occupy a strategic position 
in the industrial system and for which there is a rapidly 
growing demand on world markets, there is a widening 
gap between Japan (elasticity of 1,7) which has 
increased its degree of specialization, particularly in the 
most strategic products like digital-command machine 
See Box 3 in Chapter I of the section 'Foreign Trade' of this report for the 
definition of this index. 
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Table 5 
Price elasticities of exports; world trade broken down by main sector (annual figures, 1964-81) 
Energy Agriculture Intermediate Equipment Food Basic 
products goods products consumer 
items 
Belgium • -o,73a +0,81b -1,32a -2,02 -0,84 
FR of Germany -0,48 -1 ,07 • +0,56a • -1 ,06 
France • -0,91 • • • -1 ,09 
Ita ly - 1,61 • -2,45 - l,08a -2,55b -o,97a 
The Netherlands • -0,87 • • • -1,71• 
United Kingdom 2,26 0,84 • - 0,24 • -0,39 
EC 9 (trade with rest of world) • • • • • • 
USA - 0,70 • • -0,92b -1 ,65 - l ,44•b 
Japan - 0,77 • • • • • 
No te: n - one-year Jag on relative prices. 
b - colinearit~ problem. 
• - non-signi 1cnnt elas ticity (with a possible error of 5%). 
Table 6 
Price elasticities of imports, broken down by main sector (annual figures, 1964-81) 
Energy Agriculture Intermediate Equipment Food Basic 
products goods products consumer 
items 
Belgium · - 0,39b • - 0,26b • • • 
FR of G ermany - 0,33b • • • • • 
France - 0,17b • - 0,87•b • - 0,60 • 
Ita ly - 0,25b - 0,62 - o,54ab • +0,35b . • 
The Netherlands - 0,468 • - 0,26• • • • 
U nited Kingdom - 0,36 - 0,13 • - 0,66 • - 0,56 
EC 9 (trade with rest of world) • • • • • • 
USA • na - 0,48b • na - 0,85b 
Japan na na na na na na 
Nmr : n - onc-ycnr Ing on rclotivc prices. 
b - colinca rity problem. 
nn - dnta not nvoilablc. 
' - non-significant elastici ty (with n possible error of 5%). 
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Table 7 
Income elasticities of exports with respect to world demand, by main sector (annual figures, 1964-81) 
Energy Agriculture Intermediate Equipment Food Basic 
producls goods producls consumer 
items 
Belgium 1,34 2,29 0,87 1,01 2,51 
1,23 1,98 0,93 1,01 2,48 
FR of Germany • 3,04 1,16 0,57 3,42 1,26 
0,21 3,09 1,13 0,72 3,28 1,20 
France l,01 2,92 1,15 1,23 l,78 0,91 
0,76 2,78 1,17 1,22 1,75 0,95 
Italy 0,43 1,23 1,30 0,99 l,IO 1,25 
• 1,21 1,43 1,10 1,74 1,40 
The Netherlands 1,01 2,47 1,57 0,91 1,73 0,85 
0,70 2,47 1,55 0,90 1,71 0,83 
United Kingdom 1,77 1,97 0,94 0,57 1,59 1,91 
1,20 2,40 0,92 0,60 1,60 0,92 
EC 9 (trade with rest of world) na na na na na na 
0,73 2,06 1,17 0,75 2,69 1,00 
USA • 2,24 0,96 0,81b 1,06 0,65b 
• 2,20 1,01 1,81 1,17 1,18 
Japan • • 1,66 1,74 0,75 0,34 
1,65 -1,2 1,56 1,65 0,73 0,29 
Nott: a - one-year lag on relative prices. 
b - colincarity problem. 
na - data not available. 
• - non-significant elasticity (with a possible error of 5%). 
The first row gives the rcsulls of the multiple regression, and the second those of the simple regression. 
tools, and the European countries, much less dynamic in 
this sector. Even Germany, long predominant, is losing 
ground (the index of specialization fell from 1,4 to I, I, 
compared with an increase for Japan from 0,8 to 1,4), 
and the elasticity of its exports to world demand is only 
0, 7; this confirms the findings of the analysis of trade in 
Chapter I. 
(iii) For basic consumer items, on the other hand, the rank 
order changes significantly with fairly high elasticities 
for Italy, which has considerably increased its specializ-
ation in this sector, particularly in textiles, leather and 
clothing (an increase in the index of specialization from 
1,5 to 1,8), and for Germany, where the trend is similar if 
less pronounced (an increase from 0,5 to 0,8 in the index 
and an elasticity of 1,2), but a very low one for Japan 
(0,3), which has done much to move out of these 
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products in which it was highly specialized in 1963 
(index of 1,6 in 1963 falling to 0,5 in 1981 ). 
(iv) Lastly, for food products, the elasticities for all the 
Community countries are higher than those for their 
industrialized competitors (from 1,8 to 2,5, compared 
with I for the United States and 0,7 for Japan), with 
Germany standing out very clearly from its partners 
(elasticity of 3,4). These performances are comparable 
to the development of international specialization, with 
the index of specialization rising from I to 1,4 for the 
Community, and from 0,2 to 0,8 for Germany, and 
falling from 1,1 to I for the United States and from 0,5 
to 0, 15 for Japan between 1969 and 1981. 
The income elasticities of imports also reflect these changes 
in the way the Community countries participate in the 
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Table 8 
Income elasticities of imports from the rest of the world, by main sector (annual figures, 1964-81) 
Energy Agriculture Intermediate Equipment Food Basic 
products goods products consumer 
items 
Belgium 2,26 1,18 2,17 2,02 1,96 2,57 
1,37 1,18 1,87 1,82 1,96 2,53 
FR of Germany 2,12 0,87 2,37 2,98 1,48 2,71 
1,47 0,84 2,24 2,98 1,55 2,70 
France 1,66 0,58 2,12 2,11 1,65 2,60 
1,28 0,58 1,86 2,11 1,44 2,62 
Italy 1,69 1,03 2,37 2,13 1,68 2, 12 
0,97 0,90 2, 10 2,29 1,91 2, 11 
The Netherlands 1,99 1,39 1,79 1,49 2,06 1,97 
1,36 1,45 1,80 1,47 2, 14 1,99 
United Kingdom 0,60 - 0,2 1 2,64 (5,26) - 0.46 2,96 
* - 0,27 2,92 5,21 - 0,39 2,60 
EC 9 (trade with rest of world) na na na na na na 
1,02 0,37 1,65 2,96 * 2,02 
USA 2,49 na 2,25 3,60 na 2,82 
2,68 0,39 1,87 2,98 I 1,54 
Japan na na na na na na 
1,22 0,87 1, 16 1,02 1, 18 1,94 
Not£•: 11 - o ne-year lag on rela tive prices. 
h - colinca rity problem. 
nn - dn ta not avai lable. 
• - no n-significant elas tici ty (with a possible .error of 5';,-0 ). 
T he first row gives the results of the multiple regression, and the second those of the simple regression. 
international divi sion of labour. They are very high for basic 
consumer items, an indication of the increased dependence 
on imports o f most Community countries in the case of 
products manufactured in large measure in the newly 
industri a li zing countries and the developing countries 
(elas ticities usually in excess of 2,5, except in Italy and in the 
Netherl ands), and in some cases for equipment goods (3,0 in 
Germany, 5,2 in the United Kingdom, 2, 1 in France and 3,0 
in the United States). The la tter product category is an area 
in which the technologica l gap between the Community and 
Japan in particular has grown wider in recent yea rs (the 
elas ticit y fo r Community trade with the rest of the world is 
3.0). By contrast. these elasticities are very low in the case of 
agricultural products (equal to or lower than uni ty in most 
ommunity countries). 
The external constra int faci ng each of the industrialized 
economies thus reflects in large measure the trend in their 
international specialization and the shifts in world trade. By 
the same token , these differences in price and income 
elasticities reveal that movements in relative prices and , 
above all, changes in economic growth rates, do influence the 
product structure of trade balances. As a result, the impact 
on the trade balance of economic growth and of any 
reflationary measure will differ from one country to the next. 
Any action to underpin economic activity will weigh 
rela tively more heavily on imports of basic consumer items in 
France than in the other countries and on imports of 
equipment goods in Germany and the United Kingdom. ' A 
fo rtiori, a policy of boosting economic activity through 
consumption will not, because of these differences, have the 
same effects as a policy of investment-led recovery, since the 
situation will obviously differ from one industrialized 
Assuming a con tinuation of the underlying trend in international 
specialization observed in recent years. 
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country to another. What is more, in response to the shifts in 
international specialization, the external constraint changed 
significantly after the first oil shock. 
Breaks in the trend since 1973 
In the wake of the first oil shock and the sharp change in the 
relative prices of energy and raw materials, the industrialized 
countries have had to make considerable efforts to adapt 
their productive structures to the new conditions of 
international competition. This is clear from the trend of 
income elasticities estimated I for the periods 1964-73 and 
1973-82 (see Tables 9 and 10). 
These periods arc too short to gauge price elasticities accurately. In 
general, the shortness of the periods also affects the quality of regressions, 
particularly for the period 1973-81, where nuctuations were wider. The 
object of the elasticities calculated here was mainly to assess breaks in 
foreign trade trends since 197 3; the elasticities should not be compared 
directly with those for longer periods. 
Table 9 
The export drive after the first oil shock 
/820verall, the elasticities of exports with respect to world 
demand rose slightly after 1973 (except in the Netherlands), 
reflecting the export drives mounted by all industrialized 
countries. In the Community countries in particular, 
however, these export drives concentrated, somewhat 
paradoxically, on non-manufactures. Doubtless because of 
the keener competition between industrialized countries in 
this area, the elasticities of exports of manufactures with 
respect to world trade were thus more or less stable and, in 
some cases, actually fell (Belgium, the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom). Italy is the only country in which this elasticity 
rose significantly (from 1, I to 1,6). At sectoral level too, 
pronounced differences are apparent between the two 
periods depending on the strategies pursued by the countries 
concerned in adapting to the crisis and to the new conditions 
of international competition (Table 10). For the Community 
countries, the elasticities of exports with respect to demand 
were lower in the period after 1973 for basic consumer items 
Income elasticities of imports from the rest of the world, by main sector (1964-73 and 1973-81) 
Country Period Total Energy Agriculture Manu- Inter- Equipment Food Basic 
facturcs mediate goods products consumer 
products items 
Belgium 1964-73 2,11 2,24 1,12 2,15 2,16 1,99 1,80 2,59 
1973-81 1,59 • 1,61 1,92 1,63 1,30 2,72 2,87 
FR of Germany 1964-73 2,10 2,25 0,80 2,56 2,49 2,90 1,62 2,80 
1973-81 1,84 • 0,92 2,48 1,97 3,36 1,65 2,31 
France 1964-73 1,81 1,71 0,50 2,15 2,15 2,29 1,01 2,63 
1973-81 1,56 • 0,88 2,04 1,55 1,92 2,43 2,81 
llaly 1964-73 1,90 1,71 1,30 2,20 2,22 2,41 1,85 2,10 
1973-81 1,56 • • 2,35 2,43 2,43 1,51 2,74 
The Netherlands 1964-73 1,85 2,60 1,22 1,72 1,92 1,41 1,83 2,00 
1973-81 1,40 • 1,62 1,91 1,52 1,62 3,79 2,04 
United Kingdom 1964-73 2,15 1,92 -0,21 2,45 2,64 4,55 • 2,67 
1973-81 2.45 -4,74 • 4,18 2,88 7,04 -1,12 4,31 
EC 9 (trade with rest of 
world) 1964-73 1,52 2,02 0,37 1,71 1,82 2,41 0,21 1,96 
1973-81 1,43 • 0,75 2,67 1,83 4,05 0,73 2,62 
USA 1964-73 2,64 2,68 0,63 2,54 2,28 3,66 1,87 1,45 
1973-81 1,11 • 0,47 2,54 1,99 3,06 • 2,93 
Japan 1964-73 1,33 1,55 0,99 1.25 1,21 0,94 0,95 2,05 
1973-81 0,49 • 0,60 0,92 1,08 0,87 0,64 0,89 
Nate: • Non-significanl elasticity (with a possible error of 5°/~). 
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and for equipment goods (in both cases, with the exception of 
Italy) and higher for food products (with the exception of the 
United Kingdom) and intermediate products (with the 
exception of Belgium and the Netherlands) . Conversely, 
Japan has put the main emphasis on equipment goods 
(elasticity rising from 1,5 to 1,9) and on food products. 
The even greater drive to reduce imports, particularly of 
manufactures 
The most far-reaching changes, however, involved imports, 
where the difference between total trade and manufactured 
trade is even more pronounced. After 1973, all the countries 
apart from the United Kingdom witnessed a significant fall 
Table 10 
in the income elasticity of their total imports (from 2 to 1,5 or 
1,6 in most Community countries). Even so, the drive to 
reduce import dependence in response to the changes in 
relative prices was not the same in all countries. Although at 
an already low level, the income elasticity of Japan's imports 
fell much more than that of the other countries, even for total 
imports (from J ,3 to 0,5). As for manufactures, the trends 
have been quite different : income elasticity remained 
relatively stable in most European countries. 
On the other hand, it declined significantly in Japan and rose 
very sharply in the United Kingdom (from 2,4 to 4,2), 
probably cancelling out the beneficial effects of North Sea oil 
on UK imports. At sectoral level too, marked differences are 
discernible : the income elasticity of imports was much higher 
Income elasticities of exports with respect to world demand, by main sector (1964-73 and 1973-81) 
Coun1ry Period To ta l Energy Agricu lture Manu- Inter- Eq ui pment Food Basic 
foct urcs mediate goods produc ts consumer 
prod ucts items 
Belgium 1964-73 1, 17 1,05 1,69 1, 11 1,03 1,03 2,47 1,08 
1973-8 1 1,48 * 1,59 0,79 0,69 0,73 2,86 0,77 
FR of Germany 1964-73 0,99 * 3,2 1 0,89 1.06 0 ,68 2,83 1,13 
1973-8 1 1,25 * I , 15 0,87 1, 10 0,6 1 3,99 0,97 
France 1964-73 I , 18 0,55 3,08 1,07 1,0 1 1, 15 1,44 0,89 
1973-8 1 1,46 * 2,09 1,05 1,21 0,93 2,63 0,76 
IIa ly 1964-73 1, 12 0 ,78 0,87 1, 10 1,07 0,98 1,08 1,20 
1973-8 1 2, 19 2,60 1,7 1 1,63 1,63 1,29 3,90 1,61 
The Ne1herlands 1964-73 1, 18 0,97 1,89 I, 15 1,60 0,8 1 1,69 0,94 
1973-8 1 0.94 * 1,85 0,78 0,93 0 ,72 1,8 1 0,39 
United Kingdom 1964-73 0,79 0,65 1,73 0,79 0,89 0,57 1,67 1,04 
1973-81 1,23 * 3,75 0,63 0,92 0,42 1,38 0,71 
EC 9 (trad e with rest of 
world) 1964-73 0,89 0.70 1,47 0,82 0,98 0,60 1,84 0,87 
1973-81 1,42 * 2,45 1,78 1, 17 0,69 3,97 0,97 
USA 1964-73 1.00 * 1,30 1, 19 0,73 1,80 * 0,95 
197 3-81 2,20 -2,49 3, 16 1,59 1,57 1,63 3,06 0,94 
Japan 1964-73 1,79 1,66 - 0,60 1,42 1,59 1,50 1,23 0,49 
1973-8 1 2,07 * * 1,49 * 1,88 1,66 * 
Sorr · • 1 on-signilicnnt dnsticity (wi th n possible error or 5° 0 ) . 
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for consumer goods after 1973 (stiffer competition from the 
developing countries and the newly industrializing count-
ries), except in Germany and Japan (the latter having 
vigorously reined back the growth in imports of these goods), 
while it was lower for intermediate products (except in Italy 
and the United Kingdom). The situation in the other sectors 
varies a great deal between countries. In Germany and the 
United Kingdom for instance, the income elasticity of 
imports of equipment goods rose significantly. 
Overall, the Community countries have been relatively 
successful after 1973 in reducing the external constraint 
imposed by the operation of income elasticities, the notable 
exception being the United Kingdom. But it would seem that 
their adjustment efforts have failed to match those of Japan, 
notably in manufactures. 
2. Intra-Community trade 
Close on 50% of the Community countries' trade in goods is 
between themselves (the percentage is much higher in the 
case of the smaller countries). The trends in intra-
Community trade consequently have a great influence on the 
external constraint. which, as we have seen, affects each 
country differently. We will therefore now examine the 
specific features of intra-Community trade, first in aggregate 
and then at sectoral level. 
Trade in goods and trade in manufactures 
By and large, the results are fairly satisfactory from an 
econometric angle in spite of a number of problems of 
colinearity that primarily affect imports of manufactures 
(Tables 11 and 12). 
Price elasticities: intra-Community imports seem slightly 
more sensitive to changes in relative prices. In the case of 
intra-Community exports, the proportion of significant price 
elasticities is virtually the same as that for trade with the rest 
of the world. Generally speaking, they are of the same order 
of magnitude, except in Italy, where they are much lower. 
The price elasticities of imports are also fairly low but, in so 
far as the results are comparable, given the uncertainty 
affecting price indicators, they are slightly higher than those 
for world trade, at least where total imports are concerned. 
This is particularly so in Belgium ( - 0,69 as against - 0,38), 
Germany (-0,9 as against -0,23), France (-0,84 as against 
- 0,45) and Italy ( - 0,8 as against 0,32) and probably reflects 
the fact that Community suppliers have to compete with 
suppliers from the rest of the world ·in intra-Community 
trade. As a result, any change in relative prices in the 
Community has a significant impact on the volume of intra-
Community imports and hence probably on the geo-
graphical distribution of suppliers. 
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Income elasticities for exports close to unity 
The elasticities of exports with respect to Community 
demand (measured by the volume of Community imports) 
are fairly close to unity in all the Community countries, even 
the United Kingdom. The spread is probably so narrow 
because member countries' shares of intra-Community trade 
have changed only little in the last 15 years and, at any event, 
less rapidly than their shares of world trade, whether for total 
trade in goods or for trade in manufactures. By contrast, the 
elasticity of Japanese exports is much higher (1,6), which is 
testimony to that country's dynamism on the Community 
market, even though this market takes only a limited share of 
its total exports, the exact figure varying from product to 
product. 
Income elasticities of imports are, however, higher 
But the differences are much more pronounced for imports. 
Within the Community, elasticities range from 1,6 (the 
Netherlands) to 3,8 (United Kingdom) in the case of total 
imports. And so, as with world trade, the external constraint 
arising from the operation of income elasticities stems in the 
main from imports. 
The rank order of the countries subject to this constraint is 
similar to that observed for world trade; to a large extent, 
intra-Community trade involves the same external con-
straint as trade with the rest of the world. 
A further feature of import elasticities is that they are 
generally higher for Community trade than for trade with the 
rest of the world (2 against 1,9 for Belgium, 2 against 1,8 for 
France, 2,4 against 1,8 for Italy, and 3,8 against 2 for the 
United Kingdom). This mirrors the effects of the establish-
ment of the common market and the ensuing expansion in 
intra-Community trade, although these effects have con-
siderably slackened since the first oil shock. For example, the 
elasticities of intra-Community imports declined much more 
after 1973 than those for imports from the rest of the world. 
This pattern was particularly clear in the case of manufac-
tures, where imports from outside the Community soared 
during the 1970s. Here too, the United Kingdom is an 
exception since it continued to favour Community suppliers 
after it had joined the Community. The weakening of the 
'common market' effect for the original six Member States is 
also discernible in exports, albeit to a lesser extent. Thus, 
after 1973, the elasticity of manufactured exports rose in only 
two countries (United Kingdom and Italy), held steady in 
Germany and declined sharply in the other countries 
(Belgium, France, the Netherlands) (Tables 13 and 14). 
These results closely reflect the specific features of the pattern 
and trend of intra-Community trade which also show up at 
sectoral level. 
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Table 11 
Income and price elasticities of merchandise exports and imports (intra-Community trade; annual figures, 1964-81) 
Exports Imports 
Con- Elastici ties R2 OW Con- Elas tici ties R2 OW 
stant stant 
World Prices GDP Prices 
demand 
- 2, 14 1,0 0,19 0,99 1,97 Belgium - 8,37 1,97 - 0,69 0,99 2,25 
(44,0) (0,45) (39,9) ( - 5,0) 
- 1,99 1,0 0,99 1,9 1 - 10,43 2, 11 0,98 1,8 1 
(67, 7) (32,9) 
- l ,27b 1,0 - 0,58 0,99 2, 14 FR of Germany - 9,65 2,02 - 0,90 0,99 2,51 
(37,5) ( - 2,7) (27,3) (- 7,2} 
- 0,12 0,93 . 0,99 1.90 - 15,24 2,42 0,97 1,74 
(56,3) (25,3) 
- 3,65 1,10 - 0,84 0,99 2,09 France - 10,62 2,06 - 0,84• 0,98 2,15 
(48,8) ( - 2,2) (30,6) (- 2,3) 
- 4,16 1,12 0,99 1,85 - 10,74 20,6 0,98 1,76 
(5 1,6) (31,2) 
- 2,2 1 1,0 - 0,73• 0,98 2, 17 Italy - 6,11 2,48 - 0,58• 0,99 2, 18 
(22,4) ( - 1,9) (49,6) ( - 4,5) 
- 3,86 1,1 0,98 1,79 - 4,56 2,35 0,98 1,78 
(34, 1) (35,6) 
- 5,43b 1,18 - 0,88 0,98 2,30 The Netherlands - l ,97b 1,61 - 0,15* 0,99 2,13 
( 19,3) ( - 3,8) (13,2) ( - 0,8) 
- 2,52 1,03 0,98 1,78 - 3,14 1,70 0,99 1.90 
(30,4) (46,1) 
- 3,08 1,03 0,44* 0,97 1,84 United Kingdom - 27 ,8 3,79 - 0,12* 0,98 2,06 
(25,3) (1,9) (27,0) ( - 0,8) 
- 3.25 1,05 0,97 1,7 1 -27,6 3,76 0,98 1,77 
(23,3) (27,6) 
5,44b 0,6 1 - 0,92 0,96 3,0 USA I - 12,3b 2,04 - 0,52 0,79 2,90 
(4,4) (2,6) (6,7) ( - 4,1) 
- 1,12 0,95 0,94 1,67 2,98 0,96 0,55 1,82 
(16,5) (4,4) 
- 16,1 3b 1,69 - 0,78 0,98 2,30 Japan 1 3,96 1,18 - 1,07 0,96 2,40 
(15,6) ( - 2, I ) (15,4) ( - 3,1) 
- 20,0 1,89 0,98 1,41 2,60 1,28 0,93 1,54 
(33,5) (14,8) 
NMt• : ( ) Student 's L 
II - one-yea r Ing o n rela tive prices. 
b - colincnri ty problem. 
C - regression by reference to world GDP. 
. 
- non-signi ficant elasticity (with a possible error of 5%) . 
For each country. the results of the multi ple regression (as a function of demand and relative prices) arc given first. followed by the results of the simple regression (as a function of 
demand). 
Bilntcrnl trndc with the Community. 
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Table 12 
Income and price elasticities of exports and imports of manufactures (intra-Community trade; annual figures, 1964-81) 
Exporta Imports 
Con- Elasticities R2 DW Con- Elasticities R2 DW 
stanl slant 
World Prices GDP Prices 
demand 
-0,58 0,93 -2,18a 0,99 2,14 Belgium -17,26b 2,56 -0,34 0,99 2,36 
(50,0) (- 3,7) (22,6) (-3,9) 
-0,59 0,93 0,99 1,86 -11,12 2,14 0,98 1,83 
(41,4) (37,5) 
-2,Q9b 1,04 -0,84 0,99 2,13 FR of Germany -17,4 2,56 +0,078 0,98 1,85 
(21,8) (-2,5) (33,0) (2,3) 
0,08 0,93 0,99 1,91 -17,9 2,59 0,98 1,76 
(67,0) (32,1) 
-3,43 1,08 -1,29 0,99 2,13 France - 10,06b 2,01 +0,37* 0,98 1,86 
(65,0) (-4,2) (16,9) (1,0) 
-3,29 1,08 0,99 1,83 -11,45 2,11 0,98 1,73 
(48,5) (28,6) 
-3,14 1,05 - l,09ab 0,99 2,25 Italy - l,07b 2,05 +0,17 0,98 1,65 
(20,0) (-2,4) (14,2) (2,2) 
-5,46 1,17 0,98 1,75 -4,51 2,34 0,98 1,77 
(36,3) (34,4) 
-4,01 1,10 -0,30* 0,98 2,01 The Netherlands -3,44 1,72 o,o• 0,99 2,0 
(32,0) (-0,2) (38,3) (0,0) 
-4,05 1,10 0,98 1,76 
(34,4) 
-2,72 1,02 0,02• 0,98 1,99 United Kingdom -34,2 4,30 -0,15* 0,97 2,09 
(28,4) (0,1) (13,3) (-0,6) 
-2,79 1,02 0,98 1,80 -33,9 4,29 0,96 1,60 
(34,6) (19,7) 
-3,54 1,08 -0,16* 0,96 2,20 USAI -17,14b 2,37 -0,50 0,87 2,71 
(5,9) (-0,4) (6,2) (-2,4) 
-5,11 1,16 0,96 1,61 -5,2 1,54 0,83 1,77 
(22,5) (8,9) 
-15,6 1,67 -0,83 0,98 2,14 Japan I 3,71 1,19 -0,87 0,95 2,40 
(33,2) (-2,2) (17,4) (- 3,3) 
-15,9 1,69 0,98 1,43 3,86 1,19 0,92 1,57 
(30,5) (13,6) 
Not,: ( ) Student's l. 
a - one-year lag on relative prices. 
b - colincarity problem. 
c - regression by reference lo world GDP. 
• - non-significant elasticity (with a possible error of S"/.). 
For each country, the rcsulta of the multiple regression (as a function of demand and relative prices) arc given rust, followed by the results of the simple regression (as a function of 
demand). 
Bilateral trade with the Community. 
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Table 13 
Income elasticities of exports with respect to world demand and Community demand (1964-73 and 1973-81) 
Total Manufactures 
1964/73 1973/81 1964/73 1973/81 
Belgium Total 1,17 1,48 l , 11 0,79 
Intra 1,05 0,96 1,04 0,72 
FR of Germany Total 0,99 1,25 0,89 0,87 
Intra 0,92 0,98 0,93 0,94 
France Total 1,18 1,45 1,07 1,05 
Intra 1,20 0,90 1,10 0,84 
Italy Total 1,12 2, 19 1, 10 1,63 
Intra 1,03 1,49 1, 11 1,52 
The Netherlands Total 1,1 8 0,94 1,15 0,78 
Intra 1, 16 0,56 1,20 0,65 
United Kingdom Total 0,79 1,24 0,79 0,63 
Intra 0,84 1,53 0,90 1,11 
USA I Total 1,00 2,20 1, 19 1,59 
Intra 0,80 1,48 1, 16 1,47 
Japan I Total 1,79 2,07 1,42 1,49 
Intra 1,97 1,87 1,74 1,79 
Bilateral trade wi th the Community. 
Table 14 
Income elasticities of imports from the rest of the world and from the Community (1964-73 and 1973-81) 
Total Manufactures 
1964/73 1973/81 1964/73 1973/81 
Belgium · Total 2, 11 1,59 2, 15 1,92 
Intra 2,44 1,38 2,40 1,57 
FR of Germany Total 2, 10 1,84 2,56 2,48 
Int ra 2,79 1,55 2,94 1,94 
France Total 1,8 1 1,56 2, 15 2,04 
Intra 2,37 1,78 2,44 1,78 
Italy Total 1,90 1,56 2,20 2,35 
Intra 2,57 2,02 2,54 4,03 
The Netherlands Total 1,85 1,40 1,72 1,9 1 
Intra 1,78 1,66 1,80 1,45 
United Kingdom Total 2,15 2,45 2,45 4,18 
Intra 3,17 4,44 3,2 1 5,76 
USA I Total 2,64 1,11 2,54 2,54 
Int ra 2,18 0,57 2,09 2, 16 
Japan I Total 1,33 0,49 1,25 0,92 
Intra 1,25 1,02 1, 11 0,98 
Bilateral trade with the Community. 
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Intra-Community trade by product category 
Price elasticities: widely scattered results 
As in the case of trade with the rest of the world, the 
significant results obtained here for price elasticities are 
widely scattered (see Tables 15 and 17) and make it difficult 
to carry out any international comparison. Even so, the 
results for intra-Community exports differ in two important 
respects from the results reviewed earlier: 
(i) there is no significant price elasticity for basic consumer 
items; 
(ii) intra-Community exports of intermediate products are 
on the other hand highly sensitive in a number of cases 
to changes in relative prices (elasticity of close on 2 for 
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Japan). 
Income elasticities linked to changes in market shares 
In contrast to the situation for total trade, the elasticities of 
exports with respect to Community demand differ substan-
tially from unity (see Tables 16 and 18); while the 
Community countries' shares of total intra-Community 
trade showed little change, the changes at sectoral level were 
more marked, reflecting once again the shifts in member 
countries' specialization within the Community [9]. The 
trends observed here are fairly similar to those in trade with 
the rest of the world although elasticity comparisons alone 
are unable to tell us whether or not they are more 
pronounced in certain sectors. The following in particular 
should be noted: 
(i) for agricultural products, the high elasticity in Germany 
and France, which appear to have stepped up signific-
antly their intra-Community specialization in this 
sector, and the low elasticity in Italy; 
(ii) for intermediate products, the high elasticities in Italy 
and the Netherlands, also apparent in their trade with 
the rest of the world; 
(iii) for equipment goods, the fairly high elasticity in France, 
which appears to have benefited more from intra-
Community trade than from trade with the rest of the 
world in this sector; 
(iv) for food products, the salient position of Germany and 
the United Kingdom; 
(v) for consumer goods, the high elasticity in Germany and 
Italy, also apparent in their trade with the rest of the 
world. 
The oil shock also induced a break in sectoral trends. 
However, in contrast to the situation for trade with the rest of 
the world, the swings recorded at sectoral level are generally 
in line with those observed for each country in respect of total 
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trade (Table 19). After 1973, member countries' specializ-
ation within the Community has probably changed much 
less than their specialization outside the Community. 
The Community's weakness in the equipment goods sector 
The income elasticities of imports also reflect these shifts in 
international specialization and a certain symmetry is 
discernible between the elasticity values for exports and those 
for imports. In several cases, a relatively high value for one is 
associated with a relatively low value for the other: income 
elasticities of imports of agricultural products are low in 
France and Germany as are those of imports of intermediate 
products in the Netherlands. By the same token, while they 
are systematically higher than world elasticities in most 
sectors because of the intensification in the division oflabour 
between Community countries up to the beginning of the 
1970s, the income elasticities of imports are lower for 
equipment goods, bearing witness yet again to the Com-
munity's overall weakness in this strategic sector (Table 20). 
After 1973, however, and with a few exceptions such as 
imports of food products in France and Belgium, income 
elasticities of imports within the Community fell generally, 
like those for total trade. This was even true of basic 
consumer items, where there was some substitution between 
suppliers within the Community and those outside the 
Community (developing countries, newly industrializing 
countries). 
Conclusion 
In spite of the statistical limitations (lack ofany proper series 
of import and export indices and need to use unit values as an 
approximation) and in spite of the econometric limitations 
(large number of non-significant price elasticities), the results 
obtained for price and, above all, income elasticities permit a 
coherent set of economic conclusions. 
The estimated values provide a fairly faithful picture of 
trends in the international specialization of the Community 
countries and of their main industrialized competitors. They 
reveal that the external constraint imposed by their 
participation in the international division of labour weighs 
unevenly on each of them in both the medium and the long 
term, depending on their trade structures, their initial 
positions and their capacity to move into promising new 
markets. They also point to the need for a convergence of 
inflation rates between countries competing internationally 
and for continuation of the restructuring efforts that have 
been undertaken (more enthusiastically in some countries 
than in others) since the first oil shock as a means of easing 
the pressures on the trade balance and on exchange rates. 
Any widening of differentials between countries could 
jeopardize economic and monetary integration in the 
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Community by increasing the incentives to interfere with free 
trade. For, as we have seen, the Community countries' trade 
balances, and particularly their exports, are fairly sensitive to 
movements in relative prices (the sum of the price elasticities 
of imports and exports is probably greater than I in most 
countries, notably Italy) . To this extent, the external 
constraint is heavier for countries where inflation was or still 
is high, namely Italy, the United Kingdom and France, 
compelling them to work for a rapid alignment of their 
inflation rate on that of their partners so as to reduce their 
trade imbalances and/or the tendency for their currencies to 
depreciate. 
Yet the impact of prices on the trade balance is sometimes 
offset or accentuated by the operation of the income 
elasticities of imports and exports. Thus, a number of 
differences emerge between countries on the export front 
which reflect their differing degrees of dynamism in export 
markets. The most pronounced differences though are 
encountered at the level of imports, in particular manu-
factured imports, an indication that the external constraint 
ari ses essentially from an uneven degree of resistance to 
import penetration of the domestic market where thi s is not 
counterbalanced by a strong export position. During the last 
15 yea rs, the operation of income elasticities has proved 
particularl y benefi cial to Japan, which in this respect has 
been di stinctly more fortunate than the other industrialized 
countries, and , within the Community. to the Netherlands 
and also to Italy and France, both of which have thus been 
able to neutralize some of the harmful effects of unduly rapid 
inflation. By contrast, it has had a relati vely adverse impact 
on the United Kingdom and this probably explains why 
economic growth had to be slower there than in the other 
countries . Lastly, in Germany, income elasticities have, on 
balance, had a neutral effect on total trade but have worked 
to the slight detriment of trade in manufactures as a result of 
the surge in imports. 
Yet the effect of income elasticities, which is apparent in 
intra-Community and extra-Community trade alike, could 
prove to be less favourable in the present economic context 
oflow international growth. There is a serious risk here that a 
country stimulating economic growth in isolation may suffer 
a deterioration in its trade balance since there will be 
insufficient export demand, whether internationally or 
within the Community, and since its imports will climb 
sharply as its GDP grows, even if the long-run income 
elasticity of its exports is greater than that of its imports. In 
this sense, removing the external constraint, which is 
currently weighing heavily on certain countries (France, 
Italy), requires not only a strong attack on inflation in those 
countries but also a concerted revival of growth at 
international or Community level. 
However, the efforts already under way to adapt productive 
structures have probably helped to reduce the external 
pressure reflected in income elasticities. For instance, the 
income elasticity of imports fell significantly in most 
countries after the first oil shock. But those efforts must be 
continued or even stepped up, following the example of 
Japan. The Community countries must adopt a two-pronged 
response : they must recapture their fo rmer shares of the 
Community market for equipment goods, which has seen a 
rapid increase in imports from non-member countries, in 
spite of the slowdown in investment in the Community, and 
they must regenera te the Community market, which seems to 
be no longer providing the same stimulus to Member States' 
· trade as in the past. 
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Table 15 
Price elasticities of intra-Community exports, by main sector (annual figures, 1964-81) 
Energy Agriculture Intermediate Equipment Food Basic 
products goods products consumer 
items 
Belgium • • -1,8• • • • 
FR of Germany • • • • • • 
France • • • -1,42 • • 
Italy -2,36 • -2,09 • - l,49b • 
The Netherlands • -0,68 -2,12 • • • 
United Kingdom 2,6b • • • • • 
USA I -0,92 • • -0,97b -1,16 • 
Japan I na -1,62 -1,94 • • • 
Nolt: a - one-year lag on relative prices. 
b - colinearity problem. 
na - data nol available. 
• - non-significant elasticity (with a possible error or S"f.). 
Bilateral trade with the Community. 
Table 16 
Income elasticities of intra-Community exports, by main sector (annual figures, 1964-81) 
Energy Agriculture Intermediate Equipment Food Basic 
products goods products consumer 
items 
Belgium 1,54 1,14 0,93 1,04 1,23 0,79 
1,45 1,16 0,85 1,03 1,22 0,80 
FR of Germany • 1,71 0,96 0,90 1,90 1,13 
• 1,70 0,92 0,81 1,89 1,14 
France 0,93 1,67 0,99 1,37 0,88 0,89 
0,67 1,66 0,98 1,33 0,85 0,93 
Italy • 0,60 1,16 1,03 0,81 1,17 
• 0,59 1,21 1,06 1,03 1,25 
The Netherlands 1,15 1,33 1,34 1,22 0,96 0,74 
0,83 1,38 1,35 1,21 0,95 0,73 
United Kingdom 3,10 1,08 1,05 0,92 1,57 1,00 
1,90 1,22 1,09 0,95 1,54 0,96 
USA I -0,58 0,62 0,70 0,81 0,42 0,88 
• 0,67 0,71 1,92 0,51 0,92 
Japan I na -0,80 1,41 2,41 -0,64 0,54 
na -1,20 1,23 2,44 -0,60 0,49 
Note: a - one-year lag on relative prices. 
b - colincarily problem. 
na - dala nol available. 
• - non-significant claslicily (wilh a possible error of 5%). 
The first row gives lhc results of lhc muhiplc regression, and lhe second those of lhe simple regression. 
Bilalerol trade wilh lhe Communily. 
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Table 17 
Price elasticities of intra-Community imports, by main sector (annual figures, 1964-81) 
Energy Agriculture Intermedia te Equipment Food Basic 
products goods products consumer 
items 
Belgium -0,4)b - 0,59 - 0,3)b - 0,75b • - 0,27b 
FR of Germany - 0,57b • -0,48 0,07 • • 
France • l ,5ab - l ,03•b • - 0,35 • 
Italy • • - 0,6I ab • +0,62b • 
The Netherlands • • - 0,43• • • • 
United Kingdom - 0,28 + 0,37• +0,65 - 0,64 + 0,31 - 1,1 
USA I - 0,90b • - 1,49• - 0,67b - 0,65b - 0,60b 
Japan I na na na na na na 
Note : a - o ne-year lag o n rela tive prices. 
b - colineari ty problem. 
nu - data not available. 
' - non-signi ficant elas ticity (with a possible error of 5%). 
Bilateral trade with the Community. 
Table 18 
Income elasticities of intra-Community imports, by main sector (annual figures, 1964-81) 
Energy Agriculture Intermediate Equipment Food Basic 
products goods products consumer 
items 
Belgium 2,04 2,61 2,61 2,23 2,57 2,80 
1,21 2,42 2,25 1,74 2,59 2,59 
FR of Germany 3,60 1,35 2,82 2,65 1,97 2,84 
2,50 1,29 2,54 2,72 2,06 2,79 
France 0,71 1,44 2,32 1,5 1 2,86 2,87 
0,96 1,64 2,00 1,79 2,76 2,83 
Italy 2,44 2,41 2,59 1,76 2,64 2,35 
2,35 2,35 2,21 2, 15 3,05 2,58 
The Netherlands 0,89 2,36 1,79 1,31 2,83 1,99 
0,83 2,21 1,74 1,3 1 2,96 2,08 
United Kingdom 1,33 1,22 4,90 5,66 1,30 4,32 
• 1,49 5,70 5,23 1,72 3,70 
USA I 9,90 3,24 3,31 3,15 1,44 1,89 
7,2 3, 14 1,84 1,87 0,58 0,92 
Japanl na na na na na na 
na 1,15 1,15 0,78 2,27 1,78 
No1r : a - one-year lag on rela tive prices. 
b - colineari ty problem. 
nn - data no t avai lable. 
' - non-significant elasticity (with n possible error of 5%). 
The first row gi ,,:s the results of the multiple regression. and the second those of the simple regression. 
Bilateral trade wi th the Community. 
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Table 19 
Income elasticities of Imports from the Community, by main sector (1964-73 and 197~1) 
Country Period Total Energy Agriculture Manu- Inter- Equipment Food Basic 
racturcs mediate goods products consumer 
products items 
Belgium 1964-73 1,05 1,06 1,18 1,04 1,03 1,03 1,43 0,89 
1973-81 0,96 1,88 0,97 0,72 0,60 0,93 1,09 0,56 
FR of Germany 1964-73 0,92 • 1,75 0,93 0,93 0,84 1,92 1,14 
1973-81 0,98 • 0,85 0,94 0,94 0,81 1,77 1,04 
France 1964-73 1,20 0,63 2,11 1,10 0,95 1,45 1,02 1,00 
1973-81 0,90 1,59 0,94 0,84 1,00 0,87 0,58 0,70 
Italy 1964-73 1,03 0,84 0,36 1,11 1,09 1,06 0,86 1,17 
1973-81 1,49 • 1,06 1,52 1,39 1,39 1,68 1,56 
The Netherlands 1964-73 1,16 1,15 1,12 1,20 1,48 1,33 1,09 0,84 
1973-81 0,56 • 1,43 0,65 0,80 0,47 0,81 0,32 
United Kingdom 1964-73 0,84 0,88 0,77 0,90 0,83 0,90 1,34 0,90 
1973-81 1,53 4,92 2,77 1,11 1,33 0,82 1,57 1,21 
USA• 1964-73 0,80 -0,51 • 1,16 0,61 2,20 • 0,81 
1973-81 1,48 • 0,92 1,47 1,23 1,62 1,44 1,10 
Japan I 1964-73 1,97 na -0,35 1,74 1,75 2,47 -0,56 · 0,64 
1973-81 1,87 na -2,50 1,79 • 2,45 • 0,64 
Not,: • - non-significant elasticity (with a possible error or 5"/.). 
oa - data not available. 
Bilateral trade with the Community. 
150 
The external constraint and the operation of the price and income elasticities of external trade in the EC, the USA and Japan 
Table 20 
Income elasticities of imports from the Community, by main sector (1964-73 and 1973-81) 
Country Period Total Energy Agriculture Manu- Inter- Equipment Food Basic 
factures mediate goods products consumer 
products items 
Belgium 1964-73 2,44 1,90 3,19 2,40 2,53 2,09 2,35 2,88 
1973-81 1,38 • 1,40 1,57 1,74 0,71 3,25 2,15 
FR of Germany 1964-73 2,79 3,70 1,44 2,94 2,92 3,08 2,12 3,21 
1973-81 1,55 • 0,99 1,94 1,84 2,39 1,52 1,66 
France 1964-73 2,37 0,65 1,38 2,44 2,38 2,24 2,58 3,09 
1973-81 1,78 2,29 2,29 1,78 1,55 1,28 3,36 2,53 
Italy 1964-73 2,57 2,13 2,55 2,54 2,40 2,39 3,19 2,93 
1973-81 2,02 2,73 1,85 2,03 2,10 2,04 1,74 2,22 
The Netherlands 1964-73 1,78 • 2,67 1,80 1,94 1,40 2,50 2,26 
1973-81 1,66 5,40 1,46 1,45 1,17 0,84 4,25 1,75 
United Kingdom 1964-73 3,17 2,28 1,27 3,21 4,46 4,52 1,18 1,90 
1973-81 4,44 • • 5,76 5,50 7,06 • 7,80 
USA I 1964-73 2,18 12,3 2,48 2,09 2,93 1,98 1,85 1,47 
1973-81 0,57 3,90 3,88 2,16 1,71 3,29 • 1,41 
Japan I 1964-73 1,25 na 1,3 1 1, 11 0,92 0,83 2,06 1,94 
1973-81 1,02 • • 0,98 1,64 • 1,90 • 
Nole : • - non-significant elasticity (with a possible error of 5%). 
na - data not avai lable. 
Bilateral trade with the Community. 
151 
Foreign trade 
1. Export and import functions 
The relations tested seek to capture the main structural 
characteristics of external trade. They are thus confined to the 
key determinants of competitiveness (relative prices and degree 
of adaptation to domestic or export demand). They take the 
following form: 
Forimports: M--=!(PMi;e v.) 
I/ PD1 ' ' 
where M!/ 
e 
PD1 
Y; 
j 
imports of i from j, in volume and national 
currency; 
price (average value) of imports of i fromj, in 
US dollars; 
exchange rate; 
domestic price of i, measured here by the price 
of value added in national currency; 
GDP, in volume and national currency; 
world or EC. 
( PX ) For exports: x .. = g :...:..:JL D-
,, PXn/ 1 
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exports of i to j, in volume and in US dollars; 
price of exports (average value) of i toj, in US 
dollars; 
price ofOECD exports (average value) toj, in 
US dollars; 
indicator of export demand measured by the 
volume of'OECD' imports (trade with the rest 
of the world) or EC imports (intra-EC trade) 
or, in some cases, by the GDP of the entire 
OECD area or the entire EC, in volume and in 
US dollars. 
Since we were mainly interested in international comparisons, 
the equations tested were given a traditional form (double log) 
permitting a simple interpretation in terms of elasticities, and no 
systematic effort was made to find the form of equation that best 
suited each country. Hence: 
LogM ( PMe) p Log PD + µ Log Y + Constant 
with P<O, µ>O 
( PX·) Log X = a Log -' + ).. Log D + 
PX" 
Constant 
with a<O, )..>O 
These functions were estimated for the period 1964-81 and the 
sub-periods 1964-73 and 1973-81 using annual figures. A twofold 
disaggregation of external trade was applied: 
i) a geographical disaggregation with regressions on trade 
with the rest of the world and, to take account of the 
importance of the Community market for our economies, 
on intra-Community trade; 
(ii) a sectoral disaggregation with regressions on total trade in 
manufactures but also in the main product categories. 
In some cases, a one-year time lag was built into relative prices 
where this made for better results since the response ofimports or 
exports to changes in relative prices is not immediate and may, in 
some countries, exceed a period of several months. Likewise, the 
results of the simple regressions were systematically calculated by 
reference to GDP or export demand in order to take account of 
the relative imprecison of price indicators. 
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2. Operation of the price and income elasticities of 
external trade and the external constraint 
The price and income elasticities of external trade reflect an 
economy's structural characteristics. Depending on the value of 
these elasticities but also on its price trends and economic growth 
rate relative to its competitors, each country has a different 
capacity for keeping its trade balance in equilibrium. 
This is apparent from the following model: 
Let 
X= (\.p r D>- where X volume of exports; 
p• export price charged in the 
internationally traded 
goods sector; p domestic price charged in 
the internationally traded 
goods sector ; 
e exhange rate; 
D world demand; 
a, A price and income elasti-
cities of exports 
and 
(a < 0, A ~ 0) 
M=(L )\µ where M volume of imports; 
e - P y national GDP ; 
p, µ price and income elasti-
cities of imports 
(P < O, µ > 0) 
The rate of cover (of imports by exports) in value terms is 
written: 
T = e PX 
p*M 
and, in trend terms, if we put a' = - a et P' - p, we get: 
t = - (a· + P' - 1 ) e + (a· + P' - I) (ft* - p) + (AD - µ Y) 
where • indicates the growth rates. 
The trend in the trade balance in value terms thus depends on the 
price elasticities ( a and P), the income elasticities (A et µ) , the 
price differentials (ft* - p), the exchange rate movements (e), 
and the comparative rates of economic growth (D et Y). In other 
words, it is determined both by factors linked to the structural 
characteristics of external trade (elasticities) and by economic 
performance (inflation and economic growth). 
We see that: 
(i) the higher the price elasticities, the more the trend in the 
trade balance depends on changes in relative prices or in the 
exchange rate; 
(ii) the lower the price elasticities or the smaller the inflation 
differential, the more the trend in the trade balance depends 
on income elasticities and economic growth. 
The impact of the income elasticities and economic growth is 
represented by the term (AD - µ Y). This can be rewritten to take 
account of the economic growth differential between the country 
in question and the rest of the world (d = Y - D).We then get 
AD - µ Y = (A - µ) Y - Ad, an expression indicating that: 
(i) assuming the national economy and the economies in the 
rest of the world are growing at the same rate and that the 
other factors influencing equilibrium in the trade balance 
(notably prices) are fixed , the trend in the trade balance 
depends on the difference between the income elasticity of 
exports and that of imports, which expresses the extent of 
the external constraint to which a country is subject ; 
(ii) the adverse impact of the income elasticities (A < µ)maybe 
offset by below-average growth in the national economy 
while a beneficial effect (A > µ) permits faster growth than 
in the rest of the world . The growth rate enabling the initial 
rate of cover to be maintained is given by Y = ~ D, A/µ, 
µ 
being another way of expressing the constraint imposed by 
the income elasticities. 
We can thus see that situations may differ considerably from one 
country to another depending on certain structural charac-
teristics (price elasticities and income elasticities vary between 
countries, certain economies have much higher rates of inflation 
than others, and certain economies enjoy faster growth rates) but 
also on the general direction of economic policy. For example, 
assuming that inflation rates and price or income elasticities are 
much the same between countries, a country may be able to 
achieve higher growth at the expense of some deterioration in its 
trade balance or some measure of currency depreciation or to 
accept a stronger currency at the expense of slower economic 
growth. 
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